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PROPER NAMES IN TRANSLATION: A CASE STUDY

Abstract: This study is an attempt at explaining the treatment of proper names in the Hungarian translation of Kurt Vonnegut's *Slaughterhouse Five*. The analysis is carried out in a relevance-theoretic framework, based on the assumption that translation is a special form of communication, aimed at establishing interpretive resemblance between the source text and the target text (cf. Sperber and Wilson 1986, and Gutt 1991). The findings seem to confirm the view that proper names behave in a predictable way in translation: the particular operations chosen to deal with them are, to a great extent, a function of the semantic contents they are loaded with in the given context.

1 Introduction

In an earlier paper (Vermes 1996) I found that the translation of proper names is not a simple process of *transference*, as some authors, for instance Vendler (1975) suggested on the assumption that proper names lack meaning. The fallacy of this view lies in the faulty nature of the background assumption: not *all* proper names are mere identifying labels – in fact, most of them turn out to carry meaning of one sort or another. Then, of course, we need to carefully consider the contextual implications of these meanings before we can decide how best to render the name in the target language (TL).

I offered three operations for this purpose: *transference*, *translation* and *modification*. Here, for reasons that I will explain in a moment, I want to refine this a little by distinguishing one further operation which was left implicit earlier as a subcase, partly, of translation and, partly, of modification: *substitution*. By this term I will refer to those cases when the source language (SL) name has a conventional correspondent in the TL, which replaces the SL item in the translation. As we will see, this is true of a large number of geographical names, for example. In this case the translator (in an ordinary translation situation) is more or less obliged to use this correspondent in the translation (Hungarian *Anglia* for English *England*).

This refinement of classification is made necessary, first of all, by an intuitive recognition of the fact that when there is a conventional correspondent available in the TL, this would seem to be the translator's first and natural choice: the one that comes to mind almost subconsciously. This does not mean that no other solution is ever possible, but any digression from the most obvious solution would need to be supported by serious reasons. In a relevance-theoretic framework we would say that a translation using a conventional correspondent is the one that requires the least processing effort and any digression, increasing the amount of processing effort, would need to be justified by a substantial gain in contextual effects.

Now which of these four operations the translator employs in a particular situation depends primarily on what meanings the proper name has in the given context and which of these meanings she thinks important to retain in the TL. (From now on, for the sake of simplicity, I will refer to the translator/communicator as *she* and to the audience as *he*.) One question we will have to examine, then, is what sort of meanings a proper name may have and how these meanings can be rendered in the translation.

Before we can do this, however, we will have to clarify what a proper name is. So far we have been content with an implicit understanding of the concept but a detailed characterisation of the problem will require that the definition is made more or less explicit.

One basic assumption that we shall draw on in this paper is that communication is an ostensive-inferential process, as explicated in Sperber and Wilson (1986). A brief outline of their *relevance theory* is presented in the next section and in the subsequent sections we shall carry out our analysis of the problem in this relevance-theoretic framework.

2 Relevance theory and translation

2.1 Relevance

The principal assumption of this study is that translation is a special form of communication and, as such, is not essentially different from any other communicative process. The theory of communication, *relevance theory* (see Sperber and Wilson 1986), that we are going to build on views communication as an *ostensive-inferential* process. Ostensive because in every act of communication the communicator makes it manifest to the audience that she wants to communicate something; and inferential because comprehension involves the audience in constructing a hypothesis about the communicator's intentions via spontaneous non-demonstrative inference.

The result of this non-demonstrative inferential process, the hypothesis, cannot be logically proved but can be confirmed.

When the communicator utters something, her utterance will be interpretable in a number of different ways; however, not all of these possible interpretations are equally accessible to the audience. In evaluating the various interpretations, the audience is aided by one general criterion which can eliminate all but a single possible interpretation: the criterion of *optimal relevance*. The audience can reasonably expect that the communicator's message will be relevant to him on the given occasion and, moreover, that it is formulated in such a way that will make it easy for him to come to the intended interpretation.

Wilson (1992) gives the following definition of optimal relevance: "An utterance, on a given interpretation, is optimally relevant if and only if: (a) it achieves enough effects to be worth the hearer's attention; (b) it puts the hearer to no unjustifiable effort in achieving those effects" (175).

This definition of relevance is built on the notions of *contextual effect* and *processing effort*. A contextual effect arises when, in the given context, the new information strengthens or replaces an existing assumption or when, combining with an assumption in the context, it results in a contextual implication. The effort needed to process the utterance is a function of the linguistic complexity of the utterance, the accessibility of the context and the inferential effort made in computing the contextual effects of the utterance in the given context (Wilson 1992: 174). In brief: the more contextual effects and the less processing effort, the more relevant the utterance is to the audience on the given occasion.

It follows, then, that a reasonable communicator will formulate her message in such a manner as to enable the audience to come to the desired interpretation in the most cost-effective way: that is, she will make sure that the first acceptable interpretation that occurs to the audience will be the one that she intended to communicate. What this means at the audience's end is that as soon as he has found the first interpretation that satisfies his expectations of relevance, he has found the one that a rational communicator can be reasonably believed to have intended. Eventually, the principle of optimal relevance entails that "all the hearer is entitled to impute as part of the intended interpretation is the *minimal* context and set of contextual effects that would be enough to make the utterance worth his attention" (Wilson 1992: 176).

According to Sperber and Wilson (1986), an utterance, or indeed any representation which has a propositional form, "can represent some state of affairs in virtue of its propositional form being true of that state of affairs," that is, *descriptively*; or "it can represent some other representation which

also has a propositional form – a thought, for instance – in virtue of a resemblance between the two propositional forms," that is, *interpretively* (228–9). Interpretive resemblance between propositional forms means that the two propositions share at least a subset of their analytic and contextual implications (their *explicatures* and *implicatures*) in the given context (Wilson and Sperber 1988: 138).

2.2 Translation as interpretive language use

If we want to take account of the fact that utterance meaning is not wholly propositional (see, for instance, Lyons 1995), this definition needs to be amended. Gutt (1991) extends the notion of interpretive resemblance to linguistic utterances. Since explicatures and implicatures are assumptions and the function of utterances is to convey assumptions that the communicator intends to convey, the definition can be generalised in the following way. Two utterances (or any two ostensive stimuli) "interpretively resemble one another to the extent that they share their explicatures and/or implicatures" (Gutt 1991: 44).

He then goes on to define translation as interpretive language use across languages. In interpretive language use in general, and in translation in particular, the principle of relevance entails a presumption of *optimal resemblance*: what is rendered by the communicator (translator) is (a) presumed to interpretively resemble the original and (b) the resemblance has to be consistent with the presumption of optimal relevance. Here we have a new notion of faithfulness in translation (or equivalence – although Gutt himself abstains from using this term), which will constrain the *what* and the *how* in translation: the translation should resemble the original in that it offers adequate contextual effects to the audience (comparable to those offered by the original); and it should be formulated in such a way that it yields the intended interpretation at a minimum processing cost (Gutt 1991: 101–2).

Since the notion of interpretive resemblance rests on the notion of optimal relevance, its fulfilment is heavily dependent on the similarity of the contexts available for the source and target language readers. The same (or, at least, similar) effects can be achieved in the translation with minimum processing effort only if the two contexts are not essentially different.

3 What is a proper name?

3.1 Definitions of proper name

Let us begin our search for a suitable elucidation of the term by quoting some definitions from various English and Hungarian grammar reference books.

"Proper nouns are basically *names*, by which we understand the designation of specific people, places and institutions [...]. Moreover, the concept of name extends to some markers of time and to seasons that are also festivals (Monday, March, Easter, Passover, Ramadan)" (Greenbaum and Quirk 1990: 86–7).

"A proper noun (sometimes called a 'proper name') is used for a particular person, place, thing or idea which is, or is imagined to be, unique" (Alexander 1988: 38).

"Nouns that are really names are called *proper nouns*. Proper nouns usually refer to a particular, named person or thing" (Hardie 1992: 122).

"[A tulajdonnevek] a sok hasonló közül csak egyet neveznek meg, és ezt az egyet megkülönböztetik a többi hasonlótól" ([Proper names] name one from among many of a similar kind and distinguish this from all the other similar ones) (Rácz and Takács 1987: 122). Later on they give the following types of proper names: personal names, animal names, geographical names, names of institutions and organisations, titles of pieces of art, periodicals and newspapers, and brand names. This list is probably not meant to be exhaustive – it is still interesting to note that while in the English-speaking tradition the concept is generally supposed to include the names of days, months, and seasons, it is not so in the Hungarian linguistic tradition.

There seem to be some inconsistencies between these definitions. First, they do not make clear the difference between a *proper noun* and a *proper name*. Proper nouns like *Michael* or *Exeter* are a subclass of the grammatical class of nouns, whereas proper names are simple or composite expressions formed with words from any of the traditional word classes. For instance, an adjective like *Fluffy* would make a good name for a dog, or a noun phrase like *The Green Dragon* might well be used for a pub.

Another question arises concerning the specificity, or uniqueness, of the entity that bears the name. What do we do with stock names like *Emma*? There may be thousands of people with this name at any particular time in history. For a solution, we have to clarify what it means that a name *refers* to an entity. The term *reference* is commonly taken to characterise the relationship between a variable in a propositional representation and the

value which is assigned to it on a particular occasion of use. Thus the referents of the name *Emma* on two different occasions of utterance may well be two different persons. Words, as such, "do not have reference, but may be used as referring expressions or, more commonly, as components of referring expressions in particular contexts of utterance" (Lyons 1995: 79). Reference as a variable, context-dependent relationship is to be differentiated from *denotation*, which is not utterance-dependent but invariant within the language system. Thus we find that while the denotation of an expression is part of the semantics of a language, reference belongs to the realm of pragmatics. A name, on a particular occasion, may refer to an entity without denoting it.

This is in correspondence with what Donellan (1975) writes about the attributive and referential *uses* of definite descriptions: "In the attributive use, the attributive of being the so-and-so is all important, while it is not in the referential use" (102). In effect, here he is making a distinction between describing something as such-and-such and referring to something by using a certain description, in the act of which "the speaker may say something true even though the description correctly applies to nothing" (Donellan 1975: 110). For example, we may successfully refer to somebody at a party as 'the man drinking Martini', even if the person in question is in fact drinking something else. The interesting thing, then, is that proper names and definite descriptions are not essentially different with respect to reference: both can be used to refer successfully without providing a truthful description (Donellan 1975: 113).

Probably the only difference between these two kinds of expression is that proper names are used primarily (though by no means necessarily) to refer, while other definite descriptions may just as often be used attributively, in Donellan's terms. However, a name can also be used attributively, perhaps less often but entirely legitimately. Consider the following example. 'That boy is a real Pele.' Here the name 'Pele' is used to *attribute* certain qualities to the referent of 'that boy', concerning his skills in football.

3.2 The meaning of a proper name

Now if a name can be used attributively, it certainly carries some meaning. The question is, what sort of meaning, or meanings, can it have? Lyons's (1995) view is that names have no descriptive content (denotation) but may have shared associations (connotations) (295). My position is that this view is too simplistic. It may be true with stock names but it is certainly insufficient, for instance, with names which are based on descriptions. This

seems to be supported by the fact that a descriptive name might be changed when the underlying description is no longer appropriate. Along these lines Lehrer (1992) argues that it is difficult to draw a dividing line between descriptive names and pure descriptions and, further, that most names provide some sort of information about the referent, that is, they may serve as the basis for making reasonable inferences about it (127).

In relevance theory, the meaning of a lexical item consists in a logical entry and an encyclopaedic entry. The three different types of information (lexical, logical and encyclopaedic) are stored in different places in memory. The logical entry contains a set of deductive rules making up, in Lyons's terms, the *intension* (logical properties) of the lexical item, while the encyclopaedic entry contains information about the *extension* of the item (the group of entities it stands for) in the form of assumptions about it (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 86). I take it that the encyclopaedic entry also contains information about shared associations.

The major difference between the logical and the encyclopaedic entries is that the former is finite and holds computational information, whereas the latter is open-ended and holds representational information. Sperber and Wilson suggest that when we process an assumption, the content is determined by the logical entries of the concepts it contains and the context in which it is processed is, at least partly, determined by the encyclopaedic entries of these concepts (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 91).

In this model, prototypical proper names (that is names without a descriptive content) are handled by associating with them empty logical entries. In other (less prototypical) cases a name may also have a logical entry (or, in the case of a composite name, it may include several logical entries which combine to make up the logical content of the name) which is partly or fully definitional (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 91–2). Thus names seem to be not essentially unlike any other kinds of expression in terms of the structure of their meaning. Rather, what we find here is a continuum of various sorts of proper names, ranging from the prototypical (with a primary referential function) to the non-prototypical (with a stressed attributive function), which are practically indistinguishable from other non-referring definite descriptions. The fact that I use the terms prototypical and non-prototypical, however, is not meant to imply that the so-called prototypical names are more frequent than non-prototypical ones.

3.3 Types of proper names

One further question that remains unclear from our initial definitions is what sort of entities may be referred to by a proper name. Here I see no

reason to exclude any possible class of referents, living or inanimate, concrete or abstract, real or imaginary. The point is that a name, in a given utterance and context, singles out one unique entity or one unique class of entities which is to bind the variable represented by the name in the propositional representation of the utterance. In theory, we may distinguish as many types of proper names as many classes of entities we can discern in the world. For instance, at first glance it may seem weird that computers should have names but in actual fact they do, since the dawn of computer networks. Thus, if we find it necessary for some reason, why not set up a separate category for the names of computers?

4 The hypothesis

It is expected that names with an empty logical entry (stock names like John, for instance) are normally simply transferred, unless the encyclopaedic entry contains some assumptions that may be needed as part of the context, in which case the name is likely to be modified, depending on the context and the available options.

Names with a filled-in logical entry would normally undergo translation, unless the encyclopaedic entry again contains some assumptions that may be needed as part of the context, which would make necessary the modification of the name in the TL.

The presence of an established conventional TL correspondent would seem to generally pre-empt any other option, requiring the substitution of this correspondent for the SL name but may be overridden by the other processes if the translator considers it inadequate in the given context.

5 Materials and method

In this study I used a recent British edition of Kurt Vonnegut's *Slaughterhouse Five* and a Hungarian translation by László Nemes (see *Primary sources*). First all the different proper names were looked up in the original text and matched with the corresponding expressions in the translation. For each name, only the first occurrence in the text was recorded.

The original names were then sorted out into four groups according to the operation the translator used in dealing with them. Four operations are distinguished: transference, substitution, translation and modification. By *transference* we shall mean the process of rendering the name in the TL in the original form. *Substitution* is replacing the SL name by a conventional TL correspondent. *Translation* means rendering the SL name, or at least part

of it, by a TL expression which gives rise to the same, or approximately the same analytic implications (explicatures) in the target text; *modification* consists in replacing the original name with a TL one which involves a substantial alteration in the translation of either the analytic or the contextual implications (implicatures) that the name effects. For further clarification the reader is referred to Vermees (1996).

Subsequently, the names in each group were assigned to various types. The types used are the following: names of persons; geographical names; names of institutions and organisations; titles of paintings, books, periodicals, newspapers, etc.; brand names; names of nationalities; names of events; names of periods of time; names of abstract ideas; names of animals; names of species; and the remaining few were collapsed under the heading other names. A full list is given in the Appendix, with the names presumably having an at least partially filled-in logical entry italicised.

The validity of the hypothesis was checked by examining under each operation the occurrences of names with or without a filled-in logical entry (Table 1).

Under each operation, the number of occurrences in each type was weighed against the total number of occurrences in the given type. This was done to find out whether there are characteristic differences in the treatment of the various types of proper names (Table 2).

Then the data were rearranged under each operation in descending order of the percentages within each type to check the extent to which the different operations apply to the various types (Table 3).

Finally, individual cases which seem in some sense exceptional were considered with respect to a relevance-theoretic model.

6 Results and discussion

6.1 Implications of the numerical results

The numerical findings are summed up in Table 1. The results seem to confirm the validity of our hypothesis: names with an empty logical entry are mainly transferred, while those with at least some logical content are to a great extent translated. The large number of substituted items in both groups should come as no surprise; it is simply due to the fact that several SL names have their established correspondents in the TL, any departure from which would result in an increase in the effort required to process the given utterance. According to the requirement of optimal relevance, this could only be done in special cases when the gains on the effects side would be greater than the losses on the efforts side.

LOGICAL ENTRY	TRANSFER	SUBST.	TRANSL.	MOD.	TOTAL
EMPTY	108	54	0	12	174
FILLED-IN	22	65	56	11	154

Table 1: Primary numerical findings

What needs some further consideration is, on the one hand, the relatively high number of transferred items in the group with filled-in logical entries and, on the other hand, the causes for the modification of 12 and 11 items in the two groups, respectively, since modification apparently does not depend solely on the presence or absence of a filled-in logical entry.

Among the 22 transferred cases in the second group we find 10 personal names. Of these, some (like *Stephen Crane*) belong to real persons and would not therefore be normally translated in the target culture (Hungarian). Among the others, belonging to fictitious persons, we can distinguish between those, like *Resi North*, that have no obvious connotations in the context of the story and those, like *Billy Pilgrim*, with rather obvious connotations evoked in the given context from the encyclopaedic entry of the expression. What seems surprising, then, is that the names in this latter subgroup are transferred and not translated (or modified), since these are telling names in the most apparent manner: *Billy Pilgrim* really *is* making a pilgrimage in the story through time and space, *Montana Wildhack* *is* a porno star, and *Roland Weary* really *is* a nuisance to everybody around him. The translator's decision not to translate these names can be explained in the following way. Vonnegut creates his unique artistic world by mixing real and imaginary events and persons. In the context of the story (in this particular fictitious world), however, all the persons are thought of as real. Therefore, translating a name like *Billy Pilgrim* as *Zarándok Billy*, for instance, would be inconsistent with the practice of transferring the great majority of the other personal names and would probably cause an unwarranted increase of processing effort that would not be justified by the achieved contextual effect, which is rendering more perspicuous by the name the role of the character in the story. We could argue in a similar way in the case of *Eliot Rosewater* and *Kilgore Trout*, adding that the possibility of a desired measure of contextual effects is lessened further by the fact that these characters play no significant role in the book. Moreover, they also appear in other novels by Kurt Vonnegut, in the Hungarian translations of which their names are transferred and thus translating them here would be inconsistent with the general translation practice in this extended fictitious

world, resulting in an additional increase of processing effort with readers who are familiar with it.

Thus the translator's decision seems to be justified here on two grounds. He avoids putting the TL reader to extra processing effort by being consistent both within the world of the given text and within a wider universe of discourse including this and related texts. This then goes to show that calculations of contextual effect and processing effort involve, apart from considerations of prevailing translation practices in the TL, not only textual but intertextual factors as well.

The other names in the second subgroup include some geographical, institutional and brand names, which are again normally either transferred or substituted in the general Hungarian practice. The two animal names, *Princess* and *Spot*, are probably not translated in order to avoid incongruity with a world predominantly containing English names in the Hungarian translation, which is all the more logical since the two dogs do not have any significant role to play in the story.

6.2 Discussion of modified items

Now let us turn our attention toward the modified items. 12 of them have an empty logical entry, 11 an at least partly filled-in one, which suggests that the translator's decision to modify the expressions could not be based on the presence or absence of some logical content alone. We find four personal names here. *Mutt* and *Jeff* are rendered in the TT as *Zoro* and *Huru*. The reason is obvious: in the SL *Mutt* and *Jeff* have in the encyclopaedic entry associated with them the assumption that they form a comic couple and since it is not present in the TL, the names had to be changed for ones that will carry a comparable assumption. A similar explanation would go for *Joe College*, rendered as *Tudósjános* (Scholarly John) and possibly for *Wild Bob*, rendered as *Félelmetes Bob* (Frightful Bob).

Of the two geographical names, *Stamboul* occurs in a small poem and is turned into *Törökhon* (Turkey) simply to make two lines rhyme. A similar example is the nationality expression *Polack*, which is explicated in the TL as *lengyel nő* (a Polish woman). It appears in the last line of a ditty, cited in the book, and is probably used instead of the literal translation *lengyel* purely because of reasons of rhyme and rhythm. The other geographical term, *Russia*, becomes *az orosz front* (the Russian front) in the translation, explicating in the logical entry what was part of the encyclopaedic entry of the original. Why this change had to take place is not entirely clear. On the one hand, the TL expression makes it explicit what was implicit as part of the context in the SL, thereby reducing the inferential effort required;

however, it does this at the cost of increasing the effort needed to process the linguistically more complex phrasal expression in the TL. Thus it would appear that what is gained at the one end is lost at the other. The only obvious justification for this move would be if it was difficult for a Hungarian reader to evoke from encyclopaedic memory, as part of the context, that Russia was one of the major scenes in the Second World War, which it is not. Eventually, we could resort for a possible explanation to the idea that translation is also to a large extent a matter of personal taste: when two alternatives seem to be identical in efficiency the translator will make the decision on the basis of her personal preferences.

Among the institutional names we see two different cases. In the one an acronym is turned into the full expression: *AP* becomes *Associated Press* in the TL, *UP* is changed into *United Press*, and the *Ilium Y.M.C.A.* into *iliumi Keresztény Ifjak Egyesülete*. The reason in all the three instances is the same: the acronym has no meaning whatsoever in the TL and would consequently make the processing unbearably costly if left unchanged. The explication in the third example is rather self-evident but how could the first two cases be justified? Probably the translator thought the full name is more likely to "ring the bell" in the TL reader than the acronym, that is, it would put the reader to less processing effort. However, there seems to be a better solution to this problem, which is applied in the following three examples: *Holiday Inn* is rendered as *Holiday Inn-szálló*, *Harvard* as *Harvard egyetem*, and *Holt, Reinhart and Wilson* as *Holt, Reinhart és Wilson kiadó*. Here, for reasons of cultural differences, the SL expression does not give rise to the same encyclopaedic assumptions in the TL as in the SL and therefore this part of the context needs to be explicated in the logical entry of the TL name. The procedure is similar to what happened to *Russia*, explained in the previous paragraph, the difference being that here the explications seem to be better motivated than in the *Russia*-example.

Exactly the same takes place in the case of the three brand names, the temporal expression *Gay Nineties*, in the case of *Georgian* and *Ferris wheel* in the other names group, and one of the titles, the *Ilium News Leader*. The other title, *Gideon Bible* is similar in that it contains encyclopaedic information not available in the TL, but here the explication of this content would have been very costly since it should have included an explanation of what the Gideon Society was and therefore the translator decided to cancel this part. This results in the loss of some encyclopaedic assumptions but, since these are not essential for processing the utterance in which the name occurs, this loss is not fatal and is completely justifiable.

We still have one nationality name to discuss and one in the other names group. *The British* is rendered in the translation as *angolok* (the English),

instead of the logically closer *britek*. Why? The reason is very simple: the word *brit* does not have wide currency in Hungarian, except in a historico-political context. By using this term the translator would have deviated from standard Hungarian usage, thereby increasing the processing cost of the utterance, which he wisely avoided, applying the admittedly less precise but more commonly used term *angol*. *The Febs* is the name of an amateur vocal quartet of men in the book and is turned into *a NŐK* (The WOMEN). It is difficult to see what encyclopaedic assumptions the translator sought to preserve here; the only one that seems apparent is that the name was meant to be jocular in some way.

In summary, the modification of an item is generally made necessary by the absence of some encyclopaedic assumptions in the TL which the name carries with it in the SL and the absence of which from the target text would result in the loss of some relevant contextual implications in the given context. We have also seen two exceptional cases where the modification takes place for prosodic reasons.

6.3 Frequency of use of the four operations with the various types of name

Finally we shall check out whether there are any characteristic differences in the frequencies of use of the four techniques with the various name types. The relevant numbers and percentages are given in Table 2.

TYPE NUMBER	TRANSFER NUMBER : %	SUBSTITUT. NUMBER : %	TRANSLAT. NUMBER : %	MODIFICAT. NUMBER : %
PERSONAL 97	71 : 73.2	19 : 19.6	3 : 3.1	4 : 4.1
GEOGR. 93	39 : 41.9	50 : 53.8	2 : 2.15	2 : 2.15
INSTITUTE 48	9 : 18.8	12 : 25	21 : 43.7	6 : 12.5
TITLE 31	2 : 6.45	8 : 25.8	19 : 61.3	2 : 6.45
BRAND 18	7 : 38.9	2 : 11.1	6 : 33.3	3 : 16.7
NATIONAL. 9	0 : 0	7 : 77.8	0 : 0	2 : 22.2
EVENT 8	0 : 0	7 : 87.5	1 : 12.5	0 : 0
TEMPORAL 7	0 : 0	6 : 85.7	0 : 0	1 : 14.3
OTHER 7	0 : 0	0 : 0	4 : 57.1	3 : 42.9
ABSTRACT 6	0 : 0	6 : 100	0 : 0	0 : 0
ANIMAL 2	2 : 100	0 : 0	0 : 0	0 : 0
SPECIES 2	0 : 0	2 : 100	0 : 0	0 : 0
TOTAL 328	130 : 39.6	119 : 36.3	56 : 17.1	23 : 7

Table 2. The data are arranged in descending order of the number of occurrences of the different types. This number is taken as 100% in each case; the percentages in each line under the various operations are relative to this.

We find that while, for instance, personal names are mostly transferred and geographical names characteristically substituted or transferred, institutional names are predominantly translated. These findings are easily explicable on the basis of what has been described above. The reason is that personal names in most cases lack any logical content and are therefore transferred, geographical names are either without an identifiable or relevant logical content and are transferred or have established translations in the TL and are thus substituted, whereas institutional names characteristically contain elements with some logical information relating to the function of the institution or organisation and are consequently translated. Titles are mostly translated, obviously, because a title is normally descriptive of its referent and must therefore carry logical information. Brand names are of two major types: either they are fanciful names with no relevant logical content or they are in some way descriptive of the product they stand for; in the former case they would be transferred, in the latter, translated. (We must note here, however, that in 'real life' this picture may be complicated by several other factors like assonance, cultural dominance, etc.) Nationalities have their established names in every culture, so these names are normally substituted. The same is true with major events, temporal units or festivals, abstract ideas and species. The other names group includes names of objects (*the Iron Maiden of Nuremburg*), a style (*Georgian*) and a vocal quartet (*The Febs*). They either contain some descriptive information in the logical entry, in which case they are translated or build on associated assumptions contained in the encyclopaedic entry, not present in the TL, in which case they get modified. The two animal names are transferred in this book because neither the logical nor the encyclopaedic entries contain any relevant information.

Table 3 shows the same data arranged under each operation in descending order of the percentages relating to the frequency of use of the operation with the given type of name. It must be noted that while the statistical data are characteristic of this particular translation, they may be substantially different with others, and our explanations of individual cases above hold only as far as they seem to be systematic and consistent throughout this translation.

TRANSFERENCE TYPE : %	SUBSTITUTION TYPE : %	TRANSLATION TYPE : %	MODIFICATION TYPE : %
ANIMAL : 100	ABSTRACT : 100	TITLE : 61.3	OTHER : 42.9
PERSONAL : 73.2	SPECIES : 100	OTHER : 57.1	NATIONAL. : 22.2
GEOGRAPH. : 41.9	EVENT : 87.5	INSTITUT. : 43.7	BRAND : 16.7
BRAND : 38.9	TEMPORAL : 85.7	BRAND : 33.3	TEMPORAL : 14.3
INSTITUT. : 18.8	NATIONAL. : 77.8	EVENT : 12.5	INSTITUT. : 12.5
TITLE : 6.45	GEOGRAPH. : 53.8	PERSONAL : 3.1	TITLE : 6.45
NATIONAL. : 0	INSTITUTION : 25	GEOGRAPH. : 2.15	GEOGRAPH. : 2.15
EVENT : 0	TITLE : 25.8	ANIMAL : 0	PERSONAL : 4.1
TEMPORAL : 0	PERSONAL : 19.6	NATIONAL. : 0	ANIMAL : 0
OTHER : 0	BRAND : 11.1	TEMPORAL : 0	EVENT : 0
ABSTRACT : 0	ANIMAL : 0	ABSTRACT : 0	ABSTRACT : 0
SPECIES : 0	OTHER : 0	SPECIES : 0	SPECIES : 0
TOTAL : 39.6	TOTAL : 36.3	TOTAL : 17.1	TOTAL : 7

Table 3. The data are presented in descending order of the percentages, taken from Table 2, under each operation.

7 Conclusions

One of the interesting results of this study is the confirmation of the fact that contrary to what Vendler said, namely that proper names do not require translation into another language (Vendler 1975: 117), they often do or, in several cases, they get modified. This is not surprising in view of our assumption that proper names have basically the same semantic structure as any other kinds of expression. Of course, much depends on what we regard as a proper name. In our understanding the category includes a wide range of expressions – in fact, the difficult thing would be to tell where the list of members in the class ends. At the one end of the scale we find the most prototypical names, proper nouns, which supposedly lack any logical content but may carry several assumptions in the encyclopaedic entry. At the other extreme we have composite names made up of words from any of the lexical and grammatical word classes: nouns, adjectives, adverbs, even verbs, prepositions, articles, auxiliaries, and so on. These names, which I call *phrasal names*, are no different in terms of logical content from any ordinary phrasal expression. What makes them names, eventually, is that they are *used* as such in the given context. It seems to me that a name is more of a pragmatic category than a semantic one.

As regards the choice of the appropriate operation in dealing with a particular name, several factors may contribute to the final decision. One, of course, is the semantic contents of the name. Our hypothesis appears to be

confirmed by the statistical results: names with an empty logical entry are mostly transferred, whereas those with an at least partly filled-in logical entry are largely translated – unless a conventional TL correspondent pre-empts these options or the encyclopaedic entry of the name contains some relevant assumptions which necessitate the modification of the name in the TL.

These findings are easily explained on the basis of our initial assumption that translation is a communicative process, governed by the principle of optimal resemblance. On this assumption, the choice of a particular translation operation in a given situation is made in line with the need to preserve, as far as possible, the range of contextual effects that the semantic contents of the name contribute to in the source text. Thus, when the logical entry contains information, it is preserved by applying the operation of translation proper; when the encyclopaedic entry contains relevant information, it can be preserved by modifying the name in the translation. On the other hand, the relatively large number of substituted cases is explicable by evoking the notion of processing effort: the use of a conventional correspondent is clearly the solution that requires the least amount of effort from the audience. Therefore, a reasonable translator will consider a different solution only when the gains in effects would probably outweigh the losses caused by the increase of processing effort.

Another factor in the decision to apply a particular operation, as we have seen in several examples, is the need to maintain consistency in the translation on three different planes: with prevailing practices (standard usage) in the TL, with characteristic solutions across texts and with solutions within the given text. This train of thought, again, leads us straight to considerations of the balance between contextual effects and processing effort.

In summary, we have found that the pragmatic theory we have chosen to couch our examinations in, relevance theory, appears adequate for our purposes: it has enabled us to explain in lucid terms how and, partly, why the particular operations were applied in particular cases.

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