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Contents

The Notion of the "Sublime" in Contemporary English, French and Hungarian Literary Criticism

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1 Postmodern Approach

Scholars have become more interested than ever in the old, aesthetic category of the sublime in the past decade or so. Postmodern thinkers have recognized the problem concerning it, one they have been dealing with for a long time: the question of unspeakable expressions coming from its very essence. Jean-François Lyotard has written several works about these investigations. He says in his study, *Le sublime et l'avant-garde:* "Le mot *sublime* est aujourd'hui d'un usage courant en français populaire pour signifier ce qui provoque l'étonnement (à peu près le *great* américain) et l'admiration. Mais l'idée qu'il connote appartient aussi à la réflexion la plus rigoureuse sur l'art depuis au moins deux siècles. Newman [viz. Barnett Baruch Newman, painter] n'ignore pas l'enjeu esthétique et philosophique auquel le mot *sublime* est attaché. [...] Quand donc il recherche la sublimité dans l'ici et le maintenant, Newman rompt avec l'éloquence de l'art romantique, mais il n'en rejette pas la tâche fondamentale, qui est que l'expression picturale ou autre soit le témoin de l'inexprimable. L'inexprimable ne réside pas en un là-bas, un autre monde, un autre temps, mais en ceci: qu'il arrive (quelqu e chose)."[1]

This question is closely related to the most recent interest towards the philosophy of Kant. Without mention of other traits of the Kant-renaissance, it is enough to refer to various motifs related to the category of the sublime. It is the *analysis of the sublime* in *Critic of Judgement* that becomes the main starting point of new thinkers, but their interpretations often seem reinterpretations as is pointed out by Jörg Zimmermann[2] and Miklós Almási.[3] Le sentiment du sublime, dit Lyotard, "un plaisir mêlé de

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[1] Jean-François Lyotard, "Le sublime et l'avant-garde," in *L'inhumain*, Paris, 1988, 104; cf. "L'instant, Newman," in op. cit., 89–99; Bertalan Pethő, *Postmodern*, Budapest, 1992, 108–114.

[2] "A fenséges képei," (Pictures of the Sublime) in *Enigma* Nos. 11–12, 33–49.

[3] "Egy fogalom rekonstrukciója," (The reconstruction of a notion) in *Holmi* 1992, September, 1259–1263.

peine, un plaisir qui vient de la peine. A l'occasion d'un objet grand, le désert, une montagne, une pyramide, ou très puissant, une tempête sur l'océan, l'éruption d'un volcan, s'éveille l'idée d'un absolu, qui ne peut qu'être pensée et doit rester sans intuition sensible, comme une Idée de la raison. La faculté de présentation, l'imagination, échoue à fournir une représentation convenable de cette Idée. [...] Ce déréglage des facultés entre elles donne lieu à l'extrême tension (l'agitation, dit [Kant]) qui caractérise la pathos du sublime à la différence du calme sentiment du beau."[4] As we know, the problem of expression and representation is not a crucial element of the intellectual world of Kant. Lyotard's idea that "L'avant-gardisme est ainsi en germe dans l'esthetique kantienne de sublime"[5], therefore, can be considered strong extrapolation.

Scholars' postmodern interest in the notion of the sublime has enduced big development in typical historical research as well: several papers and volumes of essays were published under this subject matter: studies on the relationship between the sublime and painting were published in *New Literary History* (1985); the temporal dimensions of the concept were focussed on in *Revue d'Histoire Litteraire de la France* in 1986 from antique writers to the XXth century; while *Merkur* highlighted the sublime and modernity, the sublime and politics in 1989. A special 1995 issue of *Enigma* dealt with the notion of the sublime publishing relevant papers by Lyotard and Marc Richir in Hungarian for the first time.

2   Period or Discourse?

Basic critical works dealing with the XVII–XVIIIth century history of the sublime, such as monographs by Samuel Holt Monk[6] and Théodore A. Litman[7] aimed at analysing periods of the development of the concept. On the other hand, the recent English and French literature I know mostly agrees on describing various discourses of the sublime while accepting the existence of historical metamorphoses. This is due to the fact that the concept is regarded to have uncertain outlines, ones

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[4] "Le sublime et l'avant-garde," in op. cit., 109–110; cf. "Après le sublime, état de l'esthétique," in op. cit., 147–155; Bertalan Pethő, *Postmodern*, Budapest, 1992, 106–108, 291–296, 296–298.

[5] "Le sublime et l'avant-garde," in op. cit., 110.

[6] *The Sublime. A Study of Critical Theories in XVIII-century England*, The University of Michigan Press, 1960.

[7] *Le sublime en France (1660–1714)*, Paris, 1971.

which cannot be interpreted in the homogenous medium of the history of aesthetics only. The independent discipline of aesthetics had not existed before the second half of the XVIIIth century, so meditation of this kind quite naturally came about in rhetorical, philosophical, political and other contexts.

It is clearly pointed out in the introduction of a monograph by Samuel Holt Monk: "To reduce to any sort of order the extremely diverse and individualistic theories of sublimity that one finds in the eighteenth century is not easy."[8] After outlining the nature of difficulty arising, however, he describes his impressive sketch of evolution: "I have therefore grouped the theories together loosely under very general headings in an effort to indicate that there is a progress, slow and continuous, but that this progress is one of organic growth. Ideas in individual treatises often advance it imperceptibly. The direction of this growth is toward the subjectivism of Kant. Based at first on the rhetorical treatise of Longinus as interpreted by Boileau, the sublime slowly develops at the hands of such writers as Dennis, Addison, Baillie, Hume, Burke, Kames, Reid, and Alison into a subjective or semi-subjective concept."[9] Thus the pillars of development are the discovery of Longinos by Boileau in the second half of the XVIIth century, a treatise by Edmund Burke in the middle of the XVIIIth century and the critical theory by Kant towards the end of the century. These pillars are so much highlighted that the "story" of the sublime is often reduced to them, which can be observed in two French encyclopedias as well published in 1997.[10] Further simplification is achieved by the fact that Kant is introduced through his interpretation of the notion of the sublime in *Critique of Judgement,* while his earlier work, the *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime* [*Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen* (Königsberg 1764)] substantially differs from his later work, as was pointed out by Paul Crowther.[11]

As far as the story of evolution written by Samuel Monk is concerned Peter de Bolla thinks "that mid-eighteenth-century accounts

[8] Op. cit., 3.
[9] Op. cit., 4.
[10] *Dictionnaire européenne des Lumières,* publié sous la direction de Michel Delon, Paris, 1997, 1013–1016 (William Hauptman); *Dictionnaire des Genres et notions littéraires,* ed. Alain Michel, Paris, 1997, 757–770 (Baldine Saint Girons).
[11] *The Kantian Sublime. From Morality to Art,* Oxford, 1989, 8–15.

of the sublime do not assume a unified subject: they resist such a concept".[12] Thus he considers the conceptual boundaries of the notion of the sublime extremely uncertain, whereby he finds another approach: "the autonomous subject, a conteptualization of human subjectivity based on the self-determination of the subject and the perception of the uniqueness of every individual, is the product of a set of discourses present to the period 1756–63, the period of the Seven Years War."[13] He calls this group of discourses "discoursive network", and treats sublime as a part of this interpreting it as two kinds of discourse. "I have used a distinction between two kinds of discourse: the first, a discourse on something, is to be taken as a discrete discourse, a discourse which is to be read in a highly specific way, within a very well defined context. [...] This discourse on something is to be distinguished from a discourse of something. [...] the discourse of something may well subsume a large number of discrete discourses."[14] Thus the notion of the sublime may lose its unifying capability whereby it becomes possible for the extremely rich context to be comprehended.

The uncertain outlines of the sublime are reflected by the division of the reader containing essays which was edited by Peter de Bolla and Andrew Ashfield.[15] After the introduction of the Longinian tradition at the beginning of the XVIIIth century passages entitled *Rhapsody to Rhetoric* were selected from the whole century which were only very loosely joined. The most common feature shared by them seems the moral-philosophical question and search for ways of expression. The part cited from Samuel Johnson's dictionary is illuminating in terms of the immanent divergence of the concept as it describes 14 meanings within the 6 word class variants of the sublime. The lack of unified classification comes from the very concept of the notion of the sublime as it cannot be treated as a unified discourse.

Similar ideas can be observed in Pierre Hartmann's approach as well: "nous avons vu se déployer quatre types de discours assez nettement différenciés pour qu'il paraisse possible de les identifier et de les nommer. Ce furent, respectivement, les discours poétiques, esthétiques,

[12] *The Discourse of the Sublime*, Oxford, 1989, 293.

[13] Op. cit., 6.

[14] Op. cit., 9–10.

[15] *The Sublime: A Reader in British Eighteenth-Century Aesthetic Theory*, Cambridge University Press, 1996.

philosophique et dramatique. Ces discours, nous avons tenté de les
analyser comme autant d'entités perméables sans doute l'une à l'autre,
mais néanmoins closes sur elle-même et investies d'une cohérence que
nous nous sommes attaché à mettre en relief."[16] Dominique Peyrache-
Leborgne achieves the same result on her own when she says:
"Débordant les textes théoriques sur l'art pour informer des poétiques et
des mythologies personelles, le sublime fonctionne, nous semble-t-il, à
trois niveaux: il relève d'une métaphysique et d'une philosophie de l'art; il
peut être un code implicite, un axe thématique ou idéologique propre à
un univers imaginaire; il participe enfin à l'histoire des idées."[17] The
notion of the sublime is divided in the various discourses, and it unites
elements of the various discourses from another point of view. It is
associated with other theories in the history of aesthetics: the notion of
the sublime inevitably arises during the analysis of the notion of genius,
creative imagination, originality etc. as can be observed in works by
Roland Mortier, James Engell, Georges Gusdorf, Michel Delon and
others.[18] Summerizing monographs by René Wellek, Meyer Howard
Abrams and Jacques Chouillet treat it in the very same context.[19]

3 National Variants and Ranges of Interpretation

The works mentioned above can be divided into two markedly distinct
groups by reason of the fact that they approach the period analysed (the
second half of the XVIIIth century) from the point of view of
romanticism (perhaps preromanticism) or classicism (neoclassicism). I
cannot touch upon the problem of this conceptual dichotomy and
interpretation of literary period, which is generally represented by the
differences in the traditions of interpretation in France and England as

[16] *Du Sublime (De Boileau à Schiller)*, Strasbourg, 1997, 165.
[17] *La poétique du sublime de la fin des Lumières au romantisme*, Paris, 1997, 14.
[18] Roland Mortier, *L'originalité: Une nouvelle catégorie esthétique au siècle des Lumières*, Genève, 1982; James Engell, *The Creative Imagination. Enlightenment to Romanticism*, Harvard University Press, 1981; Georges Gusdorf, *Fondements du savoir romantique*, Paris, 1982; Michel Delon, *L'idée d'énergie au tournant des Lumières (1770–1820)*, Paris, 1988.
[19] René Wellek, *A History of Modern Criticism: 1750–1950 I. The Later Eighteenth Century*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955; Meyer Howard Abrams, *The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition*, Oxford, 1953; Jacques Chouillet, *L'Esthétique des Lumières*, Paris, 1974.

well as in Italy and Germany. I would only like to point out the contact points of this dichotomy with the notion of the sublime.

The notion of the sublime breaks away from rhetoric in the second half of the XVIIth century as is pointed out in terms of the French literature by Théodore A. Litman. Its interpretation had been worked out by the middle of the XVIIIth century (let us think of Burke), which is closely related to the contemporary emotionalist tendencies: this is exactly why the sublime is judged to belong to romanticism (preromanticism). The link between the sublime and emotionalism, however, is so tight that the notion seems closed in other directions. German art theory thinkers also striving to grasp at the notion of the sublime such as Winckelmann and his followers introduced the notions of grace, reinterpreted beauty and harmony, and perfection. Traditions of art criticism analysing this direction elaborated the theory of neoclassicism. Let us not forget, however, that this means interpreting the sublime too, but it is different from its emotionalist variant.

By virtue of what has been said it is no wonder that Winckelmann's name cannot be found in Samuel Monk's excellent book, and that Peter de Bolla[20] criticising Monk for disregarding the differences between English and German traditions does not put down his name either, though it is him who analyses the 1750s and 1760s (while focussing on English literature though). The notion of the sublime does not occur in monographies by Abrams and Wellek in connection with what might be identified as efforts by Winckelmann, and Abrams does not even mention it. It is only in a monograph by Dominique Peyrache-Leborgne from the works on the sublime (the ones that I know of) that I found reference to another interpretation of the sublime, and even she mentions Winckelman as opposed to Diderot: "C'est «la belle nature» et «certain beautés idéales de cette nature» qui constituent pour lui le support du sublime. [...] le terme «sublime» («erhaben») relève d'une conception platonicienne de «la beauté comme Idée», mais incarnée dans la forme; il est surtout un équivalent de la perfection, une représentation finie de l'infini. [...] Avec Winckelmann, le sublime se trouve donc dans l'ouvre d'art définie comme «totalité autosuffisante», intérieurement cohérente, «sans autre fin qu'elle-même»".[21]

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[20] Op. cit., 293.
[21] Op. cit., 125–126.

Emotionalist sublime (*sublime* par excellence) is called romantic in the range of interpretation. Neoclassicism, however, is characterized by the *sublime* (used in another sense), that is the word qualified becomes attributive, there being no other free place for it. It is used in basic monographs by Mario Praz and Hugh Honour as well.[22] Roland Mortier,[23] Jacques Chouillet[24] and Binni Walter[25] equally reflect on the emotionalist and neoclassicist variants of the sublime emphasizing the close relations between them. György Mihály Vajda points out the parallels between these variants of the sublime too in a great essay written in French,[26] which is the first element in analysing interpretations of the notion of the sublime in Hungarian literature.

4 Interpretations in Hungarian Literary History

It is the approach mentioned above that is the most elaborated in the Hungarian literature, following the basic study of József Szauder.[27] The interpretation of the sublime included in the notion of neoclassicism, and the introduction of the emotional and perfectionist sublime as a complementary phenomenon become widely known primarily owing to Péter Sárközy and József Pál applying the results of Italian literary criticism, and mainly Walter Binni.[28] At the same time, their analyses highlight the

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[22] Mario Praz, *Gusto neoclassico*, Firenze, 1940 (in English: *On Neoclassicism*, translated by Angus Davidson, London 1969); Hugh Honour, *Neo-classicism*, Penguin Books, 1968 (in Hungarian: *Klasszicizmus*, translated by Szabolcs Várady, Budapest, 1991).

[23] "'Sensibilité,' 'Néo-classique' ou 'Préromantisme,'" in *Le Préromantisme*, Actes du Colloque de Clermont-Ferrand, Paris, 1975, 310–318.

[24] Op. cit. 186–216; cf. Imre Vörös, "Neoklasszicizmus és forradalom – Marie-Joseph Chénier munkásságának tükrében," (Neoclassicism and Revolution–in the ouvre of Marie-Joseph Chénier) in *Folytonosság vagy fordulat?* (Continuity or turning-point?) ed. Attila Debreczeni, Debrecen, 1996, 163–164.

[25] *Classicismo e neoclassicismo nella letteratura del Settecento*, Firenze, 1963; cf. József Pál, *A neoklasszicizmus poétikája*, (The poetic of Neoclassicism) Budapest, 1988, 17–23 and Péter Sárközy, *Petrarcától Ossziánig* (From Petrarca to Ossian) Budapest, 1988, 100–124.

[26] "La dimension esthétique de la poésie," in *Le tournant du siècle des Lumières 1760–1820*, ed. György Mihály Vajda, Budapest, 1982, 155–212.

[27] "A klasszicizmus kérdései és a klasszicizmus a felvilágosodás magyar irodalmában," (The Problems of Classicism and the Classicism in the Hungarian Enlightenment Literature) in *Az Estve és Az Álom*, (The Evening and The Sleep) Budapest, 1970, 92–122.

[28] See note 25.

notion of *grace,* which, when regarded as related to *the beautiful* and *the sublime,* offers us to grasp the neoclassicist notion of the sublime in a more plastic way (and to name it too).

The notions *sublime* and *grace* interpreted in terms of neoclassicism was primarily applied in literary history while analysing the life-work of Ferenc Kazinczy. It was László Gergye, who observed the myth of grace from the 1780s till the end of his career,[29] while Lajos Csetri revealed the depths of contexts of "higher style" playing a crucial role in the formation of Kazinczy's stylistic endeavours.[30] What is very significant in its interpretation is that the system of comparison of "higher style" could be found in the highly rhetoric literary consciousness of contemporary Hungary, and it was not the aesthetic contexts of the sublime themselves which had been thoroughly elaborated in Europe that were applied.[31]

The notion of the sublime arose theoretically not only with Kazinczy but with Csokonai and Berzsnyi as well, the former in a study by József Szauder,[32] while the latter in that of Lajos Csetri,[33] related to the concept of neoclassicism in both cases. Furthermore, works dating back to earlier times rather highlight the emotionalist *sublime* interpretation. Andor Tarnai[34] analysed the debate on Milton between Batsányi and József Rajnis at the end of the 1780s, Márta Mezei gave an overview of theoretical works on the sublime by János Batsányi, János Földi and József Péczeli.[35]

This is all the material available at present. Other philosophical and aesthetical works can be mentioned as well (like books by Ágnes Heller and Éva Kocziszky,[36] a study by Zsolt Pálfalusi,[37] etc.) but they naturally do not enforce the aspects of literary history. No book has been written

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[29] *Múzsák és Gráciák között,* (Between Muses and Graces) Budapest, 1998.

[30] *Egység vagy különbözőség?* (Unity or Diversity?) Budapest, 1990.

[31] Op. cit., 55–56.

[32] "Csokonai poétikájához," (The Poetic of Csokonai) in *Az éj és a csillagok,* (The Night and the Stars) Budapest, 1980, 339–367.

[33] *Nem sokaság hanem lélek,* (Not Crowd but Soul) Budapest, 1986, 24–42.

[34] "A deákos klasszicizmus és a Milton-vita," (Latinistic Classicism and the Milton-debate) in *Irodalomtörténeti Közlemények* 1959, 67–83.

[35] *Felvilágosodás kori líránk Csokonai előtt,* (Hungarian Enlightenment Poetry before Csokonai) Budapest, 1974, 18–19, 47–50.

[36] Ágnes Heller, *A szép fogalma,* (The notion of the Beauty) Budapest 1998; Éva Kocziszky, *Pán, a gondolkodók istene,* (Pan, the God of the Philosophers) Budapest, 1998.

[37] "A fenséges és fölényes," (The Sublime and the Supercilious) in *Enigma* 1995, No. 2, 90–106.

on the theme being described, and there has not even been an essay written on it. On the other hand several papers have been published in the English and French literature recently, not to speak of works each focussing on one writer (e.g. Angela Leighton's Shelley or Theresa M. Kelley', David B. Pirie' and Richard G. Swartz' Wordsworth[38]). The approaches are rather varied in terms of basic issues as well. What can be learnt from this account? How can the notion of the sublime be applied when analysing the Hungarian literary approaches of XVIIIth century?

5   Conclusions

a. The notion of the sublime is not a unified concept and it cannot be understood by depicting an autonomous history of evolution. Its elements are embedded in discourses of different kinds, which means from another aspect that the discourse of the sublime unites in itself all the elements of the various discourses.

b. Its variants can be distinguished on the basis of various aspects of equal ranks which are in an interactive relationship with each other too. In terms of time (e.g. Boileau, Burke, Kant); as national variants (French, English, Irish, Scottish, German and Italian); thematically (natural, religious, literary, fine art); as variants of an epoch (attitudes of Burke, Gerard, Blair, Diderot and Winckelmann were formed in the 1750s, 1760s).

c. Emotionalist and neoclassicist interpretations of the sublime can be very closely related to each other. The introduction of the notion of *grace* is very promising in the case of the latter.

d. The sublime, as an aesthetic category and stylistic approach can be interpreted even when compared to rhetoric attitude, which was especially significant under still unformed conditions of Hungarian literary criticism at the end of the XVIIIth century.

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[38] Angela Leighton, *Shelley and the Sublime*, Cambridge University Press, 1984; Theresa M. Kelley, *Wordsworth's Revisionary Aesthetics*, Cambridge University Press, 1988; David B. Pirie, *William Wordsworth: The Poetry of Grandeur and of Tenderness*, London and New York, 1982; Richard G. Swartz, *Wordsworth and the Political Sublime*, San Diego, 1986.

e. The sublime is the aesthetic discourse of sensibility.[39] It was the carrier of attitudes and programmes in the Hungarian literature of the XVIIIth century, which significantly influenced processes of literary revival.

(Trans. Gyula Dávid)

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[39] Cf. Attila Debreczeni, "'Érzékenység' és 'érzékeny irodalom,'" ("Sensibility" and "sensible literature") in *Irodalomtörténet* 1999, 12–29.

An Outline of the Relationship Between Romanticism and Contemporary Irish Poetry

Péter Dolmányos

Continuities between Romanticism and contemporary poetry are multi - farious. In the Irish context there is almost a straight line connecting Romanticism with the contemporary scene. The Literary Revival was governed by a Romantic aesthetic, its yearning for the unspoilt Irish landscape and its mythologising of the peasant and the rural are ample proofs of this. Turbulent times facilitate the politicisation of poetry—the Revival is an obvious example of this. The specific cultural and political context of contemporary Northern Ireland has driven critics as well as readers to press poets for a public statement rooted in private exp eri- ence,[1] perhaps not without an eye on Shelley's idea about the role of poets in relation to their communities. On the technical level this in - volves the device of the autobiographical persona, which is a frequent element of contemporary poetry inherited from the Romantics.

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Seamus Heaney begins his essay 'Feeling into Words' with a quotation from *The Prelude,* the part about Wordsworth's 'hiding places':

> The hiding places of my power
> Seem open; I approach and then they close;
> I see by glimpses now; when age comes on,
> May scarcely see at all, and I would give,
> While yet we may, as far as words can give,
> A substance and a life to what I feel:
> I would enshrine the spirit of the past
> For future restoration.

The short explanation for the quotation is as follows:

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[1] Cf. Wills, C. *Improprieties. Politics and Sexuality in Northern Irish Poetry.* Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993.

> Implicit in those lines is a view of poetry which I think is
> implicit in the few poems I have written that give me any
> right to speak: poetry as divination, poetry as revelation of
> the self to the self, as restoration of the culture to itself;
> poems as elements of continuity, with the aura and authen-
> ticity of archaeological finds, where the buried shard has an
> importance that is not diminished by the importance of the
> buried city; poetry as a dig, a dig for finds that end up being ·
> plants.[2]

This is a passage at once modest and ambitious: modest in referring
to those 'few poems' of his and ambitious in establishing a kinship be-
tween his poetry and that of Wordsworth. The sentence is a rhetorical
victory in its meandering structure and also in its manipulations of
bringing to light Heaney's own (in a positive sense) obsession with the
physical and metaphorical acts of uncovering, or as he calls them,
'digging.' As far as actual physical uncovering is concerned, Wordsworth
is perhaps not the archetypal digger but his 'spots of time' render him as
an important precedent to the kind of poetry defined above.

The idea of 'revelation of the self to the self' is a point of crucial sig-
nificance: it defines an essential moment of the Romantic tradition and it
establishes a link between the contemporary scene and the Romantic pe-
riod. There is an emphasis on the self, in fact a double emphasis as the
'self' is both the direct and indirect object of the clause, which is one of
the cornerstones of Romanticism. The overtones of the word 'revelation'
suggest something of the religious or quasi-religious nature of the poetic
act. If poems are considered as 'elements of continuity' that may echo
the idea that the language of poetry has preserved something of the
original relationship between language and reality; this may be yet an-
other point where Romantic and contemporary are linked.

Heaney's affinities with Wordsworth have been noted by various
critics; it is especially his first two volumes, *Death of a Naturalist* and *Door
into the Dark*, whose poems are noted for their allegiance to Words-

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[2] Heaney, S. "Feeling into Words." In: *Preoccupations. Selected Prose 1968–1978.* New
York, The Noonday Press, 1980, p. 41. The essay is the script of a lecture given at the
Royal Society of Literature, October 1974.

worth.[3] The closing poem in *Death of a Naturalist*, 'Personal Helicon' could stand as an illustration for some of the points of this kinship.

> As a child, they could not keep me from wells
> And old pumps with buckets and windlasses.
> I loved the dark drop, the trapped sky, the smells
> Of waterweed, fungus and dank moss.
>
> One, in a brickyard, with a rotted top.
> I savoured the rich crash when a bucket
> Plummeted down at the end of a rope.
> So deep you saw no reflection in it.
>
> A shallow one under a dry stone ditch
> Fructified like any aquarium.
> When you dragged out long roots from the soft mulch
> A white face hovered over the bottom.
>
> Others had echoes, gave back your own call
> With a clean new music in it. And one
> Was scaresome for there, out of ferns and tall
> Foxgloves, a rat slapped across my reflection.
>
> Now, to pry into roots, to finger slime,
> To stare, big-eyed Narcissus, into some spring
> Is beneath all adult dignity. I rhyme
> To see myself, to set the darkness echoing.[4]

The poem is a tracing of the history of the drive of self-exploration: the early interest of the child in wells and pumps is not only for their own sake. The major importance these objects bear is the fact that they keep water in their depth—and, beside of its usual association with life, the water functions like a mirror in them; yet it is a curiously artistic mirror reflecting more than sights. The 'trapped sky' is an actual image of reflection as well as an arrested moment, a potent symbol for the powers of poetry, to be discovered later, both in life and in the poem itself.

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[3] Corcoran, N. *A Student's Guide to Seamus Heaney.* London, Faber, 1986. Also: Parker, M. *Seamus Heaney: The Making of the Poet.* London: Macmillan, 1993.
    [4] Heaney, S. *New Selected Poems 1966–1987.* London: Faber, 1990, p. 9.

Heaney uses all but one sensory fields (it is only taste that is missing)—and there is an interesting relationship between hearing and seeing, senses preferred by Wordsworth as well. The wells and pumps offer primarily sounds but time after time he balances these sounds with sights. The 'dark drop' is followed and balanced by the 'trapped sky', the 'rich crash' is paired by the reflection (though in the second stanza it is 'no reflection'), the echoes of the fourth stanza add a 'clean new music' to the original voice and the rat crosses his reflection. The most captivating instance of this balance comes at the end of the poem: 'I rhyme / To see myself, to set the darkness echoing'—the voice creates vision as well as echo.

Heaney's descriptive details are exact, which is another instance of Wordsworthian influence. The external phenomena are introduced from the point of view of their significance for the observer, focusing the emphasis on the imagination rather than on the phenomena themselves. The resolution at the end is at once a rejection of the 'old' way of looking at the world and the assertion of a higher level of consciousness through poetry.

From among other elements of affinity between the two poets their childhood influences are of great significance. The rural background of their childhood has a formative influence for both of them, the natural scenery provides an important stimulus for their poetry. Just as The Prelude contains episodes of careless happiness as well as of threatening moments, Heaney's account of his relationship with his childhood environment includes a variety of episodes covering a similar range of experience.

Politics is yet another issue which may connect the two poets. Wordsworth was deeply affected by the French Revolution, deeply enthusiastic at first, even more deeply disappointed later. His disappointment kept forcing him to find redemption in poetry by an attempt to integrate the experience in his world view.[5] Similarly, the Ulster Troubles are a haunting political presence in Heaney's poetry—his bog poems show the attempt of finding a mythic framework for the interpretation of the violence—and his painful recognition of the futility of any such at-

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[5] Cf. Wiley, B. *The Eighteenth-century Background. Studies on the Idea of Nature in the Thought of the Period.* London: Chatto and Windus, 1946, Chapter XII. Nature in Wordsworth, pp. 253–293.

tempt. Wordsworth instinctively, and before the time of its explicit definition, embodied the role of one of the 'unacknowledged legislators of the world', whereas Heaney was forced to take the position as the Northern Irish poet cannot escape the obligation of being a spokesman for the community.

*

The autobiographical persona is one of Wordsworth's major innovations: 'Tintern Abbey' and later *The Prelude* are unprecedented in their preliminary supposition that autobiography may sustain major poetry. This is especially revolutionary in the case *of The Prelude:* any earlier attempts at poems of similar length took some myth as a framework—Wordsworth was brave enough to build his monument on the foundation of his own experience. The personal universe of the poet as the essential scope of experience gained prominence in the 20th century. Contemporary Irish poetry abounds in pieces explicitly growing out of personal experience, featuring a persona who is easily identified as the poet.

There is an important relationship between the persona and the poetic voice. In Heaney's view the poetic voice is always connected with the poet's natural voice—this implies the formative influence of the tradition of the autobiographical persona. The personas of Heaney and of Derek Mahon are mainly such ones; Heaney started his poetic career exploiting his early experience as a child on a County Derry farm (the poems in *Death of a Naturalist*), whereas Mahon's experience of being displaced and alienated even from his own background animates his speakers. In one extreme case he reports his own homecoming in the third person singular, as an outsider ('Homecoming').

The autobiographical experience, however, is often turned into something symbolic in poetry; as Edna Longley puts it, poetry 'transmutes the autobiographical into the symbolic.'[6] Romanticism is once again a beginning for an important element of modern literary works through another 'innovation', the capturing of the epiphanic moment which enables us to 'see into the life of things.' This vision or as Frank Kermode labels it, the Romantic Image,[7] has had a long history ever

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[6] Longley, E. *The Living Stream.* Newcastle: Bloodaxe, 1994, p. 154.
[7] Cf. Kermode, F. *Romantic Image.* 1957. (London: Ark Paperbacks, 1986).

since—it has lived through various incarnations referred to by numerous terms but it has been essentially the same phenomenon.

The vision is one of the cornerstones of Modernist poetry and it has survived into the contemporary scene as well, though perhaps on a more modest scale. Heaney's 'Bogland' is a poem of such an epiphanic moment—Heaney sets out to find the Irish myth, a sister to the American one of the frontier, and the finding ends up as a plant: it grows by its own rules.

> We have no prairies
> To slice a big sun at evening –
> Everywhere the eye concedes
> To encroaching horizon,
>
> Is wooed into the cyclops' eye
> Of a tarn. Our unfenced country
> Is bog that keeps crusting
> Between the sights of the sun.
>
> They've taken the skeleton
> Of the Great Irish Elk
> Out of the peat, set it up
> An astounding crate full of air.
>
> Butter sunk under
> More than a hundred years
> Was recovered salty and white.
> The ground itself is kind, black butter
>
> Melting and opening underfoot,
> Missing its last definition
> By millions of years.
> They'll never dig coal here,
>
> Only the waterlogged trunks
> Of great firs, soft as pulp.
> Our pioneers keep striking
> Inwards and downwards,

> Every layer they strip
> Seems camped on before.
> The bogholes might be Atlantic seepage.
> The wet centre is bottomless.[8]

The poem almost writes itself, as image yields image through associations. The last line of the poem, 'The wet centre is bottomless', is the culminating point: this is the epiphanic moment when the poem opens up to include the endless vertical dimension which, as it is also geology, is the past at the same time—the depth brings together space and time in one image.

The vision takes its origin in the isolation of the artist. The most extreme case of contemporary isolation is exemplified by Mahon—he sees the world as a hostile place in which poetry has a limited sphere and an even more limited influence on events. A short quotation from his poem 'Rage for Order' may illustrate the case:

> Somewhere beyond
> The scorched gable end
> And the burnt-out
> Buses there is a poet indulging his
> Wretched rage for order –
>
> Or not as the
> Case may be, for his
> Is a dying art...[9]

Mahon takes the phrase 'rage for order' from Wallace Stevens—though in Stevens's late-Romantic concept it reads as 'blessed rage for order.' Mahon's replacement of 'blessed' with 'wretched' and the end of the passage are pessimistic enough as to the nature of poetry yet the fact that there is a poet present may be encouraging. Still, the idea that poetry is a 'dying art', similar to another activity, skinning a fairy, in another Mahon poem, shows his scepticism about the sphere of influence of his art.

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[8] Heaney, S. *New Selected Poems 1966–1987,* pp. 17–18.
[9] Quoted by Longley, E. "The Singing Line: Form in Derek Mahon's Poetry." In: *Poetry in the War.* Newcstle: Bloodaxe, 1986, p. 172.

Several of the recorded epiphanic moments of the Romantic period originate from a contemplation of nature. As Heaney comments, Wordsworth read the natural world as signs.[10] The stimulus provided by the natural scene induces a meditation which in turn leads the poet to recognitions of great significance. With these recognitions he returns to the natural scene but his sense of understanding has deepened, which allows him to read the landscape with more 'comprehensive' eyes.[11]

The increased significance of nature, in this way, is another heritage of the Romantic period. In contemporary Irish poetry nature has different functions for different poets but its importance is universal. For Heaney it is the starting point, for exploration and for poetry—and these two activities are often synonymous for him. The best example is 'Bogland'—in this poem the landscape functions in a similar way as in a Wordsworth poem: it ignites the imagination of the poet. Yet, just as in 'Personal Helicon', the structure of the poem does not follow the Romantic model—the natural phenomena immediately become the basis of associations. Heaney's eyes are perhaps trained by the example of the Romantics.

Derek Mahon's bleak landscapes reflect his sense of isolation, they are projections of the persona's (and ultimately of the poet's) inner reality, which is an indication of Romantic antecedents. In the poem 'Going Home' the persona sets out from a place with rich vegetation: 'I am saying goodbye to the trees / The beech, the cedar, the elm, / The mild woods of these parts', and travels to one marked by the absence of such fertility: 'But where I am going the trees / Are few and far between. / No richly forested slopes'.[12] In another poem, 'Beyond Howth Head', the persona is writing from a desolate place:

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[10] Heaney, S. "Feeling into Words," p. 51.

[11] Abrams, M. H. *Natural Supernaturalism. Tradition and Revolution in Romantic Literature*. London: Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 357.

[12] Mahon, D. *Selected Poems*. Harmondsworth: Penguin/Gallery, 1993, pp. 96–98.

> ,The wind that blows these words to you
> bangs nightly off the black-and-blue
> Atlantic, hammering in haste
> dark doors of the declining west
> whose rock-built houses year by year
> collapse, whose strong sons disappear
> (no homespun cottage industries'
> embroidered cloths will patch up these
>
> lost townlands on the crumbling shores
> of Europe)...[13]

The coasts of Ireland are the scenes of destruction, the tide eating the land away, houses falling into the sea—and these areas are at the same time the 'crumbling shores / of Europe', signalling perhaps more than a change of the physical environment, as Europe is also a cultural term. The richly alliterative music of the lines makes the vision even more haunting and the scene even darker.

Michael Longley escapes to Mayo from the violence. He is extremely fond of the lush world of the countryside and the vegetation plays an important role in his poetry: names of plants of various kinds feature significantly in his poems. Plants may act as 'instruments' of redemption in time of violence, as in the poem 'Finding a Remedy':

> Sprinkle the dust from a mushroom or chew
> The white end of a rush, apply the juice
> From fern roots, stems of burdocks, dandelions,
>
> Then cover the wound with cuckoo-sorrel
> Or sphagnum moss, bringing together verse
> And herb, plant and prayer to stop the bleeding.[14]

Specimens of plants are used here explicitly for curing, and the last two lines indicate the kinship between curative plants and poetry.

In another short poem, 'In Memory of Charles Donnelly', botany is represented by the olive tree. The Biblical resonances of the olive tree

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[13] Mahon, p. 44.
[14] Longley, M. *Poems 1963–1983*. London: Secker and Warburg, 1986, p. 159.

are sharply contrasted with the atmosphere of the Spanish Civil War (the subtitle of the poem is *Killed in Spain, 27.2.37, aged 22*):

<div style="text-align:center">

I

Minutes before a bullet hits you in the forehead
There is a lull in the machine-gun fire, time to pick
From the dust a bunch of olives, time to squeeze them,
To understand the groans and screams and big abstractions
By saying quietly 'Even the olives are bleeding'.

II

Buried among the roots of that olive tree, you are
Wood and fruit and the skylight its branches make
Through which to read as they accumulate for ever
The poems you go on not writing in the tree's shadow
As it circles the fallen olives and the olive-stones.[15]

</div>

Longley juxtaposes the horrible scene of the bullet hitting the forehead with the moment of silence and peace preceding it, and the squeezed olives become analogous with the wounded person as both are 'bleeding'. The second section is reminiscent of Wordsworth's Lucy, who also becomes one with the natural world after her death, 'Rolled round in earth's diurnal course, / With rocks, and stones, and trees'—the young victim of Longley's poem is now the 'Wood and fruit and the skylight'.

<div style="text-align:center">*</div>

Schelling considered mythology as the essential condition and primary material of all art;[16] 'for Keats myth was of the same imaginative order as the poet's knowledge,'[17] and Blake went as far as the attempt at creating a private mythology. These ideas clearly indicate the preoccupation of the Romantics with myth, based on the conviction that the experience contained in and communicated by myths is fundamental to humanity. Modernism returned to this conviction—T. S. Eliot's view of

[15] Longley, M. *Gorse Fires.* London: Secker and Warburg, 1991, p. 48.
[16] Schelling, quoted in Péter, Á. *Roppant szivárvány.* Budapest: Nemzeti Tankönyv-kiadó, 1996, p. 88.
[17] Kermode, p. 9.

his present as 'the immense panorama of futility' called for no less or-
ganising principle than mythology. The two seminal texts of Modernism,
Ulysses and *The Waste Land* are the par excellence examples of the im-
portance of myth in (modern) art.

The Irish scene offers a number of examples of the use of myth in
poetry. One of the preoccupations· of the Revival was the mythologising
of the peasant and the rural world; side by side with this went the
incorporation into poetry of mythological figures from the Irish past.
The chief exponent of the‚latter strain is William Butler Yeats. As far as
the former is concerned, though it suggests a different treatment of the
mythic, it is equally important: Patrick Kavanagh, in his poem entitled
'Epic', relates his local Monaghan world to the experience on which
Homer based his work, and John Montague turns the rural world into a
myth of continuity and tradition.

Contemporary poetry also returns to myth on certain occasions. The
most well-known Irish instance of this is Heaney's bog-motif, his
attempt at finding a mythic framework which could enable him to
interpret the contemporary outbreak of violence in Northern Ireland.
Heaney's myth is a complex one, bringing together the Iron Age fertility
ritual of the goddess Nerthus and the figure of Mother Ireland. Heaney's
myth lives its own life after a time and fails to provide any rational
explanation for the violence—it is similar in this sense to Eliot's complex
myth, which also proves abortive in bringing the required salvation for
the wasteland of the early 20th century. The fact that these myths fail to
provide solution for the problems may justify the Wordsworthian
'revolution' of using autobiographical experience instead of mythology
for his major poetic enterprise.

The return to myth and the subsequent experience of its inadequacy
as an explanation for the present conflict suggest and create a sense of
loss, and a deep sense of loss is a pervasive element of modern poetry.
Blake is the main Romantic antecedent, and Wordsworth's poetry also
contains moments of loss—though the adult finds compensation for the
loss of the child's way of experiencing nature, the political disappoint-
ment following the French Revolution is a lasting wound. The theoreti-
cal dimension of the problem is expressed in Friedrich Schiller's anxiety

about the fragmentation of human personality.[18] The Modernists mourned the loss of totality and the fragmented world in the wake of it; in a way this is also the lost innocence, though on a more comprehensive level. The Postmodern, in Lyotard's view at least, is signalled by the loss of the grand narratives—among others, that of history as well.

The consequence of the sense of loss is a sometimes nostalgic yearning for what has been lost. Irish history is more than a rich soil for nostalgic poetry: the long centuries of political antagonism between the Irish and the English yielded several cultural consequences as well, among them the relegation of the Irish language into a marginal position. One moment of cultural imperialism was the early 19th century Ordnance Survey during which the Irish placenames were 'anglicised.' John Montague's poem entitled 'A Lost Tradition' concerns the consequences of such an event. 'The whole landscape a manuscript / We had lost the skill to read, / A part of our past disinherited'[19]—such a heritage makes the question of identity a rather difficult one. In a way, 'identity', especially in relation to Northern Irish poetry is reminiscent of the lost innocence, of a natural and given state which, having been lost, seems all the more valuable.

<center>*</center>

One of the significant innovations of Wordsworth was the celebration of the common by presenting it from an unusual viewpoint. He managed to prove that a fresh eye may turn even the simplest and most trivial element of life into an experience of profound significance. Contemporary poetry may be seen as a rich record of the common scrutinised and poeticised. Heaney's poem, 'The Rain Stick' is also a celebration of something common:

> Upend the rain stick and what happens next
> Is a music that you never would have known
> To listen for. In a cactus stalk

[18] Schiller, F. *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man—Briefe über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen.* 1795…

[19] In Mahon, D., Fallon, P. (eds.) *The Penguin Book of Contemporary Irish Poetry.* Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990, pp. 44–45.

Downpour, sluice-rush, spillage and backwash
Come flowing through. You stand there like a pipe
Being played by water, you shake it again lightly

And diminuendo runs through all its scales
Like a gutter stopping trickling. And now here comes
A sprinkle of drops out of the freshened leaves,

Then subtle little wets off grass and daises;
Then glitter-drizzle, almost-breaths of air.
Upend the stick again. What happens next

Is undiminished for having happened once,
Twice, ten, a thousand times before.
Who cares if all the music that transpires

Is the fall of grit or dry seeds through a cactus?
You are like a rich man entering heaven
Through the ear of a raindrop. Listen now again.[20]

The poem suggests the possibility of looking at common things with a fresh eye, of savouring the experience regardless of its triviality, regardless of its having happened before on several times. On another level the poem may be read as an apology for contemporary poetry as well: for repeating what has been said before, for making a music which is perhaps not as smooth as it could be and also for not being able to get away from the heritage of earlier traditions—traditions such as Romanticism.

[20] Heaney, S. *The Spirit Level.* London: Faber, 1996, p. 1.

Frederick Douglass: An Intellectual Slave Narrative

Kathleen E. Dubs

1 Introduction

The years between 1703 and 1944 saw the appearance of more than six thousand accounts of life under the system of institutionalized slavery in the United States.[1] Taken as a whole, the works in this genre —and little more than one hundred exist as book-length narratives—share certain characteristics: the brutality of abuse, the subhuman conditions, the religious piety of the slaves and the attendant hypocrisy of the slaveholders, the various methods of survival, and the occasional account of a good master. As Houston A. Baker, Jr. has pointed out, they also represent "the narrator's ... heroic journey from slavery to freedom, and his subsequent dedication to abolitionist principles and goals."[2] Although many are sufficiently exciting to qualify as adventure stories (cf. *The Life of Olaudah Equiano*) and one (*Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl*) rivals the drama of *The Diary of Anne Frank,* more often than not the accounts are not autobiographies as we know them: histories of inner growth and change, and reflections on experience, as well as iterations of the external events themselves. Published largely under the auspices of northern abolitionists, they served to rally public opinion against the evil of slavery and, therefore, provided example upon example of the brutality of slave life. One narrative, however, not only stands apart from (and above) the type, but also falls within the genre of autobiography as it is more traditionally considered: *The Life of Frederick Douglass.*

Many scholars think that Douglass shaped his narrative on the model of Equiano's, which Henry Louis Gates, Jr. suggests served as a "silent second text."[3] In support, Gates cites Equiano's "subtle rhetorical strategies such as the overlapping of the slave's arduous journey to freedom and his simultaneous journey from orality to literacy," and his

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[1] Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Introduction, in *The Classic Slave Narratives*, ed. Henry Louis Gates, Jr. (New York: Mentor Books [Division of the Penguin Group]: 1987), p. ix.

[2] Houston A. Baker, Jr. ed. Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, an American Slave (New York: Penguin Books: 1982), pp. 8–9.

[3] Gates, p. ix.

"strategies of self-presentation."[4] This may well be true. But the depth of self-awareness, the knowledge of human character, and the capacity to reflect move Douglass' narrative (and Douglass himself) away from Equiano, and above any other possible influence. The concern for interior rather than exterior activity prevails; and Douglass' method is often to use an incident as material for reflection, or as cause, so that he can comment on its effect. Only rarely is the "moral of the story" left to the reader to discern. A few examples will illustrate.

2 Traditional Aspects

Early on, Douglass characterizes one of his first masters, on one of his first residences, explaining that "as [he] received [his] first impressions of slavery on this plantation, [he would] give some description of it, and of slavery as it there existed."[5]

> Mr. Severe was rightly named: he was a cruel man. I have seen him whip a woman, causing the blood to run half an hour at the time; and this, too, in the midst of her crying children, pleading for their mother's release. He seemed to take pleasure in manifesting his fiendish barbarity. Added to his cruelty, he was a profane swearer. It was enough to chill the blood and stiffen the hair of an ordinary man to hear him talk. Scarce a sentence escaped him but that was commenced or concluded by some horrid oath. The field was the place to witness his cruelty and profanity. His presence made it both the field of blood and blasphemy. From the rising till the going down of the sun, he was cursing, raving, cutting, and slashing among the slaves of the field, in the most frightful manner. His career was short. He died very soon after I went to Colonel Lloyd's; and he died as he lived, uttering, with his dying groans, bitter curses and horrid oaths. His death was regarded by the slaves as the result of a merciful providence.
>
> Mr. Severe's place was filled by a Mr. Hopkins. He was a very different man. He was less cruel, less profane, and made less noise than Mr. Severe. His course was characterized by

no extraordinary demonstrations of cruelty. He whipped, but
seemed to take no pleasure in it. He was called by the slaves
a good overseer. (p. 261)

Even when Douglass is himself the subject of cruelty, his iteration is
stoic. After two close escapes from accidental death, one of which
resulted in the destruction of his master's wagon, Douglass is escorted
back to the woods by his master.

> [Covey] then went to a large gumtree, and with his axe
> cut three large switches, and, after trimming them up neatly
> with his pocket-knife, he ordered me to take off my clothes.
> I made him no answer but stood with my clothes on. He
> repeated his order. I still made him no answer, nor did I
> move to strip myself. Upon this he rushed at me with the
> fierceness of a tiger, tore off my clothes, and lashed me till
> he had worn out his switches, cutting me so savagely as to
> leave the marks visible for a long time after. The whipping
> was the first of a number just like it, and for similar offences.
> (pp. 290–291)

The understatement here, and the irony of the "similar offences,"
focuses our attention on the incident, not the victim. It is the injustice of
the beating as much as the beating itself which is important. Compare
this description to that of Mary Prince, in her personal narrative.[6] As
punishment for breaking a large earthen jar during a thunderstorm, Mary
is whipped by her mistress, who ceases only from weakness of exertion.
But that evening, she informs her husband of Mary's "disobedience" so
that the husband not only whips Mary again, but promises to resume the
beating in the morning, which he does, repeatedly, aided by occasional
refreshment from his wife. And during one interval

> [w]hile my mistress went to bring him drink, there was a
> dreadful earthquake. Part of the roof fell down, and every-
> thing in the house went—clatter, clatter, clatter. Oh I
> thought the end of all things near at hand; and I was so sore
> with the flogging, that I scarcely cared whether I lived or
> died. The earth was groaning and shaking; everything tum-
> bling about; and my mistress and the slaves were shrieking

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[6] The narrative of the life of Mary Prince is also found in Gates, cited *supra.*

and crying out, "The earthquake! the earthquake!" It was an
awful day for us all.

During the confusion I crawled away on my hands and
knees, and laid myself down under the steps of the piazza, in
front of the house. I was in a dreadful state—my body all
blood and bruises, and I could not help moaning piteously.
The other slaves, when they saw me, shook their heads and
said, "Poor child! poor child!"—I lay there till morning,
careless of what might happen, for life was very weak in me,
and I wished more than ever to die. But when we are very
young, death always seems a great way off, and it would not
come that night to me.

The next morning I was forced by my master to rise and
go about my usual work, though my body and limbs were so
stiff and sore, that I could not move without the greatest
pain.—Nevertheless, even after all this severe punishment, I
never heard the last of that jar; my mistress was always
throwing it in my face. (p. 196)

Her purpose is clearly to present the brutality of the master and
mistress and evoke pity for herself. It is difficult to imagine Douglass
seeking such self-pity, or failing to find significance in the earthquake at
that particular moment, for, later, when detailing the circumstances
under which he is "sent" to Baltimore, he admits: "I have ever regarded
it as the first plain manifestation of that kind providence which has ever
since attended me, and marked my life with so many favours." (p. 273)

In both narratives we see the fury of the master over the loss of
property vented on another piece of property—much as we kick the tire
of a car or slam its doors when its engine won't start. But in Douglass'
narrative it is the incident, the "similar offences" and their punishments,
which arrests the reader, not the shrieks of the slave; it is the
understatement of the "normality" of such behavior. Although it may
seem that Douglass is stating the obvious, note the opportunity missed
by Mary Prince.

In a later incident Douglass recounts the fatal penalty for trespass-
ing, and the absence of penalty for its punishment.

Colonel Lloyd's slaves were in the habit of spending a
part of their nights and Sundays in fishing for oysters, and in
this way made up the deficiency of their scanty allowance.

> An old man belonging to Colonel Lloyd, while thus engaged,
> happened to get beyond the limits of Colonel Lloyd's, and
> on the premises of Mr. Beal Bondly. At this trespass, Mr.
> Bondly took offence, and with his musket came down to the
> shore, and blew its deadly contents into the poor old man.
>
> Mr. Bondly came over to see Colonel Lloyd the next day,
> whether to pay for his property, or to justify himself in what
> he had done, I know not. At any rate, this whole fiendish
> transaction was soon hushed up. There was very little said
> about it at all, and nothing done. It was a common saying,
> even among little white boys, that it was worth a half-cent to
> kill a "nigger", and a half-cent to bury one. (p. 270)

But these are the clear examples of Douglass' adaptations of the
formula; it is when he develops and advances the formula that his
narrative most moves and provokes.

3 Unique Aspects

The first hint of his deeper awareness occurs in his comments upon the
singing of the slaves, long used by slave-holders as proof of their
happiness, of their joy in their work. In quoting specifically the chorus of
a song about the Great House Farm, Douglass notes:

> This they would sing, as a chorus, to words which to
> many would seem unmeaning jargon, but which, neverthe-
> less, were full of meaning to themselves. I have sometimes
> thought that the mere hearing of those songs would do more
> to impress some minds with the horrible character of slavery,
> than the reading of whole volumes of philosophy on the
> subject could do.
>
> I did not, when a slave, understand the deep meaning of
> those rude and apparently incoherent songs. I was myself
> within the circle; so that I neither saw nor heard as those
> without might see and hear. They told a tale of woe which
> was then altogether beyond my comprehension; ... To those
> songs I trace my first glimmering conception of the dehu-
> manizing character of slavery.
>
> I have often been utterly astonished, since I came to the
> north, to find persons who could speak of the singing among
> slaves as evidence of their contentment and happiness; it is

> impossible to conceive of a greater mistake. Slaves sing most
> when they are most unhappy. (pp. 262–3)

The acknowledgement of ignorance, of growing self-awareness, the reflection of being inside "the circle" or out: these mark the narrative of Douglass. So, too, do his perceptions of what these events represent, not just what they are. For Douglass songs are expressions not of happiness, but of relief: "The songs of the slave represent the sorrows of his heart; and he is relieved by them, only as an aching heart is relieved by its tears. At least, such is my experience." (p. 263) And if we misunderstand, it is because we have not shared in that experience, have not been "inside the circle." But Douglass has, and here, as elsewhere, *the* black slave speaks for all slaves.

In other passages Douglass counters similar myths of slave life—for example, that slaves do not complain of their treatment. In reporting that the wealth of Colonel Lloyd was so vast that many of his own slaves often never saw him, he details a chance encounter between the Colonel and one of his slaves. When asked whether he was well treated, the slave replied in the negative. "What, does he work you too hard?" "Yes, sir." "Well, don't he give you enough to eat?" "Yes, sir, he gives me enough, such as it is." (p. 265) After this brief exchange, both go about their business. But within three weeks the slave, informed that he had displeased his master, was sold "down the river," to a Georgia trader, "a condition held by [all slaves] in the utmost horror and dread." (p. 282) Douglass concludes: "It is partly in consequence of such facts, that slaves, when inquired of as to their condition and the character of their masters, almost universally say they are contented, and that their masters are kind. ... They suppress the truth rather than take the consequences of telling it, and in so doing prove themselves a part of the human family." (p. 266) Who could quarrel with their response, or the conclusion Douglass skilfully draws: slaves not only learn to survive, they are human.

Another myth Douglass exposes, in his coolly analytical way, is that slaves lack human feeling, or, as Marie St.Clare repeats over and over again in *Uncle Tom's Cabin,* "They just don't feel things the way we do." At the beginning of his narrative, Douglass had reported that he and his mother had been separated when he was an infant, and that he never knew her as [his] mother." (p. 256) It was the practice of slave-holders to separate children from their mothers during infancy, return the mother

to whatever work she was doing as soon as possible, and place the infant with an old woman, useful for nothing else. Douglass does not know the purpose of this practice "unless it be to hinder the development of the child's natural affection towards its mother, and to blunt and destroy the natural affection of the mother for the child. This is the inevitable result." (p. 256) And yet Douglass' mother felt such strong natural affection for him that on four or five occasions she journeyed, on foot, about twelve miles (each way) to be with him. These visits occurred at night, after her work in the fields; and from each visit she returned early, to be in the field before sunrise to avoid being whipped. She put him to sleep, but left before he awoke. As he movingly admits:

> Very little communication ever took place between us. Death soon ended what little we could have while she lived, and with it her hardships and suffering. ... I was not allowed to be present during her illness, at her death, or burial. ... Never having enjoyed, to any considerable extent, her soothing presence, her tender and watchful care, I received the tidings of her death with much the same emotions I should have probably felt at the death of a stranger. (p. 256)

With this incident, Douglass accounts for the "fact" that slaves have no feelings for family. And he exposes, as he will again and again, the brutality at the heart of the system.

By far the most significant event in Douglass' life occurs in Baltimore—"[that] first plain manifestation of ... kind providence. ..." As do many other slaves in their narratives, Douglass expresses his desire to learn to read. And while under the tutelage of Mrs. Auld, he makes progress. But Mr. Auld, on learning of the schooling, forbade it, telling his wife, among other things, that it was unlawful to teach a slave to read, and that "learning would spoil the best nigger in the world. ... If you teach [a] nigger to read, there would be no keeping him. It would forever unfit him to be a slave. He would at once become unmanageable, and of no good to his master. As to himself, it could do him no good, but a great deal of harm. It would make him discontented and unhappy." (pp. 274–5) The effect of this pronouncement on Douglass is profound.

> These words sank deep into my heart, stirred up senti-
> ments within that lay slumbering, and called into existence an

> entirely new train of thought. It was a new and special reve-
> lation, explaining dark and mysterious things, with which my
> youthful understanding had struggled, but struggled in vain. I
> now understood what had been to me a most perplexing dif-
> ficulty—to wit, the white man's power to enslave the black
> man. It was a grand achievement, and I prized it highly.
> From that moment, I understood the pathway from slavery
> to freedom. It was just what I wanted and I got it at a time
> when I the least expected it. (p. 275)

And literacy did prove damaging to the young Douglass—who was
at this point about twelve years old.

> The more I read, the more I was led to abhor and detest
> my enslavers. ... As I read and contemplated the subject,
> behold! that very discontent which Master Hugh had
> predicted would follow my learning to read had already
> come, to torment and sting my soul to unutterable anguish.
> As I writhed under it, I would at times feel that learning to
> read had been a curse rather than a blessing. (p. 279)

It is the institution of slavery which repels Douglass, not his specific
condition. At this point he has not been brutally mistreated, whipped,
starved, bred; relatively speaking his life has been "good." Even so, he
admits: "I often found myself regretting my own existence, and wishing
myself dead; and but for the hope of being free, I have no doubt but that
I should have killed myself, or done something for which I should have
been killed." (p. 279) Many slaves had understood literacy as a means to
freedom: the ability to forge papers, to read posters, and so forth. But
Douglass sees literacy in a much deeper sense: intellectual freedom,
liberation of the spirit. In this, as in other instances, he demonstrates his
understanding of slavery as an institution: how it holds the slave, how it
robs him of his humanity—if he lets it. It is this extraordinary awareness
which sets Douglass and his narrative apart.

The epiphany of his narrative occurs after the death of his master,
Captain Anthony, when he is sent for, "to be valued with the other
property. Here again [his] feelings rose up in detestation of slavery. [He]
had now a new conception of [his] degraded condition." (p. 281) Not a
human being; but a piece of property. "There were horses and men,
cattle and women, pigs and children, all holding the same rank in the

scale of being, and ... all subjected to the same narrow examination. ... At this moment, I saw more clearly than ever the brutalizing effects of slavery upon both slave and slaveholder." (p. 282) This is Douglass' most profound insight into the evil essence of the insititution of slavery: that it reduces to the level of sub-humanity both the slave and the slave-holder. Here, exposed to full view, is the soul of slavery in all its naked ugliness.

And again, Mrs. Auld, innocent of slavery, was a kind woman, the good Christian woman who had wanted to teach him to read.

> But, alas! this kind heart had but a short time to remain such. The fatal poison of irresponsible power was already in her hands, and soon commenced its infernal work. That cheerful eye, under the influence of slavery, soon became red with rage; that voice, made all of sweet accord, changed to one of harsh and horrid discord; and that angelic face gave place to that of a demon. (p. 274)

> The slave is not unique in being robbed of his humanity, Douglass observed: "Slavery proved as injurious to her as it did to me." (p. 277)

Douglass' sense of self-awareness and the bestiality of slavery are expressed again, when he relates his last experience of being whipped.

Captain Auld, unable to handle Douglass—considering him ruined by city life—leases him for one year to Mr. Covey, who had the reputation of a "nigger-breaker." By his own testimony, he was unmanageable when he arrived. Usually, Douglass posits his own awkwardness as the excuse for being whipped; but on one occasion he is pushed, and whipped, beyond endurance. He runs off to his owner, a journey of seven miles which takes him about five hours, so bad is his condition. He arrives in a state of shock.

> From the crown of my head to my feet, I was covered with blood. My hair was all clotted with dust and blood; my shirt was stiff with blood. My legs and feet were torn in sundry places with briers and thorns, and were also covered with blood. I suppose I looked like a man who had escaped a den of wild beasts, and barely escaped them. In this state I appeared before my master, humbly entreating him to interpose his authority for my protection. (p. 296)

The master, on learning the facts, allows Douglass to stay the night. In the morning, assuring him he is in no mortal danger from Covey, "a good man," he orders him back, threatening him if he does not obey. When Douglass reaches Covey's cornfield, and sees Covey coming toward him with his cowskin, to give him another whipping, he runs into the cornfield, and escapes to the cabin of Sandy Jenkins, a slave whom Douglass knew, who lived there with his free wife.

Noting that his "behaviour was altogether unaccountable," (p. 296) Douglass once again asks advice. Jenkins tells him he must return, but gives him "a certain root" which he must always carry "on [his] right side, (which) would render it impossible for Mr. Covey or any other white man, to whip [him]." (p. 297) Curiously, when Douglass returns, Covey greets him "very kindly." But it is, after all, Sunday; and Covey, being a pious man, is on his way to church. It must be that, and not the root, Douglass believes. But on Monday the root receives a severe test.

In the early morning hours, in the barn about his chores, Douglass is lassoed by Covey, who attempts to tie him. At this moment, Douglass tells us, "from whence came the spirit I don't know—[but] I resolved to fight." (p. 298) Overcoming his initial shock, Covey calls to a hand—Hughes—who joins the fray. Incredibly, Douglass dispatches Hughes, and when Covey calls for help from Bill—another slave—Bill informs him that he had been hired out to work, not assist in whippings. So Douglass and Covey "were at it for nearly two hours." The conclusion of the matter is clear to all but Covey.

> Covey at length let me go, puffing and blowing at a great rate, saying that if I had not resisted, he would not have whipped me half so much. The truth was, that he had not whipped me at all. I considered him as getting entirely the worst end of the bargain; for he had drawn no blood from me, but I had from him. (p. 298)

Further, for the remainder of Douglass' service, Covey never lays a finger on him. Douglass is convinced it is because Covey knows that he will come off worse than before. But this battle marks more than the end of Douglass' whippings.

> This battle with Mr. Covey was the turning-point in my career as a slave. ... I felt as I never felt before. It was a

> glorious resurrection, from the tomb of slavery, to the
> heaven of freedom. ... I now resolved that, however long I
> might remain a slave in form, the day had passed forever
> when I could be a slave in fact. I did not hesitate to let it be
> known of me, that the white man who expected to succeed
> in whipping, must also succeed in killing me. (pp. 298–9)

And he was true to his word. Though he remained a slave for four more years, and had several fights, including one in which he was nearly killed by a gang of carpenters, he "was never whipped." (p. 299)

Once again we see that Douglass penetrates to the heart of slavery. It is not the conditions of slavery, it is the essence of slavery: being made subhuman, less than a man.

> I have found that, to make a contented slave, it is neces-
> sary to make him a thoughtless one. It is necessary to darken
> his moral and mental vision, and as far as possible, to anni-
> hilate the power of reason. He must be able to feel that slav-
> ery is right; and he can be brought to that only when he
> ceases to be a man. (p. 315)

Douglass also reveals keen insight into the methods slaveholders use to keep slaves "happy." As an example, he cites the Christmas holidays. The days between Christmas and New Year were holidays, and the slaves were not required to perform any physical labor. They spent the time as they chose: visiting relatives; making mats and baskets; hunting; ball-playing, fiddling, dancing, drinking whiskey. Douglass observes that the drinking of whiskey was the pass-time most approved by the masters. "It was deemed a disgrace not to get drunk at Christmas." (p. 299) Other-wise it was as though the generosity of the master were being refused, and the slave himself lacking sufficient industry to provide the where-with-all for his recreation. More significantly, according to Douglass, these festivities were "among the most effective means in the hands of the slaveholder in keeping down the spirit of insurrection. Were the slaveholders at once to abandon this practice, ... it would lead to an im-mediate insurrection among the slaves." (p. 300)

Not only did these holiday revels serve as safety valves, they were

> part and parcel of the gross fraud, wrong, and inhumanity of
> slavery. They are professedly a custom established by the

> benevolence of the slaveholders; but ... it is the result of
> selfishness, and one of the grossest frauds committed upon
> the down-trodden slave. They do not give the slaves this
> time because they would not like to have their work during
> its continuance, but because they know it would be unsafe to
> deprive them of it. (p. 300)

Further,

> their object seems to be, to disgust their slaves with freedom,
> by plunging them into the lowest depths of dissipation. For
> instance, the slaveholders not only like to see the slave drink
> of his own accord, but will adopt various plans to make him
> drunk. ... So, when the holidays ended, we staggered up
> from the filth of our wallowing, took a long breath, and
> marched to the field,—feeling, upon the whole, rather glad
> to go, from what our master had deceived us into a belief
> was freedom, back to the arms of slavery. (p. 300)

Where other slave narrators present only the revels, Douglass
provides keen analysis. His is more than a presentation of aspects of
slave life; it is a critique of the institution itself and the fraud and
deception upon which it is based.

4 Conclusion

Douglass' *Life* also includes his views on the effects of religion,

> If it had any effect on [Auld's] character, it made him
> more cruel and hateful in all his ways, for I believe him to
> have been a much worse man after his conversion than
> before. Prior to his conversion, he relied upon his own
> depravity to shield and sustain him in his savage barbarity;
> but after his conversion, he found religious sanction and
> support for his slaveholding cruelty. (p. 287)

the account of his escape to freedom, characterizations of other slaves
and slave practices, and some passages of melodrama and piety. The final
facet of the appeal of Douglass' narrative is his insight into human
character. His knowledge that slavery damages the slave-holder as well as
the slave is clear. So too is his ability to read individual human beings.

His analysis of his relationship with Covey—the man with whom he successfully fought—is astute.

> Mr. Covey enjoyed the most unbounded reputation for being a first-rate overseer and negro-breaker. It was of considerable importance to him. That reputation was at stake: and had he sent me—a boy about sixteen years old—to the public whipping post, his reputation would have been lost; so, to save his reputation, he suffered me to go unpunished. (p. 299)

His analysis of his master, Captain Auld, who sent him to Covey, is similarly perceptive. The description also shows Douglass at his rhetorical best. Captain Auld was mean.

> And, like most other mean men, he lacked the ability to conceal his meanness. Captain Auld was not a born slaveholder. ... He came into possession of all his slaves by marriage; and of all men, adopted slaveholders are the worst. He was cruel, but cowardly. He commanded without firmness. In the enforcement of his rules, he was at times rigid, and at times lax. At times, he spoke to his slaves with the firmness of Napoleon and the fury of the demon; at other times, he might as well be mistaken for an inquirer who had lost his way. He did nothing of himself. He might have passed for a lion, but for his ears. In all things noble which he attempted, his own meanness shone most conspicuous. His airs, words, and actions, were the airs, words, and actions of slave-holders, and being assumed, were awkward enough. He was not even a good imitator. He possessed all the disposition to deceive, but wanted the power. Having no resources within himself, he was compelled to be the copyist of many, and being such, he was forever the victim of inconsistency and of consequence he was an object of contempt, and was held as such even by his slaves. (pp. 286–287) [1]

What a damning description; yet how convincing.

But to say that it is typical of the genre is to say that the *The Canterbury Tales* is typical of narrative poetry. Douglass, in relatively few pages, presents his life, his character, and a stinging indictment of the institution of slavery by countering the myths of slavery, penetrating the

essence of "the whole system of fraud and inhumanity," and revealing the weakness and corruption upon which it was based. It is a remarkable work.

More than the story of "how a man was made a slave; and ... how a slave was made a man," (p. 294) it is a story demonstrating incontrovertibly that slaves were indeed men, human beings, with feelings and moral values, and with intellects of great power. Douglass knew that he was living proof that the slave who learned to read and write was the first to run away.[7] But he also knew—and he was living proof—that running away was insufficient. So was simply telling the story of the escape and the horrors which led to it. Douglass was a black man, freed—or rather freeing himself—from the barbarity of an animalistic existence, destined to act as spokesman for humanity. His call for abolition was as much a plea for the slaveholder as for the slave. And it was a powerful call ignored at one's peril.

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[7] Gates, p. ix.

Ledas and Swans in Angela Carter's *The Magic Toyshop* and *Nights at the Circus*

Angelika Reichmann

> I become mildly irritated [...] when people
> [...] ask me about the 'mythic quality' of
> work I've written lately. Because I believe
> that all myths are products of the human
> mind and reflect only aspects of material
> human practice. I'm in the demythologising
> business. ("Notes from the Front Line" by
> Carter quoted in Day 3)

Angela Carter's *The Magic Toyshop* and *Nights at the Circus* are both "overtly intertextual" (Fokkema 175), containing numerous and innumerable allusions to the Bible, myths, fairy tales and other literary works of art. Among these references, however, the myth of Leda and the Swan plays a central role in both of them (D'Haen 199, Mills 173). Theo D'Haen in his essay points out the implied relationship between this myth and "the foundation of a male line in Western literature": "the rape of Leda by Zeus engendered [Helen and by that] the oldest Western work of literature known to us[,] Homer's *Iliad*" (199). It is in the context of the roles this mythological story plays in the two novels that I will examine their similarities and differences, and show the close connection between them, concentrating mostly on *Nights at the Circus:* in a sense, it really starts where *The Magic Toyshop* ends, can be read as a "sequel" to the other novel written almost twenty years earlier.

Since Carter took a rather radical stance against myth as such—she claimed in "Notes from the Front Line" that she is "in the demythologising business"—it is of crucial importance to examine in what sense this term is applicable to her works. In a 1988 interview with Anna Katsavos she said the following: "[I am defining myth] in a sort of conventional sense; also in the sense that Roland Barthes uses it in *Mythologies*—ideas, images, stories that we tend to take on trust without thinking what they really mean" (Day 4). From this point of view the story of Leda and the Swan is not only a myth in the classical sense of the word but also an element in patriarchal discourse reflecting

traditional gender roles. It is taken for granted that Leda—that is,
Woman—is the passive character in the sexual intercourse that takes
place. It is also natural that her name does not pass into oblivion for the
single reason of her assistance in divine male creation—both biological
and artistic. Her desires and identity are irrelevant—she is an object of
desire and a muse. Thus the story would have an absolutely legitimate
place among the myths surrounding Woman mentioned by Simone de
Beauvoir:

> It is always difficult to describe myth; it cannot be grasped or
> encompassed; it haunts the human consciousness without
> ever appearing before it in fixed form. The myth is so
> various, so contradictory, that at first its unity is not
> discerned: Delilah and Judith, Aspasia and Lucretia, Pandora
> and Athena—woman is at once Eve and the Virgin Mary.
> She is an idol, a servant, the source of life, a power of
> darkness; she is the elemental silence of truth, she is artifice,
> gossip, and falsehood; she is healing presence and sorceress,
> she is man's prey, his downfall, she is everything he is not
> and that he longs for, his negation and his *raison d'être*.
> (Beauvoir 143)

As Simone de Beauvoir points out, in the framework of myth women are
seen as the Other, as Woman, but not as actually existing human beings.
They are trapped in a patriarchal discourse that defines available—and
often self-contradictory—role models for them. It is from this respect
that the treatment of the myth of Leda and the Swan becomes
emblematic of an attitude towards patriarchal discourse both in *The Magic
Toyshop* and *Nights at the Circus*. The models of behaviour offered by
myth—Woman as mute victim of a rape scene and man as aggressive
divine creator/artist—undergo subversion in both novels, but to a
different extent.

     In *The Magic Toyshop* "[Melanie's] passage to womanhood seems, in
this patriarchal system, to demand a symbolic loss of virginity to an all-
powerful phallic male" (Mills 175), which results in a row of
theatricalised and ritual scenes, imitating and acting out the loss of her
virginity. These "attempts" are, however, equally "unsuccessful", that is,
they are not real initiations into adult womanhood, though for different
reasons. On the one hand, they are the reenactments of prefabricated
dreams created by popular fiction and magazines (Mills 173)—like the

"love scenes" in the Pleasure Garden or in Finn's room. On the other hand, the covert or overt element of violence and exertion of male power is always rejected, like in the actual culmination of these scenes, in the theatrical performance of the rape of Leda. In all of these cases— apart from the wedding-dress night, where Melanie is alone, and the actual or symbolic male partner is missing—Melanie is sometimes victimised and definitely always plays a passive part—that of Leda—, never making a decisive move: it is Finn who hides in the cupboard and decides not to make love to her, and she passes out when the Swan covers her.

In *Nights at the Circus* Fevvers' birth is implied to be the result of an event similar to Leda's rape—in fact, she "never docked via what you might call the *normal channels,* sir, oh, dear me, no; just like Helen of Troy, was *hatched* " (*Nights at the Circus*[1] 7). However, instead of being a symbolical descendent of a god—that is, a Swan in this case—and a human being, she is a "divinely tall" bottle blonde with "wings [...] unfolding fully six feet across, spread of an eagle, a condor, an albatross fed to excess on the same diet that makes flamingoes pink" (*NC* 15). She literally embodies the most important physical characteristic features of both her "parents", thereby transferring the novel into the fantastic world of magic realism—and also becoming one of the typical mixed creatures of a carnivalesque universe. If in the original myth "the rape of Leda by Zeus engendered [Helen and by that] the oldest Western work of literature known to us[,] Homer's *Iliad* ", then the offspring of this intercourse is a creature whose slogan is "Is she fact or is she fiction?" (*NC* 7) Though Fevvers certainly does not look like Helen of Troy, there is no doubt about her physicality: there is something "fishy about the Cockney Venus" (*NC* 8), she "launch[es] a thousand quips, mostly on the lewd side" (*NC* 8), her smell is that "of stale feet" (*NC* 9), "she look[s] like a dray mare" (*NC* 12) and "Her face ... might have been hacked from wood and brightly painted up by those artists who build carnival ladies for fairgrounds or figureheads for sailing ships" (*NC* 35), so that the question emerges in Walser if she might be a man. In fact, "there is a [carnivalesque] provocative element in the descriptions of the bodily functions" (Fokkema 166). Her identity cannot be decided in any terms, let alone the terms of her mythical story of origin, though at

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[1] From now on *NC* as a source after quotations.

different points in the novel, she acts out in a modified form all the possible roles offered by it—and a lot of others. From this respect the case of the painting depicting her "primal scene", the rape of Leda by a painter of the Venetian school, is emblematic. Walser guesses—and thus the text implies—that the reader should bear in mind of the numerous depictions of this scene the one by Titian. However, such a painting does not exist.

Nor is Fevvers the passive victim in the several episodes similar to the staged scenes of the loss of virginity—or rather rape—in *The Magic Toyshop*. In fact, the whole first part of the novel, which consists of the stories told alternately by Fevvers and Liz about the *aerialiste* during their "first interview" with Walser, is nothing else but a series of inconclusive attempts at making love to her or raping her. The first two of these stories, Fevvers' fall from the mantelpiece in Ma Nelson's drawing-room and her first ascent from the roof of the brothel with Liz' help, are highly symbolic events. While telling these stories Fevvers practically also interprets them, clearly referring to a quite unambiguous parallel with sexual intercourse. The two events take place when she is fourteen, that is, at the age of puberty. The first unfortunate ascent, which seems to double the wedding-dress night scene in *The Magic Toyshop,* takes place in the drawing-room, under the picture of Leda and the Swan. The result of her fall is that she breaks her nose, or more exactly what Liz emphasises is that her nose starts to bleed since she "near busted her nose in half" (*NC* 30), which may be a reference to the loss of virginity. It is the fear—the fear of dying—she experiences that is emphasised, as well as in the second story which is told by Fevvers herself. She uses expressions like "The transparent arms of the wind received the virgin" (*NC* 34) and "I was in the arms of my invisible lover" (*NC* 34) in connection with the wind during the description of this first flight.

Moreover, the role she acts out voluntarily in this scene is not passive at all, since "the wind did not relish [her] wondering inactivity for long [...] and as if affronted by [her] passivity, started to let [her] slip" (*NC* 34), by that urging her to start to move rhythmically with her wings. Though this scene can be conceived as well as parallel to the wedding-dress night in *The Magic Toyshop,* there are some basic differences between these two scenes in *Nights at the Circus,* in the sense that the first one is much closer to the one in *The Magic Toyshop:* Melanie and Fevvers experience fear, loneliness, and fail to carry out their plan (whatever it is),

practically both events take place at midnight, when time seems to stop, both events are compared to the Fall, to the original sin or the fall of Lucifer (*NC* 30), the girls are almost of the same age and both end up desperate and bleeding. While Melanie is tortured by a sense of guilt, since the tearing up of her mother's wedding-dress that night seems to be the cause of her parents' death in some magical way, Fevvers is helped by Liz to go on and study enough to give a new try—she has a mother- (or rather grandmother-) figure with her, whom Melanie misses all her life. It is Liz who launches Fevvers on the first flight, helping her to gain independence, but still saves her when she starts to fall. Though Fevvers is too frightened to start this flight, and almost dies at the end of it, this event is practically the nearest thing to a pleasurable sexual intercourse described in the novel: "the wind … clasped [her] to his bosom once more so [she] found [she] could progress in tandem with him just as [she] pleased, and so cut a corridor through the invisible liquidity of the air" (*NC* 35). It is only implied that when "At the end of *Nights at the Circus* a 'swan' [Fevvers] will gently—though passionately— make love to the male protagonist" (D'Haen 199), something similar happens. In these scenes Fevvers really plays rather the role of the swan, though without the element of violence, and retaining her femininity—in fact, approaching androgyny. *The Magic Toyshop* practically does not contain any scenes like that. While "[it] can be read as a fable of the absence of what can be written of female desire, [as a story in which] woman's desire is yet unnameable" (Mills 177–178), in *Nights at the Circus* this desire gets articulated.

Concerning the other rape attempts, Fevvers does not seem to be in any need of a Knight to help her escape. The scene in the Gothic mansion of "Mr Rosencreutz" (*NC* 74) can be clearly compared with the Grand Duke's attempt to rape her in Petersburg and with the theatrical performance of the story of Leda and the Swan in *The Magic Toyshop*. As opposed to Melanie's passing out on this occasion, Fevvers fights for herself, although not always with the same success. To defend herself from Mr Rosencreutz' blade that he wants to use during the ritual, she has a sword of her own, which she is quick to show, even if she does not use it. The sword can be interpreted as a phallic symbol, in the same way as the Mr Rosencreutz' blade and also as a clear reference to castration— it is not by chance that he is so much surprised by it and that earlier in the brothel when "[the young men's] eyes would fall on the sword [she]

held … Louisa or Emily would have the devil's own job with them, thereafter" (*NC* 38). The old "magic sword" (*NC* 192) is bequeathed to Fevvers by Ma Nelson—nothing short of a phallic mother-figure—, and clearly implies that Fevvers transgresses traditional gender boundaries. She escapes both times without external help, though not without suffering some losses and she is never the passive victim in these cases, never acts out the role of Leda "perfectly". Just like in her rewritings of fairy-tales, "Carter reverses the gender biases …, which assign action and adventure to boys and quiescence and passivity to girls" (Abel et al. 17). Fevvers seems to be similar to her "modern fairy-tale heroines [who] are rescuers and fighters [and] whose growth is enabled by strong female relationships" (Abel et al 170).

In the case of both novels the covert or overt aim of male characters in the rape scenes is actually to fix female characters in the gender role offered by the story of Leda and the Swan—it is the actual rape that would make them Ledas, attach a certain meaning to them, read them as signs in a patriarchal discourse and by that appropriate—in the case of Fevvers literally buy—them. But while Melanie in *The Magic Toyshop* is not conscious of this hidden purpose—it is only Finn who draws her attention to the manipulations of Uncle Philip during the almost fatal rehearsal of the rape scene in his room—, Fevvers consciously resists any attempt to read her as a sign, to cage her in a fixed patriarchal discourse, though her obviously symbolic nature is a constant urge for male characters to try to do so. She is Cupid—the sign of love—, she is Winged Victory, she is Divine Sophia, she is an angel, she is the Yeatsian golden bird on a golden bough, she is the Angel of Death, she is the New Woman—and she is none of them. She is Fevvers—the first and unique creature of her sort, without any acceptable pattern of behaviour to follow within the patriarchal discourse, as Lizzie says to her: "You never existed before. There's nobody to say what you should do and how to do it. You are Year One. You haven't any history and there are no expectations of you except the ones you yourself create" (*NC* 198).

Both female characters are forced to escape attempts at fixing them in patriarchal discourse by leaving houses—which are more often demolished by fire at the same time than not—in fact, to fly in either or both senses of the word. On the one hand, in terms of the myth of Leda and the swan flying in its literal sense is associated with the Swan. In the sense of escape it is something—why is it so "natural"?—that does not

even occur to Leda as a possibility: the innumerable artistic adaptations of the myth often show her as less than half-reluctant. So from this respect neither Melanie nor Fevvers follow the pattern of the myth—in a sense, both of them are rather swans than Ledas. On the other hand, as Sarah Gamble has also pointed out, one cannot not notice the obvious parallel between the text of *Nights at the Circus* and Hélène Cixous' "The Laugh of the Medusa". She says the following about the nature of feminist texts:

> Flying is woman's gesture—flying in language and making it fly. We have learned the art of flying and its numerous techniques; for centuries we've been able to possess anything only by flying; we've lived in flight, stealing away, finding, when desired, narrow passageways, hidden crossovers. [...] A feminist text cannot fail to be more than subversive. It's volcanic; as it is written it brings about an upheaval of the old property crust, carrier of masculine investments; there's no other way. There's no room for her if she's not a he. If she's a her/she, it's in order to smash everything, to shatter the framework of institutions, to blow up the law, to break up the "truth" with laughter. (Cixous 258)

Just like Cixous, Carter plays with the two possible meanings of flight, especially in Fevvers' case. It is in this light that I will examine the symbolic flights from houses in both novels. "Carter said that she had often been asked why there were so few mothers in her books, and had realised that in her imaginative topography houses stood for mothers ... [while] it is Grandma who presides over the space of [her] matriarchal house of fiction" (Sage 6). Getting out of the house—or rather being pushed out of it—then should mean for a woman being excluded from a protective space and should be a kind of initiation which leads to maturity by identification with the closest role model, that is, with the mother (Cronan Rose 225).

In *The Magic Toyshop* Melanie unintentionally locks herself out of the house at the wedding-dress night, but having realised that she is not mature enough to act out the role she has chosen, climbs back into the house in a frenzied state, like a child. However, both nature and the house itself seem to have conspired against her to make it as difficult as possible—as if the house, which is clearly associated with her mother, wanted to take revenge on her for her blasphemous treatment of her

mother's wedding-dress, for putting it on, and by that trying to take her mother's place. An apparent contradiction between the need to break out from the house as a symbolic representation of a patriarchal discourse and the traditional association of houses with female space and mothers can be resolved by taking into consideration the mother's role in maintaining dominant discourses. As Rosalind Coward claims in her book *Our Treacherous Heart:*

> Feminism is almost invariably seen as a struggle—or head-on collision—with men. But the truth is that the deep struggle of feminism was with the previous generation of women. Feminism could be called the daughters' revolt, so central has been the issue of women defining themselves against the previous generation and distancing themselves from their mothers. (quoted in Sage 7)

The situation at the end of the novel seems to be absolutely unambiguous in this respect, though: Uncle Philip's house, which is obviously a representation of a male dominated universe, burns down by that facilitating something like a "real" initiation at this time. The house itself clearly resembles the mysterious castles of Gothic stories and fairy-tales, while Melanie and Finn act out the role of the Princess and the Prince or Knight, respectively. It could be argued that while flying a patriarchal universe, Melanie only acts out another prefabricated story of the same discourse by asking Finn to save her. As Mills points out, this ending still may not be a "real" initiation into adulthood and womanhood for her: "it is into the keeping of another male that [her] escape from the older patriarch leads" (178). The story ends here, it is not known what their future will be like, it is only implied that it might be very similar to Melanie's quite sad expectations.

In *Nights at the Circus* there are several escapes from different houses that resemble in some way Uncle Philip's house: Ma Nelson's brothel burns down in the same way as his house, Madame Schreck's house is definitely like a medieval castle with a dungeon, and the Siberian "modern" prison is not much better, either. All these houses seem to be out of their time, in the same way as time seems to have stopped in Uncle Philip's house. Ma Nelson's house "was built by the Age of Reason" (*NC* 26), but it "seem[s] almost too *modern* for its own good" (*NC* 26) and in it "all still stimulat[es] the dark night of pleasure" in the

same way as "the clock in her reception room must show the dead centre of the day or night, ... the still hour in the centre of the storm of time" (*NC* 29). Madame Schreck's house is compared with a graveyard, with hell, with a Gothic castle, while she herself is nothing else but death impersonated as a skeleton. The Siberian prison may be a forerunner of 21st—or 20th?—century prisons: though Fevvers' story takes place at the turn of the century, and ends on New Year's Eve in 1900, there are deliberate anachronisms and "numerous manipulations of time, place, scenery and character" (D'Haen 199) all through the novel. All of these houses are inhabited solely by women. The utopian "sisterhood" (*NC* 39) in Ma Nelson's house is shattered only by her death, and it is to defend the house from male intrusion and order that the ex-whores burn it down, while the freak-women in the "museum" and the prisoners and gaol-keepers in Siberia join their forces to get rid of Madame Schreck and the Countess, respectively, and establish a new existence of their own. The latter examples can be interpreted as worlds dominated by female characters, who, however, only reinforce the dominant patriarchal discourse. Practically the element of breaking out of such a world is the point where *The Magic Toyshop* ends—but *Nights at the Circus* does not stop here: all the life-stories go on and have a happy ending, like fairy-tales. In fact, Fevvers and Liz use the possibility to tell the *aerialiste*'s life-story to tell several life stories, till Walser feels like "a sultan faced with not one but two Scheherezades, both intent on impacting a thousand stories into the single night" (*NC* 40). The stories are all rewritings of fairy-tales, of literary works of art, even of Carter's own rewritings of fairy tales, such as the story of the Sleeping Beauty, or the Beauty and the Beast. These women get a voice only through Fevvers, who, in her turn, can speak only through Walser in the first part of the novel.

As far as Fevvers herself is concerned, her life-story seems to consist of nothing else, but repeated escapes from different houses. Though she "both hate[s] and fear[s] the open country" (*NC* 81), she is forced to fly—in both meanings of the word—either by a friend or by an enemy. The scene of her first flight from the roof of Ma Nelson's house is of crucial importance here. Since her first attempt from the top of the mantelpiece was unsuccessful, Liz feels that she "must shove [her] off the roof" (*NC* 33) and she does so. Fevvers evaluates her help by saying that "it seemed that Lizzie ... was arranging [her] marriage to the wind itself" (*NC* 33), which connects the motifs of flying, leaving the house

and losing virginity, that is, gaining maturity, and implies that it is
impossible without the help of the mother or grandmother. Fevvers, like
Melanie at the wedding-dress night, has to go back to the house at the
end of the first flight, and she has difficulties as well—in fact, her life is
at stake—, but Lizzie helps her back and saves her. This is one of those
motifs that is completely missing from *The Magic Toyshop,* implying that
one of the reasons of Melanie's failure is the lack of a proper model and
of the help of the (grand)mother-figure.

What are the implications of the mythical story of Leda and the
Swan concerning textuality, or, to ask the same question in a slightly dif-
ferent form, what are the possibilities for defining herself as a subject for
a woman within a patriarchal discourse? Catherine Belsey in her essay
"Constructing the Subject, Deconstructing the Text", offers two alterna-
tives:

> [For women] the attempt to locate a single coherent subject-
> position within these contradictory discourses, and in conse-
> quence to find a non-contradictory pattern of behaviour, can
> create intolerable pressures. One way of responding to this
> situation is to retreat from the contradictions and from dis-
> course itself, to become "sick" [...] Another is to seek a
> resolution of the contradictions in the discourses of femi-
> nism. (Belsey 586)

It could be argued that the first alternative is not an alternative at all,
since it turns a woman into a symptom, a sign, into something mute that
is unable to define itself, something that depends on being read by a
discourse that is not hers. This is the position of Leda—the dumb
muse—in the myth, while the swan is traditionally associated with male
poetic creation.

While *The Magic Toyshop* ends with a symbolic outbreak—flight—
from the patriarchal discourse, it does not seem to offer any alternative:
female characters might be swans in the sense that they can fly but they
are definitely dumb swans—in the literal as well as in the figurative sense
of the word—and use body language instead of symbolic articulation and
instead of creating and/or appropriating a language for their own
purposes. In this sense Finn and Francie appear in a basically feminine
position, since they are powerless: Francie hardly ever speaks, and Finn's
constant flow of speech is temporarily arrested after he is beaten up by

Uncle Philip. The block is broken only with the symbolic burial of the swan at the very end of the novel. What is more, in the course of the novel Melanie tends to see herself only in terms of ready-made ideas of womanhood: it is not by chance that the story, which is told from her perspective, is full of intertextual references from the metaphysical poetry of John Donne, through the Romantics to contemporary romance. Finn actually accuses Melanie in one of the crucial scenes of "Talking like a woman's magazine" (*MT* 155). This does not hinder him though, in his turn, from also constructing himself in a ready-made story, which is even realised by Melanie: she knows that Finn, after having buried the swan, a symbolic representation of Uncle Philip's power, wants to hear the words "He'll murder you" (MT 172) because that confirms his role as a rebel against power, on the one hand, and as a Christ-like sacrifice on the other hand. Since until the end of the novel—until the outbreak—the characters remain within the space of patriarchal discourse, only the first option seems to be available for them. Apparently, the possibility of subversion is not open for them, yet. Aunt Margaret starts to speak only when the fire breaks out and though her communication—her voice—is firm, her discourse I presented rather as a possibility beyond the limits of the novel than as an actually existing alternative. The very last sentence of the novel leaves Melanie and Finn in the garden—a place that is by that time absolutely overburdened with symbolic meanings and associations. In fact, intertextuality seems to be a device for defining them within the patriarchal discourse—just like in the emblematic case of the story of Leda and the Swan.

The situation changes dramatically in *Nights at the Circus:* as Lorna Sage has pointed out, "Yeats in the Leda poem produces a grand rhetorical question: 'Did she put on his knowledge with his power …?' Well, annoyingly enough, yes, in this version" (Sage 49). Fevvers is characterised by an overflow of speech (Fokkema 170–171). What Carter does in *The Magic Toyshop* as an author, that is, "attempts to subvert traditional patriarchal themes and imagery in fairly subtle and covert ways" (Mills 134), is carried out in *Nights at the Circus* by a character, Fevvers, as well as by "the" narrator "in fairly overt ways". Leda, who is a passive, mute victim suffering the rituals of inconclusive initiations and fails to come to terms with herself, to create an independent identity for herself in *The Magic Toyshop,* turns into Helen, starts to speak out and reinvent the paradigm in which she was engendered to launch a new

tradition "that redifines the future of humanity from a feminist ideology" (D'Haen 199). Instead of using only body-language, her speech is her body, just like in Hélène Cixous' "The Laugh of the Medusa":

> Listen to a woman speak at a public gathering (if she hasn't painfully lost her wind). She doesn't "speak", she throws her trembling body forward; she lets go of herself, she flies; all of her passes into her voice, and it's with her body that she vitally supports the "logic" of her speech. [...] In fact, she physically materialises what she's thinking; she signifies it with her body. In a certain way she *inscribes* what she's saying, because she doesn't deny her drives the intractable and impassioned part they have in speaking. (Cixous 251)

From this point on the only remaining question is how her overflowing speech should be read. Maybe not so surprisingly the validity of the stories told by Fevvers and Liz is called into question at the very end of the novel, when after really making love to her at this time, Walser asks her: "… why did you go to such lengths, once upon a time, to convince me you were the 'only fully-feathered intacta in the history of the world'?" (*NC* 294) and the answer is "I fooled you, then! … Gawd, I fooled you! … To think I really fooled you! … It just goes to show there's nothing like confidence" (*NC* 294–295). It should imply that either none of these stories are completely true, or at least one of them is not true, or there is at least one story missing. "The autobiography she sells to Walser [really may be] a staged performance" (Fokkema 172)—a repeated expression of Fevvers' fear of the loss of her independence, freedom, and identity by giving in to possessive male desire that would cage her and fix her as a sign. The aim of telling these stories—not only about herself, but about other women as well, still all of them repeating the basic scheme of women escaping, gaining freedom and establishing an existence on their own—seems to be not telling the "truth", but storytelling itself and giving rewritings of "the literary past, the myth and folklore and so on [that] are a vast repository of outmoded lies" (Carter quoted in Mills 133–134).

What is more, Fevvers, "this overliteral winged barmaid" (*NC* 16) is not only a narrator, but also an author herself, who is, by the way, conversant not only with the male literary tradition, mythology and folklore, but also with modern and postmodern poetics. While in *The*

Magic Toyshop intertexts play with the characters, in *Nights at the Circus* Fevvers herself plays with intertextuality, probably with the hidden slogan that nothing is sacred. Parodies of postmodernist and magic realist poetics, Bakhtinian ideas and even some points in feminism are given by her—that is, she parodies practically all of the most important paradigms that seem to read her and the novel itself. She refuses and resists to be interpreted as a sign either by literary tradition itself or by literary criticism and thus, by way of analogy, undermines any attempts at reading the novel itself smoothly, without gaps and contradictions within these paradigms. The narrative is like Fevvers' body: it finally turns out that she actually does not have a navel—a centre—and the story ends at the note of her laughter, a nonverbal device. "The spiralling tornado of Fevvers' laughter began to twist and shudder across the entire globe, as if a spontaneous response to the giant comedy that endlessly unfolded beneath it, until everything that lived and breathed, everywhere, was laughing" (*NC* 295). It might be "the big belly laugh" that certain extreme feminist ideas usually produce in readers according to Carter (Day 167). In Bakhtinian terms it might be the original universal medieval grotesque laughter of the carnival—a laughter that, as opposed to the totally destructive Romantic grotesque embodied by the Clowns in the novel, demolishes only in order to recreate. It might be that Fevvers' case is similar to La Zambinella's elaborated in *S/Z* by Roland Barthes, though at this time it is not castration that is unnameable but a woman as a subject defies attempts to pinpoint her in any myth about Woman and to be read as a sign. This, however, does not mean that she does not exit. According to Hélène Cixous:

> It is impossible to *define* a feminine practice of writing, and this is an impossibility that will remain for this practice can never be theorised, enclosed, coded—which doesn't mean that it doesn't exist. But it will always surpass the discourse that regulates the phallocentric system … (Cixous 253)

Thus the end note might be "the laugh of the medusa", the victorious laughter of a woman who has not only escaped patriarchal discourse, just like being encoded in the emblematic myth of Leda and the Swan, but has also rewritten it. As far as her reading is concerned, though, maybe just like a poem, Fevvers—and a woman—"should not mean but be".

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Fiction as the 'River Between': *Daniel Martin*

Tibor Tóth

Daniel Martin[1] is not only John Fowles's longest novel, but it is also a work of fiction which challenges the most feared rival of contemporary fiction both at the level of its plot and by way of 'bringing home' its technical solutions.

The most feared rival of contemporary fiction is of cours e twentieth century film, more specifically its Hollywood versions. We assert that the process of 'bringing home' technical solutions, which earlier belonged to the realist novel but by now are predominantly employed by the art of film, is an essential aspect of the novel.

This process is extremely complex and it is virtually impossible to describe it, so we would like to use two quotations taken from John Fowles's non-fiction to suggest the 'atmosphere' it is supposed to create and support.

John Fowles explains the artist's desire to be at home in a kind of myth which is at the same time extremely private and also universal, where childhood and adulthood are one but are still identifiable, where dreams and reality are and are not interchangeable.

> Beyond the specific myth of each novel, the novelist longs to
> be possessed by the continuous underlying myth he enter-
> tains of himself-a state not to be obtained by method, logic,
> self-analysis, intelligent judgement, or another of the qualities
> that make a good teacher, executive or scientist. I should
> find it very hard to define what constitutes this being pos-
> sessed, yet I know when I am and when I am not; know too,
> that there are markedly different degrees of the state; that it
> functions as much by exclusion as by awareness; and above
> all, that it remains childlike in its fertility of lateral inconse-
> quence, its setting of adultly ordered ideas in flux. Indeed,
> the workbench cost of this possession is revision-the elimi-

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[1] Fowles, John. 1986. *Daniel Martin.* Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

nation of the childish from the childlike, both in the lan-
guage and in the conception.[2]

In the following short quotation John Fowles warns against
'archetypal fear' that illusions reflected in images which are perceivable
through the senses become static and destroy the mobility characteristic
of creative perception.

> Novelists have an almost archetypal fear that illustration will
> overstamp text, or more precisely that their readers' imagi-
> nations (which play a vitally creative part in the total experi-
> ence of a book) will be pinned down and manacled by a set
> of specific images. This began long before the cinema, of
> course.[3]

Robert Huffakker states that in John Fowles's concept the artist
might occasionally conquer time and thus achieve a status, which is
superior to its rival arts. When writing about *Daniel Martin* he reaches
relevant conclusions, which serve as starting points for our expertise in
the present essay.

> The all-wise Herr Professor whom Dan and Jane meet
> cruising the Nile tells of feeling, as he concentrated upon an
> artefact, that he became "the river between"—that he
> somehow sensed *the artist's living presence, beyond time*, of *the
> ghosts of his past*.[4]

Robert Huffaker also states that for Fowles, man's triumph over
time and "the tyranny of the stupid" is his native freedom—particularly
the freedom to express the depth and breadth of his own feelings.
Robert Huffaker also writes that freedom came to be expressed in a
number of ways which otherwise could be interpreted as examples of
enslavement or tyranny.

[2] Fowles, John. 1977. "Hardy and the Hag." In *Wormholes*, 140–41. London:
Jonathan Cape, 1999.
    [3] Fowles, John. 1981. "The Filming of *The French Lieutenant's Woman*." In
Wormholes, 34–42. London: Jonathan Cape, 1999, 40.
    [4] Huffaker, Robert. 1980. *John Fowles*. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 42.

> Obsessed by magnitude and quantity, pharaohs had forced
> their people's sensibilities into a monstruosity-as-art, but
> human feelings have survived despite megalomania. (For
> John Fowles writing a novel becomes the expression of free-
> dom) "especially the freedom to know oneself" which has
> always been the driving-force of human evolution.[5]

Daniel Martin is a novel, which discusses the freedom to know one-
self, the possibility of return to the childlike innocence of its character
and of the above-mentioned mode of 'illustration,' and return to its tra-
ditional status. John Fowles tries to incorporate into his novel technical
solutions perfected by contemporary film to demonstrate their limited
possibilities in terms of artistic creativity and as opposed to the flexibility
of various fictional solutions available for the contemporary novelist.

The task undertaken by John Fowles in the novel we are discussing
is an extremely difficult one as his intention to apply the technical
solutions of film industry to fiction writing is problematic and of course
it has provoked serious criticism regarding the style, technique and
structure of *Daniel Martin*. Similar attempts of John Fowles to juxtapose
seemingly incompatible art techniques, periods of history, different
forms of art supported the artist's fiction in virtually all his earlier books.

The plot, style, technique of *Daniel Martin* lead to conclusions which
support our thesis regarding John Fowles's faith in the possibilities of
contemporary fiction to sort out and artistically formulate aspects of life,
art and freedom which are not available to other arts. As the novel is
extremely difficult to read and equally difficult to interpret, we are going
to select some relatively accessible aspects for our discussion of the
themes of art, life and freedom in *Daniel Martin*.

At the level of the plot of the novel the direction suggested by John
Fowles is easy to interpret. The protagonist of the novel is an extremely
talented middle-aged Englishman, who is a successful writer of film
scripts who at the time of the novel's present lives in Hollywood and
enjoys financial wealth, the company of beautiful women and even his
work.

Yet, his conversation with the young Scottish actress reveals frustra-
tion as the intention formulated both by the young actress and the writer
of film scripts is formulated as the necessity of going home. The possi-

[5] Huffaker 1980, 44.

bility or impossibility of getting home will become one of the central theoretical concerns of the novel as well.

The question is whether Daniel Martin can 'get home' to his country and regain his right to dream about love, friendship, countryside and an adequate form of art which can formulate his yearning for a form of life which is freed of the tyranny of money and success.

The form of art he dreamed of as a young man was drama. The availability of this form of literature to fiction was convincingly demonstrated earlier in *The Magus* where the 'art world' efficiently supported the idea that fiction is an extremely flexible form of literature, which can absorb a number of possible artistic formulae, offered up by other arts. Daniel Martin will express his intentions to write a novel entitled *Daniel Martin*, which is the novel we are about to finish when the intention is formulated

As we have already mentioned reading the novel we find out that Daniel Martin the scriptwriter working for Hollywood productions discovers that financial wealth, fame and success with women cannot compensate for the loss of his dreams to write drama. Consequently he starts writing a novel which is, actually, John Fowles's novel, entitled *Daniel Martin*.

The first section of the novel is a mixture of film and fiction and its effect is negative in the extreme. This negative aesthetics is created through the dialogic sections of the novel, which are dense with technical solutions characteristic of film-scripts. They are intended to suggest at the level of discourse and style the alien character of the world chosen earlier by the title character.

Stage directions and technical directions interrupt the fictional material and they very often disturb, technically deconstruct the tone, if not the flow of the main narrative. For example, the dialogue between the title character and his mistress ends with a short cut and thus aggressively contradicts our expectations and of course the authorial intention is to 'stain the water clear.'[6]

The above irregularities stress one of the themes behind the novel, namely the author's meditation on the difference between film and novel and the status of the artists who together contribute to the creation of a film and the solitary novelist.

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[6] Reference goes to William Balke's formula employed in "Introduction" to *Songs of Innocence*.

Stage or rather script directions call attention to the alien domain from which Daniel Martin has to escape if he wants to regain the old fashioned freedom and privacy of fiction writing. John Fowles' expertise seems to be aimed at detecting those elements, which can be shared by the two arts and the process by way of which he can render the incompatible elements of film fictionally accessible.

John Fowles discussed the difference between film and fiction on several occasions. He denounced the distortion of normal, new-humanist value system of the Hollywood 'image-making' industry in "Gather Ye Starlets."[7]

In other non-fictional works John Fowles's interpretation of the loneliness of the novelist in comparison with the 'team-work' existence of scriptwriters, directors, cameramen and actors suggests the author's pride in the difficult task of the novelist and the freedom of any writer of fiction which is a function of his individual talent.[8]

John Fowles's attitude towards film industry stems from his respect for a form of art, which gathers great talents, but he is careful to formulate his esteem for the film in the context of knowledge that film is a rival art for traditional fiction. As traditional, representational, or realistic fiction is extremely important for John Fowles, when his novels, short stories and non-fiction are concerned with the relationship between film and fiction awareness of the above rivalry is emphatically formulated.

When John Fowles casts his title character in the position of the prodigal son, whose return to the world he earlier betrayed and abandoned becomes a central concern at all the dimensions of the book, he creates the fictional frame for the discussion of the relationship of the two contemporary rival arts as well.

Yet, *Daniel Martin* should not be interpreted in (auto)biographical terms, because its larger context establishes the theoretical interpretation of contemporary fiction's possibilities as a first principle, and thus it becomes consistent with most of John Fowles's work, in that it fictionalises the theoretical aspects which regard the state of fiction.

As we have already suggested, in this sense the novel follows the authorial intention stated by his earlier novels. *The Collector* discusses the

[7] Fowles, John. 1965. "Gather Ye Starlets." In *Wormholes*, 89–99. London: Jonathan Cape, 1999.

[8] Fowles, John. 1981. "The Filming of *The French Lieutenant's Woman*." In *Wormholes*, 34–42. London: Jonathan Cape, 1999.

possibility of fictionalising the dual narrative in essentially realistic mode and yet avoids similarity with the inarticulate material created by some fifties and sixties fiction. Aspects of life and art relationship are relevant, impenetrable mysteries for the collector who is a monster created by the process of dehumanisation which dominates the fifties.

The Magus demonstrates that the death of the novel, formulated by one of the main characters of the novel is a false fictional possibility. Maurice Conchis's insistence on artistic possibilities other than fictional are articulated within the frames of traditional narrative. In that novel the result is that that fiction benefits from the contribution of the technical and artistic possibilities offered up by the 'masks,' or the relevant literary and artistic echoes employed to justify and articulate the 'lessons' formulated by the dramatic episodes.

Mechanical 'art' is condemned in *The Collector*, where it is mainly associated with killing, and perverse dehumanisation. Maurice Conchis promises June and Julie roles in a film which is never completed, and the films that are actually produced in that novel produced are porno material.

Daniel Martin starts from the description of the harvest scene, which turns horrible through its imagery. The chapter forces the reader to accept that he or she is ignorant about the nature of the memories, which were revealed by the author. The text of the chapter becomes difficult to interpret and authorial support is refused to the reader. "Did 'ee see 'un, m'? Did 'ee see 'un, Miz Martin? Us-all coulda touched'un, coulden us, Danny?" could be the more intelligible variant of James Joyce's song introducing Stephen Dedalus's story, but as the image of the bombers and of the animals being massacred predicted the 'pastoral' dimension lost its meaning as idyllic or peaceful.

The presentation of the scene is impersonal to the extent that it could be charged as cruel. We jump in time through a short 'Later.' The scene, which openly recalls Hardy, ends, when the young protagonist says goodbye to his boyhood.

> Adieu, my boyhood and my dream.
> Close shot.
> D.H.M.
> And underneath: 21 Aug 42. (*D. M.* 16)

This is then the dimension to which the novel's title character has to return in order to achieve the 'whole sight,' without which all is desolation as the first line of the novel announces. Yet we know that the past which has to be revisited showed him as "Inscrutable innocent, already in exile." (*D. M.* 16) The question is whether return to an earlier phase of exile is worth the price. Of course we do not know yet what the price is.

The chapter entitled "Games" introduces us to a more comfortable form of exile. Daniel Martin manages to write materials, which actually bring him success in a totally alien world; the dream factory of media dominated contemporary society.

As it happened in John Fowles's earlier novels the mobility of the setting is relevant. Daniel Martin, the child whom we met in the first chapter was born and brought up in England, but in the novel's present he lives in Hollywood. The first chapter is not his memory of the past but an impersonal, 'shooting' a technical solution, which is meaningless even in the context of the first two chapters.

The paradise, or dream world of many artists was generous to the prodigal son, who nevertheless has to travel back to England to discover his need for 'naturalness' and later his right to be happy and rooted in a tradition which he came to forget. The journey is rather relevant in its spiritual sense, and this is explicit in the novel as Daniel Martin can only arrive 'home' if he visits a land of more complex spiritual significance than England or America.

Egypt brings about the theme of Isis and Osiris, with the possible interpretation of the spirit of Dorset assimilating its 'brother' formerly blinded and misled by financial success and giving birth to it. What disturbs the reader of *Daniel Martin* is its 'material' pretence, that is that in most part John Fowles is trying to pass a theoretically discussed series of film-script-like chapters as a coherent, traditional novel.

Actually, the above mentioned pretence supports the 'existential' and spiritual situation of the protagonist. Daniel Martin misinterpreted the concept of freedom similarly to Nicholas Urfe in *The Magus*. Nicholas Urfe interpreted freedom as the result of being unattached. Daniel Martin interpreted freedom as a series of fragments of indispensable infidelities. These infidelities are interpreted as fragments because they were committed by Daniel Martin as reactions to certain conflicting situations viewed in isolation which the protagonist is trying to interpret

in the larger context of his enslavement by a definitely alien form of life and art only when he is forced to meditate on his possibilities of 'getting home.' We have already demonstrated the nature of the technique, which creates the sense of isolation, which rules the novel's first two chapters.

Daniel Martin is culpable for a series of infidelities, which in their turn determine his perception of spiritual and material reality and the narrative strategy employed by John Fowles attempts to reproduce the novel's dissociation from traditional interpretation, which his title-character importantly comes to understand step by step.

The successful scriptwriter only realises after many years of pseudo-security provided by financial wealth that he has to pay for his disloyalty, his betrayal of what he at the moment of the writing of the novel comes to understand as art. Art is different from the 'creative writing' he has excelled in as a famous scriptwriter and his gradual 'reforgetting'[9] of earlier dreams of art brings about his 'reforgetting' of earlier dreams of life as well.

Consequently the novel reveals other aspects of betrayal as he discovers that the lovely mistress with whom he has a love affair, or rather a flirt fades away besides the memory of the woman he loved and deserted. This realisation helps him understand one source of his exile.

Art and love have become for him constituent elements of an overall false attitude towards life and implicitly are telling of his paradoxical betrayal of ideals, which are indispensable for his integrity. This means that Daniel Martin is faced with his image as an artificial 'version' of what he could have become if he had chosen the right form of art and life.

He has to learn that if he wants to interpret his existence in human-istic terms, he has to give up his right to direct, order and manipulate people from the position of authority provided for him by his status as a script writer of international fame. Because he has the courage 'to get home' our idea of him will be interpretable by paraphrasing John Fowles.

> I don't think of myself as 'giving up work to be a writer,'
> I'm giving up work to, at last, be.[10]

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[9] *Reforgetting* is a term employed by John Fowles's artist character in *Mantissa*.

[10] Fowles, John. 1964. "I Write Therefore I Am." In *Wormholes*, 5–12. London: Jonathan Cape, 1999, 7.

Similarly Daniel Martin has to understand that he sacrificed traditionally human institutions like marriage, friendship and professional dedication on the altar of false judgements, which nevertheless are valid, accepted and powerful in the world of success. Yet, the title hero senses that money, success and international reputation as established authority in the film industry do not allow for dimensions which are natural in the world of a novelist who is dedicated to fiction the 'Cinderella' in the world mass-produced art.

When he calls the novel a 'Cinderella' form of art John Fowles explains that for most novelists to have their fiction filmed is the equivalent of having a luxury hard cover edition published. Yet, we should remember that he hastens to add that novel writing can offer a privacy, and fidelity to the 'muse' or inspiration which film industry can never achieve.[11]

The novel is not so pessimistic as some critics understood it to be, what is more, we could say that it is, so far, the first from among John Fowles's novels, which has a happy ending. As we have already stated the frustration of the reader stems from the intentionally 'mistaken' choice of technique, the discomfort brought about by the wrong means employed for the wrong art an aspect that is explicit in the narrative technique of the novel. The tyranny of success and money is also given comprehensive presentation and its seemingly unquestionable dominance comes to be reduced as the protagonist manages to identify his 'roots' and 'reactivate' them.

In *Daniel Martin* mass-dehumanisation is more comprehensively handled than in *The Collector* and the process is envisaged as reversible. The title hero of the novel can take the road he earlier abandoned for money, success or what seemed to be a more rewarding form of existence as the novel Daniel Martin is writing manages to disclose its roots, and this process is not delayed by the author. When John Fowles admits his association with the art of Thomas Hardy in the first chapter of *Daniel Martin* he makes it clear that return to tradition is possible mainly owing to the life force contained by that tradition.

[11] Fowles, John. 1988. "A Modern Writer's France." In *Wormholes*, 43–55. London: Jonathan Cape, 1999, 43.

Thomas Hardy's influence[12] also suggests that the world to which Daniel Martin wants to return is loaded with ideological, moral, ethical and artistic dilemmas. We also should remember that return would not bring about happiness as a static condition but rather as a series of 'short lived joy' which compensates for participation in the continuous drama of 'being at home.'

The protagonist of the novel has to find remedy for virtually all the wrongs that he caused through his ignorance of his own status as artist and a human being. Daniel Martin gave up genuine love out of misjudged honesty towards his friend with the result that his friendship with Anthony became the victim of false social and moral norms and expectations.

The existential elements at stake are 'solved' in the course of the plot and they are supported by the possibility created by another major theme of the novel, which is the relationship between art and life. Life, that is events formulated by the plot, Anthony's approaching death and the relative impossibility of refusing a dyeing friend's last wish creates the fictional pretext or possibility for Daniel Martin to revisit the physical dimension which hosted the promise of a fuller, more human variant of life in his youth.

If we interpret the novel as a set of isolated 'scenes' where the 'artificial' distance is preserved by the infidelities of the title character we may say that Anthony's death could be compared to the removal of one brick from the wall which separates the falsehood of 'adulthood' and the 'innocence in exile' of childhood. Because the 'wall' which separates these dimensions is of Dan's construction it does not 'collapse' and the process brings about an easily interpretable stream of memories.

The proximity of a myth influences the course of the protagonist's spiritual 'career,' as in most of the novels of John Fowles. Art 'regained,' in its turn allows for the reformulation of human relationships and marks the end of Daniel Martin's hollow existence. The principle of chronologically identifiable and describable journey, which actually is the material equivalent of a character's spiritual journey, is relevant and consistent with John Fowles's art so we have to pay attention to his handling of this dimension in the novel as well.

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[12] Cassagrande, Peter J. 1987. *Hardy's Influence on the Modern Novel.* London: Macmillan Press.

In *Daniel Martin* John Fowles's handling of chronology or rather the time dimension is also designed to support the success of the other narrative elements at work. *Daniel Martin* opens at two widely separate times and settings which actually determine the protagonist's fate, because they can be identified as standing for his relationship towards two opposite interpretations of life and art.

As we have already mentioned we meet Daniel who is fifteen years old in Devon in August 1942. Two incidents deconstruct the idyllic possibilities of harvest and the rural setting. It is also important that Daniel Martin is the son of a rural clergyman whose first memories envisaged in the novel are related to horror, rather than idyllic peace and calm.

The young boy watches in horror the slaughter of the rabbits by the harvesters and air raids and bombing disturb the harvest. War and bombing are relevant elements of memory, but as there are no victims, it is the sense of panic, which it causes, that becomes a relevant element that can contribute to the general atmosphere of the novel. The events have to be defined as the novel's past, although, as we have stated earlier, awareness of the protagonist's past has to be regained.

The present tense of the novel introduces the other face of Daniel Martin. He is a middle-aged film writer of international reputation. Prosperous, envied by many he lives in his luxury apartment building in Hollywood, California. A successful middle-aged man should be attractive for women and the stereotype is complete as when we meet him Daniel Martin is speaking with his mistress, Jenny O'Neill. This beautiful woman is a promising young Scottish actress, of course, but as we learn about their conversation the accepted stereotypes do not match perfectly, as the two are speaking about the necessity of 'going home' and going home is not only interpretable literally. Returning home and being at home do not complement an atmosphere of certainty and balanced existence but suggest a sense of split identity.

> 'It was on the old Camelot set. It suddenly hit me. How well I matched it. The betrayal of myths. As if I was totally in exile from what I ought to have been.' He added, Done.'
>> 'And what is that?'
>> 'Good question.'
>> 'Try.'

'Something to do with the artifice of the medium.'
(D. M. 20)

The novel itself is telling of split identity because it is written in the form of a film script and it is absorbed by the permanent sense of division in the novel as it illustrates Daniel Martin's return from California to Devon. For the successful film-writer of international reputation return to Devon means that he is to abandon all that only Hollywood can offer in terms of money. Here again the situation suggests that human relationships, forgotten ideals can only be regained if he is able and ready to resume his place in a long forgotten ambition to become a writer of drama, or rather fiction. This process of 'reforgetting' can help him regain freedom over creating his own fictional future.

Mistaken decisions determine the directions taken by the book we are reading. Daniel Martin has betrayed Nell before their marriage with her sister Jane and during their marriage he betrayed her with a series of other women. Daniel Martin betrayed his friend and his ideal of friendship, when he had an affair with Jane of which Anthony knew and later as he had written and staged a spiteful play in which he puts the blame on Anthony, Jane and Nell. Daniel Martin betrayed his father who was an Anglican clergyman and his creed, because he becomes an atheist. He betrayed his artistic inclinations, his creative urge when he abandoned his dream to write a drama for the profits and fame of commercial film writing. No wonder he is telling Jenny that getting home is impossible.

> 'If you run away, Jenny, you can't find your way back. That's all I meant. Trying to ... it's only a pipe-dream. Trying to crawl back inside the womb. Turn the clock back.' He turns and smiles across at her. 'Late night maundering.'
>
> 'You're so defeatist. All you have to do is put down exactly what you've just said.'
>
> 'That's the last chapter. What I've become.' (D. M. 22)

Dan has given up home, Devon, his roots convinced that it belongs to a dimension of his existence that will never reveal itself, once success, new life, career women give a new sense to his life. Anthony's approaching death becomes a kind of call for a new life for Daniel Martin, an undreamed of opportunity to achieve something he himself never really was able to articulate. He is offered the chance that one of his infi-

delities could be pardoned. The call from England is the call of a long forgotten past dream, a dream he could not even articulate as the two women are calling at Anthony's request, to ask Dan to visit his former friend, who is dying of cancer.

Daniel Martin reacts favourably to his former friend's request and when he flies to England he reveals that his ignorance of his former infidelity was a pretence as the fact that he 'repents' and goes to Oxford to meet with Anthony, now an Oxford philosopher, demonstrates that he knows that he must face the 'heart of darkness' of his own creation and this revelation enables him to use the chances to recover his lost past.

The novel creates a sense of a new beginning, of rebirth as Daniel Martin visits Anthony and the two confess their infidelities to each other. Daniel Martin is faced with his own earlier dreams is able to articulate his ambitions and understands that art and life are more important than his 'official' status.

> 'Long-distance. From home. They transferred the call.'
> 'Who is it?'
> 'The operator didn't say.' [...]
> 'I shouldn't get excited. A hundred to one it's just some moronic Fleet-Street tattle-monger short of a paragraph.'
> 'Or my Highland great-grandmother.' [...]
> In his ear, distances.
> The voice; and unbelievably, as in a fiction, the door in the wall opens. (*D. M.* 24)

Daniel Martin discovers that he is not flying to New York and home but into an 'empty space.' Anthony dies but not before making Dan promise to help Jane regain her status as a free woman. Anthony's argument actually charts Daniel Martin's journey back home.

'What she needs is someone who both knows her and doesn't. Who can remember what she once was? She's become very withdrawn, Dan. [...] One reason I can't talk with her about all these matters is that our marriage has become the standing proof that my case has no validity. I preach in an empty church, which proves my sermons are worthless.' (*D. M.* 203)

Dan is left no time to change his mind after agreeing, for Anthony commits suicide moments after Dan leaves the hospital. In large part

Dan will compensate for the lost time and possibilities as his relationship
with Jane assumes the optimistic tone of the happiness he could not
sense some twenty years earlier.

This more 'optimistic' ending is accompanied by the change of the
narrative technique of the novel. In the moment Daniel Martin manages
to abandon interpreting his life as if it were a film and return to a more
comprehensive tradition which is fiction he becomes able to restore
some of the essential dimensions of one's perception of reality, of the
existential.

Katherine Tarbox explains John Fowles's attitude and the nature of
the above narrative strategy.

> Fowles believes that linear time is an artificial measuring
> device imposed upon experience, the real time is nebulous
> and that all time lies parallel.[13]

Dan returns with Jane to Thorncombe and they feel that they get
home to precious experiences of their youth. He does it also by rejecting
film-writing and committing himself to writing, with Jane's encourage-
ment, an autobiographical novel whose hero is named Simon Wolfe.

As Katherine Tarbox notes Daniel Martin has to escape the tyranny
of the cinema.

> Dan's art lapses into present-tense narration mimic, the pre-
> sent tense tyranny of the camera.[14]

He manages to escape this tyranny and the novel reproduces the
tonal recovery of the characters at the level of its texture.

One of the most curious features of this novel is that it changes
abruptly two thirds of the way through. It changes, of course at the
section that deals with Dan and Jane going up the Nile. The crazy-quilt
structure gives way to a very traditional, linear, sequential narration.[15]

We may say that *Daniel Martin* is a novel, which is quite difficult to
read because it contains technical solutions and methods, which belong
to another sort of art, which is film. John Fowles has repeatedly men-

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[13] Tarbox, Katherine. 1988. *The Art of John Fowles.* Athens and London: The
University of Georgia Press, 7.
[14] Tarbox 1988, 89.
[15] Tarbox 1988, 100.

tioned his concern regarding the inadequate means by which the realist novel is trying to do something that other arts are better equipped to achieve. The artist was absolutely right when he continued by attesting that the novel will continue in this way because readers are not prepared to accept a radically different solution to these problems.

Daniel Martin is an excellent illustration of what happens if the very nature of the two arts, that is the cinema and the fictional one are applied mechanically on either of them. It is important to remember that Daniel Martin considers the novel to stand above other forms of representation.

He manages to give up scriptwriting by the end of the novel in an attempt to 'get home,' that is to find his peace and harmony, or at least what is left of it. The novel employs the means of cinematic representation, such as flashbacks, intercutting, close-ups, which are actually inadequate as means of fictional representation in order to create the sense of displacement characteristic of the novel.

The structure of the novel is rendered similarly chaotic by a constant change of narrators, tenses, points of view. Yet it is possible to detect behind the parade of alien technical solutions which seem to govern the problematical structure of the novel the development of Daniel Martin's life-story from his teenage period to adulthood.

Daniel is a lonely character in the opening chapter of the novel and his alienation from the people slaughtering the rabbits and scared to death by the German bombers is clear from the very beginning of his life story. We are tempted to say that middle aged Daniel Martin is trying to tell us his interpretation of what he really was and is with the intention to find out what he can be, but this very smooth formula is contradicted by the organising principle at work.

We have already mentioned that Daniel Martin understands the artificial quality of his 'existence' and he compares it to the artificiality of the only medium he seems to be 'at home' in, which is film. Because he employs the technique of film, the different perspectives remain isolated, and they cannot cohere a narrative deficiency which is employed to express the kind of 'technical exile' as opposed to the '(human) spiritual exile' experienced by the protagonist.

The novel thus 'cuts' the roots of art, which feed on life and the most visible dimension of 'rootlessness' is linked to traditional elements of fiction like setting, time and narrative point of view. If we take, for example, time it is quite easy to demonstrate that life and art are in

search of conventional definition of time which includes past, present
and future. Three-dimensional time is regained through journeys dense
with private and collective myths, from among which the one regarding
Isis and Osiris seems to be extremely important.

> They were taken into a room to see a delicately incised wall-
> carving of the ritual pouring of the flood waters of the Nile,
> and he and she stayed on to see it better [...] Two divinities,
> a male and a female, faced each other, holding up tilted
> flasks from which the water poured in two curved and
> crossing lines, forming an arch; except that it wasn't water,
> but chains of the ancient keys-of-life, cascades of little loop-
> topped crosses. (*D. M.* 533)

Whether story, fictional reworking, 'homecoming' can be interpreted
or not remains unstated at the end of the novel.

> Dan's novel can never be read, lies eternally in the future,
> his ill-concealed ghost has made it impossible last his own
> impossible first. (*D. M.* 668)

Since *Daniel Martin* does not follow a traditional presentation of
events, does not have chronological order a great deal of ordering is re-
quired. The novel contests and subverts the linear or diachronic devel-
opment of events and challenges the straightforward way of reading.

The economy of traditional fictional methods fits better the
fragmented accounts, the chaos of which Daniel is trying to make sense,
but he has to work hard to regain access to smooth interpretation.
Daniel starts to write a novel about his own life and the book 'suffers'
the disadvantages of fiction constructed upon elements of film-script but
in the end it leads to the union of the two arts in fiction.

As we have already stated the 'chaos' is supported through John
Fowles's handling of the dimension of time. Timelessness replaces tem-
porality and it dismisses unity, classification, or conventional order of
narrative. This kind of interpretation of time is not really problematical
in *The French Lieutenant's Woman*, because one finds conventional ele-
ments that render the different experiments comprehensive for the
reader. Of course, the flow of water which is not water, of time which is
not time, the "chains of the ancient keys-of-life," the 'cascades' of differ-
ent time dimensions, settings, meanings and technical solutions contrib-

ute to the unnatural character of the book which can be explained as the representation of the artist, life and art seen as "character(s) who must be seen in flight, like a bird that has forgotten how to stop migrating." (*D. M.* 295)

This 'migration' from one art to another, from one dimension in time to another, from artificial to natural life is supported by Daniel Martin's anxiety which stems from his understanding that the old is dying and the new cannot be born, reminiscent of John Fowles's theory regarding the situation of the novel in the twentieth century, when he states that if the novel is to survive it has to narrow its field to what other systems of recording cannot record.

> I say 'one day' because the reading public still isn't very aware of what I call mischanelling [...].[16]

This individual and artistic anxiety is explained at the level of social and moral development as well at the beginning of the novel when he states that his contemporaries were brought up in the spirit of the nineteenth century because the twentieth century only started after 1945.

The statement is interesting with regards to the development of fiction, the genre Daniel Martin is trying to return to because the disputes about insistence on the material world as opposed to the representation of the artist's and its protagonists' interior world started much earlier. The criticism is then addressed to those who let themselves, their perception and presentation be reduced to the material world, its artifice in search of "something discontinuous and disconnected from present being." (*D. M.* 95)

Of course, Daniel Martin's personal failure is described in terms of the more private dimension of man woman relationship when he shows himself as someone who wants to define his identity by using the surface-reflection of him formulated by women.

> He was arguably not even looking for women in all this, but collecting mirrors still; surfaces before which he could make himself naked—or at any rate more naked than he could before other men—and see himself reflected. A psychoanalyst might say he was something for the lost two-in-one identity

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[16] Fowles, John. 1964. "I Write Therefore I Am." In *Wormholes*, 5–12. London: Jonathan Cape, 1999, 7.

of his first months of life; some solution for his double separation trauma, the universal one of infancy and the private experience of literally losing his mother. (*D. M.* 255-56)

Daniel Martin understands that the traditional definition of harmony, unity, order traps people into self-discipline, and restraint and this is ultimately the strategy that made of him a kind of authority in a world which is as artificial as the Victorian world dominated by the image of God. Daniel Martin discovers that homecoming in both terms of art and life is to know the difference between conventions and individual freedom, financial prosperity and spiritual redemption.

> She was also some kind of emblem of a redemption from life devoted to heterogamy and adultery, the modern errant ploughman's final reward; and Dan saw … for the first time in his life, the true difference between Eros and Agape. (*D. M.* 596) [Or Eros and civilisation, we might add.]

As we have already stated most notably, the novel explains the importance of absorbing the possibilities offered by contemporary rival arts. Daniel Martin understands that "dialogue is the only tool of the scriptwriter, but it is only a part of the novelist's art."[17]

The novel's insistence on two narrative points is abandoned in the last part and thus the 'I' and the 'he' is telling about the union of showing and telling and of the rebirth of past in present, much in the fashion described by Fowles.

> I have heard writers claim that this first-person technique is a last bastion of the novel against the cinema, a form where the camera dictates an inevitable third-person point of view of what happens, however much we may identify with one character. But the matter of whether a contemporary novelist uses 'he' or 'I' is largely irrelevant. The great majority of modern third person narration is 'I' narration very thinly disguised. The real 'I' of the Victorian writers—the writer himself or herself—is as rigorously repressed there […] as it

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[17] Ibid., 93.

is, for obvious semantic and grammatical reasons, when the narration is in literal first-person. [18]

John Fowles's "I Write Therefore I Am" seems to offer relevant help when trying to formulate conclusions to our discussion of *Daniel Martin*.

> Why have I got it in for the novel? Because it has been shifted away from life, whatever, as Wittgenstein put it, is the case, these last fifty years. Circumstances have imposed this shift. It is not the novelists' fault. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the novel was at one remove from life. But since the advent of film and television and sound recording it is at two removes. The novel is now generally about things and events, which other forms of art describe rather better. [...] All of us under forty write cinematically; our imaginations, constantly fed on films, 'shoot' scenes, and write descriptions of what has been shot. So for us a lot of novel writing is, or seems like, the tedious translating of an unmade and never-to-be-made film into words.[19]

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[18] Fowles, John. 1969. "Notes on an Unfinished Novel." In *Wormholes*, 13–26. John. London: Jonathan Cape, 1999, 18.

[19] Fowles, John. 1964. "I Write Therefore I Am." In *Wormholes*, 5–12. London: Jonathan Cape, 1999, 7.

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On the Constituent Structure of Infinitives and Gerunds in English

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In this paper, I discuss the constituent structure and syntactic category of English infinitives and gerunds—two closely related issues in the syntax of nonfinite complements in English that have emerged since the publication of Rosenbaum 1967, the first major work on nonfinite complementation in a generative framework. For the purposes of the present discussion, I will essentially assume the principles and categories of Government and Binding Theory (as developed in Chomsky 1981, 1982, 1986), and X-bar Theory (cf. Chomsky 1970 and Jackendoff 1977), with minor modifications. After reviewing the major competing hypotheses, and weighing the arguments, on the syntax of English infinitival and gerundive complements, I will conclude that both infinitives and gerunds are essentially clausal in constituent structure, with the proviso that Poss-*ing* gerunds are clauses embedded in noun phrases.

1 Introduction

The following morpho-syntactic types of nonfinite complements (and adjuncts) occur in English:

1. *to*-infinitives,
2. naked infinitives,
3. gerunds (and *-ing* participles), and
4. *-ed* participles.

The term *nonfinite* will be used, following accepted practice, to refer to the form of a sentence or clause which is not marked for the categories of mood, tense, number, and person, though it will be marked for voice and aspect. Attention will be focused on *to*-infinitival and gerundive complements. I will say nothing about type 4 complements (though they are frequently inadequately treated in standard reference grammars, such as, e.g., Quirk et al. 1985), and very little about naked infinitives or *-ing* participles.

Two major classes of competing hypotheses have been proposed on the syntactic category and constituent structure of nonfinite constructions in English in generative grammar and frameworks sympathetic to

it. Chierchia (1984), for example, argues that English infinitives and gerunds are verb phrases, while in Chomsky 1981, and much other work inspired by GB, either both infinitives and gerunds, or at least the former, are analyzed as embedded sentences. Koster and May (1982) address the issue directly in an influential article, where they provide a detailed comparison of the predictions the VP hypothesis and the clausal hypothesis make, and they conclude that infinitives—and as the analysis, they claim, extends readily to gerunds, they too—are sentences in English.

Not all hypotheses treat infinitives and gerunds uniformly, though. It is often argued, principally, and sometimes exclusively, on distributional grounds, that infinitives and gerunds must be assigned to different categories. In Chomsky 1981, for example, infinitives are sentences, and gerunds are NPs, although Chomsky leaves open the possibility that gerunds "might be analyzed as containing a clause internal to the NP" (p. 223, fn. 10). In the lexicalist framework of Maxwell (1984), which might be characterized as intermediate in a sense between the VP hypothesis and the clausal hypothesis, infinitives and gerunds are likewise treated differently. Maxwell claims, quite surprisingly perhaps, that gerunds but not infinitives are sentences in English, the latter taken to be VPs. Finally, it has also been proposed that *to*-infinitives should be treated as prepositional phrases headed by the particle *to,* analyzed as a preposition, and thus kept distinct from gerunds, which are claimed to be noun phrases (Duffley and Tremblay 1994). These and related issues are discussed in sections 2 and 3 below.

2 The Constituent Structure of Infinitives

2.1   The PP Hypothesis

An intriguing but extremely problematic proposal concerning the category of English *to*-infinitives is put forth by Duffley and Tremblay (1994), who argue that "the best way to describe the syntactic role of the *to*-infinitive seems to be to analyze it as a prepositional phrase having an adverbial function with respect to the main verb."

Duffley and Tremblay argue, following Emonds (1976), that gerunds but not *to*-infinitives are NPs. The significance of the NP status of gerunds for their hypothesis is to confirm that gerunds and *to*-infinitives are different syntactic categories. This would lend indirect support to

Duffley and Tremblay's claim that *to*-infinitives are PPs in the function of adverbials, in contrast to gerunds, which, being NPs, have the function of direct object complements on the matrix verb.

In support of their proposal that *to*-infinitives are PPs, Duffley and Tremblay (1994:570) argue, incorrectly, that the *to* particle of the infinitive is parallel to a P in a PP in that both may be used as 'pro-forms' to represent the XP they head in sentences like

(1) a. He crawled through the tunnel.
     b. Then his brother crawled through too.

(2) a. He tried to open the door.
     c. Then I tried to as well.

The argument fails simply because *through* is an AdvP in (1b) and not a P. A preposition cannot behave in ways claimed by Duffley and Tremblay, cf.

(3) a. John put the vase on the table.
     b. *Mary put the vase on too.

(4) a. John sat on a chair.
     b. *Mary sat on too.

In another argument, Duffley and Tremblay suggest a parallelism in structure between the following examples.

(5) a. She longed for peace and quiet.
     b. She longed to be quiet.

They argue that the occurrence of an infinitival complement on prepositional verbs, such as *long for,* which subcategorize for PPs, is not exceptional since the *to*-particle is in fact a P. But then what about the many non-prepositional verbs like *want, like, try,* etc. which take infinitival complements? It would be extremely dubious to assume that they are characterized by two subcategorization frames: one with a direct object NP and another with a PP (of a unique sort which may contain exclusively the preposition *to* and no other prepositions), let alone the other part of the claim that this PP is an (obligatory) adverbial.

It would be equally problematic to assume that there are PPs in English of the form $[_{PP} [_{P} to] [_{\alpha} ...]]$, where α can only be a naked infinitive. Notice that we would still have infinitives, but all would be naked, *to*-infinitives having been eliminated from the grammar by being converted to PPs. If, on the other hand, α is a clause, then an important generalization will again be lost, since on this assumption the lexical entries for all non-prepositional verbs of the *want* type will have to be restructured so that they can take PP complements of this very special kind. These are highly undesirable consequences, therefore the hypothesis must be rejected as untenable.

2.2   *The Clausal Hypothesis*

The assumption that English infinitives, as well as nonfinite complements in general, are sentences is well supported by theoretical as well as empirical arguments. Greenbaum (1980) and Quirk et al. (1985) present some relevant arguments informally. The essence of their arguments can be summarized like this: the constructions under discussion are regarded as sentences because their internal structure can be analyzed into the same constituents as independent sentences. A more formal discussion of the subject within a generative framework is offered by Koster and May (1982), who consider both the internal and the external syntax of nonfinites.

Koster and May argue that infinitive complements on verbs, and that in fact all infinitives, are sentential. They assert, also, that the analysis extends readily to gerundial complements. In this type of analysis the complementizer and subject which are absent from superficial structure are represented by lexically empty categories.

In this approach, "there are two types of clausal complements, finite and non-finite, symmetrical with respect to internal phrase-structure" (ibid., 116). It is assumed in general in what is referred to here as the clausal hypothesis that in infinitival and gerundial complements that lack a surface subject and complementizer "the missing constituents ... are in fact categorically present, but devoid of terminal elements" (ibid., 117).

The major arguments center around three aspects of infinitive complements. First, it is demonstrated that infinitives not only have parallel phrase structure with finite clauses, but they also share the important syntactic property with finite clauses that a number of syntactic

processes that affect the latter also affect the former. Second, it is shown that "infinitives (and gerunds) must have subjects at some level of representation" (ibid., 136). Third, it is pointed out that certain properties of the semantic component and of X' syntax provide further arguments for the claim that infinitives and gerunds are clauses.

Since many syntactic processes affect finite as well as nonfinite clauses but never VPs, they can be used to distinguish between VPs and clauses.

2.3   Pseudo-Clefting

Clauses but not VPs may occur in the focus of a pseudo-cleft:

(6) a. What he suspected was [$_{CP}$ that Bill saw Monument Valley]
     b. *What he suspected that Bill was [$_{VP}$ saw Monument Valley]

(7) a. What he wanted was [$_{CP}$ for Bill to see Monument Valley]
     b. *What he wanted for Bill was [$_{VP}$ to see Monument Valley]

(8)   What he wanted was [$_{CP}$ to visit Monument Valley]

Koster and May note that only *for-to* infinitival complements may be pseudo-clefted, that is, pseudo-clefting of an infinitive complement is restricted to matrix verbs that allow or require a complementizer C in their clausal CP complement to be filled by the C *for* (1982:132, fn. 10). This group of verbs may be identified semantically as the subclass of "subject-oriented" (see Maxwell 1984) emotive verbs (see Kiparsky and Kiparsky 1971, Maxwell 1984, and also Quirk et al. 1985), which describe the opinion or emotional attitude of the person denoted by the subject. The class includes *want, like, hate, prefer,* etc. but not *believe, know, try,* or *condescend,* for example, which seem to belong in the class of "epistemic" verbs that are characterized by Chomsky and Lasnik (1977:475) as selecting a 0 (zero) complementizer. Verbs of the latter group do not select the complementizer *for* and they do not allow pseudo-clefting of their infinitival complements, as is demonstrated by the following examples.[1]

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[1] It must be noted, however, that analyses as well as acceptability judgments sometimes vary, as in this case. (10) above is rejected as ungrammatical by Koster and May, but a close analog is deemed acceptable in Boskovic 1997, where, importantly, it

(9)   *What John believes is him to have seen Monument Valley.

(10) *What John tried was to see Monument Valley.

(11) *What the manager condescended was to have lunch with us in
      the canteen.

2.4   Extraposition from NP

Since infinitival VPs do not extrapose but finite clauses with filled C, as
in (12b), may, extraposition of an infinitive, as in (13b), testifies to its
clausal status (cf. Koster and May 1982:133).

(12) a.   A book which we didn't like appeared.
     b.   A book appeared which we didn't like.

(13) a.   A book on which to work appeared.
     b.   A book appeared on which to work.

2.5   Finite and Infinitival Clauses Conjoined

A universal constraint on coordination requires that the coordinated
constituents be of the same syntactic category. Therefore we do not
expect to find VPs coordinated with clauses. But, as Koster and May
observe, infinitives do have the ability to conjoin with finite clauses,
which furnishes us with a further argument in favor of the sentential
status of infinitival complements. Consider the following examples:

(14) To write a novel and for the world to give it critical acclaim is
      John's dream.

(15) John expected to write a novel but that it would be a critical
      disaster.

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supports the minimalist claim that all control infinitives are IPs, which, in turn, justifies
Boskovic's move, motivated by economy considerations, to eliminate c-selection from
grammar (p. 21):

     (i)   What the terrorists tried was [$_{IP}$ PRO to hijack an airplane]

    Alternatively, it might also be that we are simply witnessing variability, or perhaps
even an ongoing change, in the use of patterns of complementation in the sense of
Mair (2002), which then means that we indeed need different grammars of comple-
mentation to account for dialectal differences.

However, acceptability judgments with regard to such sentences do not seem to be unanimously positive. Quirk et al. (1985:947), for example, assert quite the contrary, saying that "the members of coordinate constructions tend to be parallel both in their structure and in their meaning" therefore "it is scarcely acceptable for different types of nonfinite clause to be coordinated, or for finite dependent clauses to be coordinated with nonfinite clauses, even where there is a strong semantic affinity between the two clauses." They assert that "it seems impossible, for example, to coordinate a nominal infinitive with an *-ing* clause" (ibid.):

(16) *George likes *going to the races* and *to bet on the horses.*

But they, too, admit that "occasional examples such as the following occur" (ibid.):

(17)   The empress, *nearing her death* and *surrounded by doctors and necromancers,* was no longer in control of her ministers.

(18)   The curfew bell rang at sunset every evening, *to warn the citizens that it was time for bed,* and *so that secret defensive measures could be taken by the army.*

2.6   WH-Movement

Consider the following examples:

(19) a.   I wonder [$_{CP}$ [$_C$ what] to do].
     b.   a topic [$_{CP}$ [$_C$ on which] to work]

The only way to account for the existence and structure of such sentences on the VP hypothesis is to assume that not only finite clauses but VPs too are introduced by C, which would raise serious problems. In addition, on this assumption we would also have to allow VPs 'to function as relative clauses' within NPs. As Koster and May (1982:133) observe, *Wh*-movement is "a typical S'-rule moving WH-phrases to COMP." The fact that it appears to apply in 'subjectless' infinitival complements is interpreted by Koster and May, following Chomsky (1980) and Williams (1980), as direct evidence that infinitives are sentential.

As I have already suggested above, certain distributional properties of infinitives (and some *-ing* participles) also point to their sentential status. It is noted in Chomsky and Lasnik 1977 that infinitives pattern with finite clauses in that they occur as restrictive relatives:

(20) a. I found a poem to memorize.
     b. I thought up a topic for you to work on.
     c. I found a topic on which to write my term paper.
     d. There is a man to fix the sink at the front door.
     e. If you find anyone to fix the sink, let me know.

As the following sentences show, *-ing* participles also pattern with finite clauses in that they occur as restrictive relatives in noun phrases:

(21) a. I found a sentence requiring careful analysis.
     b. There is a man selling cherries at the front door.
     c. If you find anyone carrying a large umbrella, call me.

Such participial relatives are more restricted in occurrence than their infinitival counterparts. Participial relatives occur only with a null subject which is always coreferential with the noun phrase which they modify. So the participial counterparts of (20a–c) do not exist:

(22) a. *I found a poem memorizing.
     b. *I thought up a topic you working on.
     c. *I found a topic on which writing my term paper.

2.7 *Topicalization*

As Koster and May (1982:129), in agreement with Jackendoff (1977), observe, sentences may be topicalized under certain restrictions, but VPs may never undergo topicalization:

(23) a. That you were coming tomorrow, no one ever expected Bill to find out.
     b. *Coming tomorrow, no one ever expected Bill to find out that you were.

Similarly, clauses but not VPs may occur in subject position, which clearly shows that the infinitives and gerund below are all clauses:

(24) a. That Gödel proved the continuum hypothesis was his
         greatest achievement.
     b. For Gödel to prove the continuum hypothesis would have
         been his greatest achievement.
     c. To prove the continuum hypothesis would have been
         Gödel's greatest achievement.
         (Cf. Koster and May 1982:129–30.)
     d. (Gödel) proving the continuum hypothesis was a great
         achievement.

2.8   *Complementizers in Dutch*

Assuming that only embedded clauses but not phrases may be
introduced by complementizers, the presence of a complementizer may
be taken as evidence that the constituent it precedes is a clause. Dutch
om, like English *for*, is not a singular category but a phonological entity
that corresponds to two different grammatical categories: preposition
and complementizer. The former may take an NP complement, the latter
introduces a clause.

The parallel between the complementizers *for* and *om* introducing
infinitival complements extends to both being optional (in certain
dialects of the respective languages (cf. Koster and May 1982, and
Chomsky and Lasnik 1977).

(25) a. Would you like for Agnes to reply?
     b. Would you like Agnes to reply?

(26) a. John probeerde om het boek te lezen.
         John tried   C   the book to read
         'John tried to read the book'
     b. John probeerde —   het boek te lezen.
         'John tried to read the book'

Assuming that complementizers but not prepositions may be op-
tional (cf. Chomsky and Lasnik 1977), the absence of *for* and *om* in the
respective examples is evidence to their status as complementizers (as
opposed to prepositions),[2] and the presence of these complementizers in

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[2] For additional empirical evidence that the preposition *om* is distinct from its
complementizer homonym in Dutch see Koster and May 1982.

the respective examples is evidence that the infinitives that follow them are sentences. Furthermore, because of the parallelism in structure between the (a) and (b) examples in (25) and (26), the same observations count as evidence that the infinitives in the (b) examples are also sentences.

2.9   Subject-Oriented Adverbs in Object-Control Structures

An argument similar to the one constructed from the presence of complementizers in the preceding section can be constructed from the presence of subjects. If embedded sentences are assumed to have the structure

(27)   [$_{CP}$ [$_{IP}$ NP INFL VP]]

then the presence of subjects in infinitives and gerunds can be taken as evidence that they are embedded sentences.

Koster and May (1982:136) observe that certain adverbs, such as *intentionally* and *carefully,* are regularly interpreted as predicated of the subject of the sentence in which they occur. This is the case in

(28)   John married Mary intentionally.

But in examples like the following the property expressed by the adverb is understood as predicated of the surface object NP.

(29)   a.   John forced Bill to hit Harry intentionally.
        b.   I persuaded Bill to carefully cut the cake.

The only way to accommodate these facts in the VP hypothesis is to formulate some (ad hoc) rule that says that such subject-oriented adverbs express properties predicated of the subject except after verbs like *force, persuade, ask,* etc. This amounts to saying that such adverbs are sometimes subject-oriented and sometimes object-oriented, the consequence of which is that an otherwise interesting empirical generalizations is lost.

This apparent irregularity is easily explained, however, if these examples are assumed to have the following structures:

(30)   a.   John forced Bill$_2$ [PRO$_2$ to hit Harry intentionally].

b. I persuaded Bill$_2$ [PRO$_2$ to carefully cut the cake]. (ibid., 136)

If the infinitives are assumed to have a (phonetically unrealized) subject, the regularity of the behavior of subject-oriented adverbs is restored, and the generalization can be maintained. The adverbs will be construed as expressing a property predicated of the embedded subject, and under control by the matrix object with which it is coreferential, the property is eventually predicated of the matrix object.

Since without assuming PRO (the phonetically empty subject controlled by the matrix object) in the embedded infinitives we would lose an explanation for the regularity of subject-oriented adverbs in English, and since the assumption of PRO in otherwise 'subjectless' infinitives helps restore the generalization, it may be taken as evidence that all infinitives have subjects, hence all are sentential.

2.10 C-Commanded Predicates

Koster and May (1982) show that a further argument may be constructed in favor of the clausal hypothesis on the constituency of infinitives and gerunds assuming Williams' (1980) condition on predication, which requires that predicates be c-commanded by an argument with which they are coindexed. What the argument directly shows is, again, that infinitives and gerunds have subjects, and therefore it provides indirect evidence that infinitives and gerunds are sentences. Consider the following example (cf. Koster and May (1982:136):

(31) *John* ate the meat *nude.*

Given a reading of (31) on which *nude* is predicated of *John,* the predicate *nude* is co-indexed with the subject NP, its c-commanding argument.

Now consider the following examples (ibid.):

(32) a. [PRO eating the meat *nude*] is a little obscene.
     b. [PRO killing the giant *by himself*] made David famous.

The complement clause in (32a) must be construed as having an unspecified subject in order for there to be an argument of which *nude* is predicated, simply because there is no other c-commanding NP for the predicate to be coindexed with. In (32b) the NP *David* controls PRO, thus

the adverb *by himself* is predicated of this NP, since *David* does not c-command *by himself.* Similarly, *nude* is predicated ('via PRO') of *David,* the controller NP for PRO in (33), once again because *David* does not c-command *nude:*

(33)   [PRO eating the meat *nude*] made David famous.

Summarizing, a c-commanding condition on predication, if correct, provides evidence that "subjectless" English infinitives and gerunds have phonetically null subjects, therefore they are sentences.

2.11 Bound Anaphora

A further argument that supports the hypothesis that both infinitives and gerunds are sentences in English derives from considerations of the binding relation that holds between anaphors and their antecedents. These considerations again directly show that infinitives and gerunds have subjects, and that therefore they are sentences.

Assuming Chomsky's (1981) principles of Binding Theory, Koster and May (1982) show that phonetically unrealized subjects must be postulated in the syntactic representation of "subjectless" infinitives and gerunds, otherwise many infinitives and gerunds that contain reflexive pronouns (i.e., anaphors) will be incorrectly ruled out as ungrammatical on the grounds that they violate Principle A of Binding Theory.

Given that binding is a coreference relation between an anaphor (a reflexive or a reciprocal) and a coindexed antecedent that c-commands it, it must satisfy the following conditions:[3]

(34)   Binding Theory
        a.   Anaphors must be bound in their governing category.
        b.   Pronouns must be free in their governing category.
        c.   All other NP's must be free in all governing categories.

[3] The principles of Binding Theory are given in the form in which they appear in Koster and May 1982. For alternative formulations see, e.g., Chomsky 1981, 1982, and Haegeman 1991.

(35) Governing Category

α is the governing category for β if and only if α is the minimal category containing β and a governor of β, where α = NP or S. (See Chomsky 1981:188)

Now consider the following examples (cf. Koster and May 1982:137):

(36) a. John said [it was difficult *to shave himself*].
      b. Mary said [that *shaving herself* was a pain in the neck].
      c. *Helping oneself* would be difficult.

All these grammatical examples constitute violations of Principle A of the Binding Theory if the italicized nonfinites are analyzed as VPs. Furthermore, (36c) poses the additional problem of a VP appearing in subject position, already noted (see section 2.7 above). If, however, the examples are assigned the structures indicated below, none of the violations will arise, nor will we have to swallow VP subjects any longer (cf. ibid.).

(37) a. John$_2$ said [it was difficult [PRO$_2$ to shave himself$_2$]].
      b. Mary$_2$ said [that [PRO$_2$ shaving herself$_2$] was a pain in the neck].
      c. [PRO$_2$ helping oneself$_2$] would be difficult.

In (37a–b), the reflexives no longer have their antecedents outside their governing categories, since *himself* as well as *herself* is now a clause-mate with its antecedent (PRO) which binds it.

In (37c), without the postulation of an empty subject (PRO) the reflexive *oneself* would not have an antecedent at all.

To summarize, the consideration of anaphoric binding suggest that we must postulate intermediate (empty) subjects in "subjectless" infinitives and gerunds, thereby providing further support for the hypothesis that these complements are sentences.

2.12 Floated Quantifiers

It has been observed (cf. Koster and May 1982, quoting D. Pesetsky, personal communication) that a quantifier may be floated off its NP in a

superordinate clause and land in an infinitival complement, producing a fairly acceptable sentence:

(38) a. ?The men promised the women to all come to the party.
     b. ?The men persuaded the women to all come to the party.

Such floated quantifiers, as Koster and May observe, may be construed as anaphors with respect to the Binding Theory. Assuming that this is correct, given the semantic interpretations of these examples, the antecedent of *all* in (38a) is the subject NP *the men,* and in (38b) *all* is bound by the object NP *the women.* The solution, once more, is to postulate an empty subject in the embedded sentences.

(39) a.   The men$_2$ promised the women [PRO$_2$ to all$_2$ come to the
          party].
     b.   The men persuaded the women$_2$ [PRO$_2$ to all$_2$ come to the
          party]. (ibid., 137)

Now both *all*s will be bound by the respective PROs. Furthermore, each will be construed with the NP which it was floated off, the construal based upon, and mediated by, the relation that holds between PRO and its controlling NP *the men* in (38a), and PRO and its controlling NP *the women* in (38b), given that *promise* and *persuade* are marked as subject-control and object-control, respectively.
     These observations, *ceteris paribus,* allow us to make the generalization that floated quantifiers are interpreted as floated off the NP controlling the embedded subject.

2.13 Split-Antecedent Phenomena

Koster and May (1982:138) observe a very important difference between personal pronouns like *they* and anaphors like *each other:* the former may have split antecedents but the latter requires a unary antecedent. The personal pronoun *they* may be construed in (40a) as coreferring to John and Mary, but *each other* in (40b) cannot be interpreted as coreferential with the NPs *John* and *Mary,* as the ungrammaticality of the example shows.

(40) a. *John* told *Mary* that *they* had to leave.

b. *_John_ talked with _Mary_ about _each other._

The verb _propose_ has the remarkable property that it allows its subject and prepositional object arguments to jointly determine the reference of the understood subject of the complement (split-control):

(41)   _John_ proposed to _Mary_ to go to the movies.

On the most natural reading of (41), it means that 'John suggested to Mary that _they_ go to the movies'. In other words, the understood subject in (41) behaves like _they_ in (40): both are coreferential with two distinct NPs, that is, both have split antecedents. Now consider (42) with _each other_ in the complement, which requires a unary antecedent:

(42)   _John_ proposed to _Mary_ to help _each other._

The fact that (42) is grammatical, that _John_ and _Mary_ cannot be the direct split antecedents for _each other,_ and third, that _each other_ requires the presence of a unary antecedent show that it has the following structure:

(43) $John_i$ proposed to $Mary_j$ [PRO_{ij} to help $each\ other_{ij}$].

These considerations again show that we must postulate a phonetically empty category as the subject of nonfinite complements in English, which entails that they are clauses.

2.14 The Problem of 'VP-Complementizers'

As noted by Riemsdijk and Williams (1986:135), the existence of sentences like (44) creates serious problems for the VP hypothesis, on which it is claimed that all infinitives are base-generated in their surface form, that is as VPs, and as such they obviously do not contain PRO subjects.

(44)   John wonders what PRO to do.

On the VP hypothesis, in order for the grammar to generate the structure of such sentences, VPs must be assumed to contain a C position (into which the _wh-_ word is moved from its base-generated θ-position). If, however, VPs are of the structure

(45) $[_{VP} [_{C} \ldots] \ldots]$

then some rather artificial mechanism is necessary to bar such a C
position from the VPs of finite clauses, or, at least the C of finite VPs
must somehow be prevented from being filled, in order to block the
generation of ungrammatical structures like

(46) *John $[_{C}$ who$_i]$ saw c_i

This problem does not arise at all on the clausal hypothesis.

2.15   *The Structure at LF and CS*

Let us assume that Logical Form (LF) is the level of representation
where predicates are paired up with their arguments in propositional rep-
resentations, and Conceptual Structure (CS) is a level of representation
beyond LF where linguistic expressions are brought into correspondence
with mental representations. On the simplest assumption, the syntactic
counterpart of a proposition is a sentence. If predicate–argument struc-
tures correspond to syntactic representations in such a way that every
predicate and each argument of every predicate is represented as a con-
stituent in syntactic structure, then the mapping of syntactic representa-
tion onto Logical Form (which in turn is brought into correspondence
with Conceptual Structure) is straightforward. This is the case on the
clausal hypothesis, where there is a one-to-one correspondence between
logical and syntactic subjects, and logical and syntactic predicates, with
the consequence that there is no predicate without a corresponding sub-
ject either in logical or in syntactic representation. For concreteness, con-
sider the following example (cf. Koster and May (1982)):

(47)   John$_2$ wants [PRO$_2$ to try [PRO$_2$ to date Mary]].

Every verb in (47) has a corresponding subject, so subject–predicate
relations can directly be read off the syntactic representation. This is, I
believe, a desirable consequence if the 'simpler the better' principle
applies to the syntax–semantics interface.

    Under the VP hypothesis the single subject in (47) would be related
to three different verbs, and the verb in (48) would not be related to any
subject at all.

(48)   [PRO to leave now] is impossible for John.

The subject–predicate pairing would only be reconstructed at the level of logical representation, where the crucial point to notice is that it *would* be reconstructed at *some level* of representation. In other words, the clausal nature of infinitives and gerunds *would be* recognized at the level of logical representation, but there only. It is a corollary of the VP hypothesis that semantic structures are derived independently of syntactic structures (cf. Chierchia 1984).

       To summarize, there is overwhelming evidence that nonfinite complements have subjects at some level of representation. The arguments discussed in the preceding sections also suggest that the appropriate level of representation of the clausal structure of nonfinite complements is S-structure.

3   The Constituent Structure of Gerunds

As we have seen in the preceding sections a number of observations suggest that not only infinitives but also gerunds have a clausal structure in English. Although I believe that in general it is correct to assume a clausal internal structure for gerunds, we must note a few problems in this respect, since the evidence is not conclusive.

       One of these problems concerns the topmost node dominating a gerundive complement. Assuming the principles of X' Syntax (cf. Jackendoff 1977) and Government-Binding Theory (cf. Chomsky 1981, 1982, 1986), on which embedded clause complements are normally analyzed either as IP or as CP, the possibilities include IP, CP, and NP (dominating IP).

       Jackendoff's (1977) proposal is that gerunds (Chomsky's (1970) 'gerundive nominals') have the internal structure of sentences, but at the maximal level of projection, which is level X''' in Jackendoff 1977, they are NPs. This is a most problematic option, however: if basic principles of X-bar Theory are to be observed, we cannot simply stick an NP node at the top of a complement clause, or else the X-bar theoretic principle is violated which requires that all phrases be endocentric. There are at least two reasons that (49b) cannot be the structure of (49a) below. First, the topmost NP lacks a head, and second, V cannot project an NP (cf. Abney 1987).

(49) a.   John's building a spaceship
     b.

building   a spaceship (cf. Abney 1987:17)

If one takes categorial, structural, as well as functional criteria into consideration, the following *-ing* forms may be distinguished (cf. Chomsky 1970, Williams 1975, Quirk et al. 1985, Abney 1987, Pullum and Zwicky 1991, and Laczkó 1995):

Progressive *-ing:*	Brown is painting his daughter.
Premodifier *-ing:*	the silently painting man
Postmodifier *-ing:*	The man driving the bus is Norton's best friend.
Absolute *-ing:*	Brown painting his daughter that day, I decided to go for a walk.
	With me singing madrigals, everyone will be amused.
	Having died, they were no further use to us.
Adverbial *-ing:*	John decided to leave, thinking the party was over.
Acc-*ing:*	I watched Brown painting his daughter.
PRO-*ing:*	I enjoyed reading *The Bald Soprano.*
Poss-*ing:*	I dislike Brown's painting his daughter.
Action nominal:	his looking up of the information
(*Ing-of*)	John's singing of the Marseillaise
Verbal noun:	Brown's deft painting of his daughter
Deverbal noun:	Brown's paintings of his daughter

Since this paper is concerned with nonfinite complements on verbs, only the following *-ing* constructions will be relevant to the discussion: Acc-*ing*, Poss-*ing*, and (argumental) PRO-*ing*. Therefore progressive *-ing*, pre- or postmodifying *-ing*, absolute (Nom- or Acc-) *-ing*, adverbial *-ing*, which are commonly called the 'present participle', will not be discussed.

Noun phrases with a head noun in -*ing* will also be excluded from the investigation as irrelevant. This class includes action nominals in -*ing*, Abney's (1987) "*Ing-of*",[4] verbal nouns, and deverbal nouns. The head of all these nominal structures is lexically derived by -*ing*, hence -*ing* does not project its own functional category in any of them.

3.1 Why Gerunds Are Noun Phrases

The principal motivation for the assumption that gerunds, but not infinitives or *that*-clauses, are dominated by an NP/DP node at the level of X^{max} derive from their external syntactic properties, and include the following (cf. Horn 1975, Jackendoff 1977, and Abney 1987):

Gerunds, but not *that*-clauses or infinitives, occur in all NP positions, namely, they can be (a) the subject of questions, (b) the subject of relative clauses, (c) the subject of infinitival clauses, (d) the subject of a sentence following a sentence-initial adverb, (e) the object of prepositions, and (f) the focus of clefts:

(50) a. What would $\begin{Bmatrix} \text{John's leaving} \\ \text{*that John left} \\ \text{*for John to leave} \end{Bmatrix}$ reveal about him?

b. a man who $\begin{Bmatrix} \text{John's leaving} \\ \text{*that John left} \\ \text{*for John to leave} \end{Bmatrix}$ would irritate

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[4] Abney classes *Ing-of* constructions with gerunds in spite of the fact that they have nothing in common with Acc-*ing* or Poss-*ing* gerunds except their superficial morphological form. In addition to the inability of the -*ing* form in *Ing-of* constructions to Case-mark its object, for example, phonological evidence also testifies to the categorial difference. As Laczkó (1995:250–51) shows, *Ing-of* -*ing*, like derivative -*ing* and unlike gerundial -*ing*, does not display an alternation between a velar and an alveolar realization, cf.

(i) the enemy's destroying the city
(ii) the enemy's destroyin' the city
(iii) the enemy's destroying of the city
(iv) *the enemy's destroyin' of the city
(v) *singing outside the buildin'

c. It would be disgraceful for $\begin{Bmatrix} \text{John's leaving} \\ \text{*that John left} \\ \text{*for John to leave} \end{Bmatrix}$ to bother

us.

d. Perhaps $\begin{Bmatrix} \text{John's smoking stogies} \\ \text{??that John smokes stogies} \\ \text{??(for John) to smoke stogies} \end{Bmatrix}$ would bother you.

e. I learned about $\begin{Bmatrix} \text{John's smoking stogies} \\ \text{*John smokes stogies} \\ \text{*(for John) to smoke stogies} \end{Bmatrix}$.

f. It's $\begin{Bmatrix} \text{John's smoking stogies} \\ \text{*that John smokes stogies} \\ \text{*for John to smoke stogies} \end{Bmatrix}$ $\begin{matrix} \text{that I can't abide.} \\ \text{that I can't believe.} \\ \text{that I won't permit.} \end{matrix}$

Another nominal property of gerunds is that they may not contain sentence adverbial PPs:

(51) *John's $\begin{Bmatrix} \text{to our delight} \\ \text{in his haste} \\ \text{for some reason} \end{Bmatrix}$ leaving so early didn't distress Sue.

Note, however, that nominal relative clauses, also called 'free relatives', may also occur in all the positions illustrated in (50) above, although they cannot be derived from NPs, as Jackendoff (1977) shows. Consider the following examples (cf. Jackendoff 1977 and Abney 1987):

(52) a. What would what the FBI found out reveal about John?
     b. a man to whom what you found out would be a nuisance
     c. It would be disgraceful for what you found out to be revealed.
     d. Perhaps what John found out would upset you.
     e. I heard about what you did.
     f. It's what you have in your head that counts.

Chomsky (1986) too raises the possibility that gerunds may be NPs, but he finally appears to conclude that gerunds are CPs, that is, they have a C position. This raises the problem that gerunds, as contrasted with finite and infinitival clauses, do not appear ever to be introduced by complementizers, at least not by *wh*-complementizers, as is shown by the following paradigm (cf. Chomsky 1986:84):[5]

(53) a. I remembered that he read the book.
     b. I remembered his reading the book.
     c. I remembered why he read the book.
     d. *I remembered why his reading the book.

On the assumption that gerunds as well as infinitives are CPs, the problem of constituency would practically reduce to the exceptional character of gerunds that they do not occur with *wh*-complementizers. I will consider the arguments for the sentential status of gerunds in the following section.

3.2   *Why Gerunds Are Sentences*

As we saw in the previous section, distributional properties of gerunds suggest that they are noun phrases. Let us now consider aspects of their internal structure that they share with ordinary sentences, *that*-clauses, and infinitival clauses, which would favor a sentential analysis. The reasons that gerunds ought to be analyzed as sentences include the following (cf. Jackendoff 1977 and Abney 1987):

We find both English aspectual auxiliaries in gerunds, as in ordinary sentences:

(54) a. Byrne having been refusing the offer just when Nixon
         arrived
     b. Byrne's having been refusing the offer just when Nixon
         arrived

---

[5] This sharp contrast between finite and infinitival clauses on the one hand and gerunds on the other may diminish somewhat if *from* in gerundive complements on verbs like *prevent, stop,* etc. is analyzed as a complementizer, as Mair (2002), for example, seems to allow, in sentences like *This prevented me from leaving early.*

Gerunds may contain the same range of adverbs as ordinary sentences:

(55) a. John sarcastically criticizing the book
     b. John's sarcastically criticizing the book
     c. John criticizing the book too often
     d. John's criticizing the book too often
     e. John refusing the offer in a suspicious manner
     f. John's refusing the offer in a suspicious manner

Transformations, such as Extraposition, Subject Raising, Tough Movement, Dative Movement, and Particle Movement, which otherwise apply in finite and infinitival clauses, also apply in gerunds:

Extraposition and Subject Raising:

(56) a. That John will win being certain
     b. It(s) being certain that John will win
     c. John('s) being certain to win

Tough Movement:

(57) a. It(s) being easy to please John
     b. John('s) being easy to please

Dative Movement:

(58) a. John('s) giving a book to Bill
     b. John('s) giving Bill a book

Particle Movement:

(59) a. John('s) looking up the information
     b. John('s) looking the information up
     c. *John's looking of the information up

V+-*ing* assigns Case to its argument:

(60) a. John destroyed the spaceship.
     b. John('s) destroying the spaceship
     c. *John's destruction the spaceship

Gerunds take adverbial rather than adjectival modification:

(61) a. Horace('s) carefully describing the bank vault to Max
     b. *Horace's careful describing the bank vault to Max

ECM is possible in tensed sentences and gerunds but not in noun phrases:

(62) a. John believed Bill to be Caesar Augustus.
     b. John('s) believing Bill to be Caesar Augustus
     c. *John's belief Bill to be Caesar Augustus

Object-control constructions occur in gerunds and tensed sentences but not in noun phrases:

(63) a. I persuaded John to leave.
     b. me/my persuading John to leave
     c. *my persuasion of John to leave

Gerunds may contain secondary predicates with a resultative meaning. This is not possible in noun phrases:

(64) a. We painted the house red.
     b. us/our painting the house red
     c. *our painting of the house red

Gerunds and tensed sentences may contain concealed questions, noun phrases cannot:

(65) a. I considered sabotage.
     b. me/my considering sabotage
     c. *my consideration of sabotage

Finally, Abney (1987) points out that noun phrases *may* contain subjects, but their presence is not obligatory. Ordinary sentences, infinitives, and gerunds, on the other hand, *require* the presence of a subject. The observations suggest that gerunds must be analyzed as sentences.

3.3   Differences between *Acc*-ing *Gerunds and Poss*-ing *Gerunds*

The arguments that we reviewed in the previous section all appear to suggest a uniform clausal analysis of gerunds. In this section I will discuss some properties of Poss-*ing* gerunds that distinguish them from Acc-*ing* gerunds (cf. Horn 1975, Williams 1975, Reuland 1983, Abney 1987, and Webelhuth 1995).

Extraction is possible from Acc-*ing* but not from Poss-*ing:*

(66) a.   We remember him describing Rome.
     b.   the city we remember him describing
     c.   What do you remember him describing?

(67) a.   We remember his describing Rome.
     b.   *the city we remember his describing
     c.   *What do you remember his describing?

In subject position of a tensed sentence, conjoined Acc-*ing* gerunds behave differently from conjoined Poss-*ing* gerunds: the former take singular agreement (like conjoined *that*-clauses and infinitives, and unlike conjoined NPs), while the latter induce plural agreement on the verb (like conjoined NPs):

(68) a.   John playing the piano and Fred singing a song *were/was terrifying.
     b.   John's coming and Mary's leaving bother/*bothers me.

Acc-*ing* gerunds cannot but Poss-*ing* gerunds can be coordinated with other NPs:

(69) a. *Kennedy having made a big mistake and the recent unrests have left the country shaken.
     b.   Kennedy's having made a big mistake and the recent unrests have left the country shaken.

Acc-*ing* constructions occur in argument, as well as adjunct positions; Poss-*ing* gerunds occur only as arguments:

(70) a.   John being a spy, Bill thought it wise to avoid him.

    b. *John's being a spy, Bill thought it wise to avoid him.

Acc-*ing* gerunds may take sentence-adverbials in adjunct positions (though not in argument positions); Poss-*ing* gerunds do not allow sentence-adverbials:

(71) a. John probably being a spy, Bill thought it wise to avoid him.
     b. *I was worried about John probably being a spy.
     c. *I was grateful for John's fortunately knowing the answer.

Although in general both Acc-*ing* and Poss-*ing* gerunds permit pleonastic subjects, only Acc-*ing* permits *there:*

(72) a. I was worried about it being too obvious that Charlie was lying.
     b. I was worried about its being too obvious that Charlie was lying.
     c. I approve of there being a literacy exam for political candidates.
     d. *I approve of there's being a literacy exam for political candidates.

Acc-*ing* gerunds but not Poss-*ing* gerunds occur as complements on perceptual matrix verbs:

(73) a. I can't hear John playing the piano.
     b. *I can't hear John's playing the piano.

Finally, it is, I think, in order for me to point to a non-argument concerning the status of Acc-*ing* and Poss-*ing* gerunds. Horn (1975) argues that Acc-*ing* gerunds do not occur in the focus of cleft sentences. He gives the following example (also cited by Reuland, who appears to adopt Horn's position on this matter):

(74) *It was John kissing Mary that upset everyone.

Horn's generalization is not entirely correct. Acceptability judgments concerning clefts and pseudo-clefts seem to show considerable variation.

There are many speakers for whom clefted Acc-*ing* gerunds are just as acceptable as clefted Poss-*ing* gerunds, as the following examples show:

> (75) a. It was the moon rising over the mountain that we saw.
>   (Akmajian 1977)
>   b. It's Fred losing that I can't stand the thought of. (Bresnan 1982)

In view of these data, Horn's generalization cannot be maintained. At least for a group of speakers, Acc-*ing* gerunds and Poss-*ing* gerunds do not differ as potential cleft foci.

The arguments presented in this section appear to support an account on which Acc-*ing* gerunds and Poss-*ing* gerunds are different categories. In view of the nominal properties of the Poss-*ing* construction presented in this section and section 3.1 above, and the clausal properties of the Acc-*ing* construction discussed in this section and section 3.2 above, the proper analysis seems to be that Acc-*ing* gerunds are clauses and Poss-*ing* gerunds are noun phrases. I take them up for a closer look in the remaining two sections.

3.4   Why Acc-ing *Gerunds Are Sentences*

Reuland (1983) shows that at least some gerunds (what he calls NP-*ing* constructions, to be distinguished from Poss-*ing* gerunds) must be analyzed as CPs with an empty C position. On his account, -*ing* is Infl, which contains AGR, an abstract nominal agreement marker in finite clauses, which transmits Case to the subject. AGR transmits nominative Case to the subject in tensed clauses, where Infl is marked [+tense]. In NP-*ing* constructions, which on his account are tenseless finite clauses, -*ing* realizes the nominal element AGR in Infl. The finiteness of such tenseless clauses consists in Infl transmitting its Case (which it receives from the matrix verb or preposition) to the subject of the complement clause. PRO in 'subjectless' gerunds escapes government and Case-marking, because, by assumption, Affix Hopping may apply either in the syntax, disallowing -*ing* to transmit Case to the subject, thus licensing PRO, or in PF, allowing Case to be transmitted to an overt subject, which it governs prior to the application of Affix Hopping. Thus, when Affix Hopping takes place in the syntax, gerunds with PRO subjects are derived, when it applies in PF, gerunds with overt subjects are derived.

In either case, a gerund is a CP. On these assumptions, the structure of (76a) is (76b):

(76) a. I approve of John studying linguistics.

   b.

```
              IP
            /    \
          NP      I'
          |      /  \
          I   Infl   VP
            [+tense]  |
              AGR     V'
                     /  \
                    V    PP
                    |    |
                 approve P'
                        / \
                       P   CP
                       |   |
                       of  C'
                          / \
                         C   IP
                            /  \
                          NP    I'
                          |    /  \
                        John Infl  VP
                            [-tense] /\
                              AGR   /  \
                              |    /    \
                             -ing study linguistics
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
Johnson (1988) also comes to a similar conclusion from quite different assumptions. His arguments derive from the assumption that clauses introduced by a temporal preposition contain an empty operator (*Op*), which moves to C. This is based on the observation (credited to Geis 1970) that sentences containing temporal prepositions introducing a clause are ambiguous with respect to the interpretation of the temporal preposition. Thus, (77) has the two interpretations in (78):

(77) Liz left before you said she had.

(78) a. 'Liz left before the time of your saying that she left'

b. 'Liz left before the time which you said she had left at'

The ambiguity is accounted for if (77) contains *Op* (a phonologically null *when*), which may move from either the *said*-clause or the one embedded in it, yielding the two different representations in (79), which correspond to the interpretations in (78):

(79) a. Liz left [$_{PP}$ before [$_{CP}$ *Op$_i$* [$_{IP}$ you said [$_{CP}$ she had] t_i]]]
     b. Liz left [$_{PP}$ before [$_{CP}$ *Op$_i$* [$_{IP}$ you said [$_{CP}$ she had t_i]]]]

On the simplest assumption, gerunds introduced by temporal prepositions have the same structure:[6]

(80)   Liz left [after [$_{CP}$ *Op$_i$* [PRO saying [she wouldn't] t_i]]]

On Johnson's account, phonetically overt subjects of gerunds are Case-marked (and governed) by some X^0 category outside the gerund. Consider, for example, (81a), which has the structure in (81b):

(81) a. I remember him telling the story.
     b. I remember [$_{IP}$ him telling the story]

In (81b) *remember* governs (and Case-marks) the embedded subject across IP. The null subject of gerunds, on the other hand, is protected from government by a verb or preposition in the matrix clause thus:

(82)   I remember [$_{CP}$ [$_{IP}$ PRO telling the story]]

The matrix verb in (82) is prevented (by CP) from governing the subject inside IP, so PRO may occur. On Johnson's account, then, gerunds with overt subjects are bare IPs, and gerunds with phonetically null subjects are CPs. Whichever account is assumed (Reuland's or

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[6] Such temporal gerunds do not display the scope ambiguity we saw in the finite clauses, and, second, they may not contain overt subjects, as the examples below show, but these observations are irrelevant to the point being made about their internal structure:

(i)   *Liz left [after [$_{CP}$ *Op$_i$* [PRO saying [she wouldn't t_i]]]]
(ii)   *Liz left after him saying that she wouldn't.

Johnson's), Acc-*ing* gerunds are sentences, and at least PRO-*ing* constructions are CPs.

Finally, although Abney recognizes that "Acc-*ing* has the distribution of a noun phrase but no other noun phrase properties," this is sufficient for him to class Acc-*ing* gerunds with noun phrases (1987:173). However, this observation, which is based exclusively on external syntactic considerations, does not, in itself, justify such a conclusion. As we have seen above, considerations of internal syntax appear to outweigh the single argument from distribution, which is, again, a property of Acc-*ing* gerunds that they share with finite as well as infinitival clauses. Therefore my conclusion is that Acc-*ing* gerunds and PRO-*ing* gerunds are sentences (either with a uniform CP structure, as Reuland argues, or with the option that some gerunds project only up to IP, as Johnson claims; I leave this issue for future research).

3.5 The Poss-ing *Griffon*

As Abney notes, "the English Poss-*ing* construction is not simply a noun phrase with sentential properties, but has a decidedly griffon-like structure. Its "forequarters" (i.e., its external distribution and its subject) are that of a noun phrase, while its "hindquarters" (its complement structure) are that of a verb phrase" (1987:165).

On Abney's account, noun phrases are DPs, headed by a D(eterminer). In a noun phrase, D projects its own functional category (DP) and takes an NP complement, the projection of N.[7] For the purposes of the present discussion I will assume his proposal (suggested to him by Richard Larson) on which possessive *'s* is D.[8] On these assumptions, a possessive noun phrase like (83a) has the structure in (83b) (cf. Abney 1987:79):

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[7] In Abney's analysis, N projects a single level only, so N' = NP, a maximal projection. I will not discuss this nonstandard X-bar theoretic assumption here.

[8] This is not Abney's final analysis of possessive noun phrases. I prefer his *'s*-as-D account to his *'s*-as-case-marker analysis because I find the idea unattractive that *'s* is a postpositional Case-marker (K). I cannot discuss my reservations about it in detail here; suffice it to say that it would be a most peculiar category in English (the only one, and a very special one, of its kind), and, second, this account does not generalize to languages like Hungarian (as Abney claims), where there are no postpositional Case-markers, since Hungarian postpositions assign both Case and theta-role to their arguments (which K does not do).

(83) a.   John's book

    b.

```
              DP
            /    \
          DP      D'
          |      /  \
          |     D    NP
          |     |    |
        John   's   book
```

When the analysis is extended to Poss-*ing* gerunds like (84a), they can be assigned the structure in (84b):

(84) a.   John's hitting the ball

    b.

```
                ·DP
              /     \
           DP        D'
           |        /  \
           |       D    IP
           |       |   /   \
           |       |  DP     I'
           |       |  |     /  \
           |       |  |    I    VP
           |       |  |    |    /\
         John     's PRO -ing  hit the ball
```

On this analysis, *-ing* is Infl, which is a natural assumption, and *'s* is D, which assigns Case and the Possessor theta-role to the external subject in [Spec, DP]. D takes IP as complement, and D and *-ing* occupy two distinct functional-element positions, as is natural to assume. The structural parallel with Acc-*ing* and PRO-*ing* gerunds is obvious: *-ing* is Infl in all, and all three are essentially clausal. The nominal distribution of Poss-*ing* is predicted—IP is embedded in DP, with the subject occupying an operator position in [Spec, DP]. As Abney notes, "in effect, this analysis involves the embedding of a PRO-*ing* structure under a noun-phrase specifier" (1987:200).[9]

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[9] D in this structure corresponds to C in CP gerunds, and DP corresponds to CP. In fact, another option would be to extend the CP analysis to Poss-*ing* gerunds, with *'s* generated in C position. On these assumptions, Acc-*ing* and Poss-*ing* would still be assigned different structures, as apparently desired. The structure of Poss-*ing* gerunds would still be reminiscent of the structure of Hungarian possessive DPs (a chief motivation for Abney's DP analysis of noun phrases and Poss-*ing* gerunds): the subject

Borgonovo's (1994) solution to the categorial problem posed by gerunds is to assume the existence of mixed or unspecified categories in grammar. Given a feature system for the characterization of syntactic categories, such as that proposed by Chomsky (1970), categories may be identified as feature complexes. What Borgonovo proposes is the possibility that mixed categories, such as the English gerund, be unspecified for certain categorial features.

Mixed categories are categories that seem to behave like a major category up to a certain level of projection, and a different functional category beyond that level (cf. Borgonovo 1994:21). Borgonovo argues that the puzzling behavior of gerunds (that they sometimes behave as CPs and sometimes as NPs) may be resolved by assuming that there are projections in grammar that are underspecified for syntactic category status. Borgonovo assumes that *-ing* projects a syntactically underspecified functional category termed GerP. GerP, then, sometimes behaves as an NP, like in Poss-*ing* structures, sometimes as a CP, like in Acc-*ing* gerunds. The structure assigned by Borgonovo to Poss-*ing* gerunds is this (cf. 1994:26):

(85)
```
              DP
            /    \
         Spec    D'
                /   \
               D    GerP  [0N, 0V]
                    /   \
                 Spec   Ger'
                       /    \
                     Ger    VP  [+V, –N]
```

(85) is essentially an Abney-style structure (and may, therefore, be considered a notational variant thereof), except that GerP replaces IP (in Abney's D–IP analysis), and Ger, a radically underspecified (non)cate-

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would occupy the operator position in [Spec, CP], which would then correspond to the position of Dative/Genitive possessors (*Jánosnak* [John's] in *Jánosnak a kalapja*, ['John's hat']) in Hungarian DPs (and not to the position of nominative possessors, as Abney assumes, cf. *János* [John] in *János kalapja* [John's hat]). Note in this respect that -NAK ['s] on Genitive possessors is not regarded as a true Case-inflection in Hungarian, but a marker of an operator position, where the possessor may move (cf. Szabolcsi and Laczkó 1992). I must leave it at that, since to pursue this idea any farther would lead us too far afield.

gory replaces Infl. Otherwise the two analyses make the same predictions and either account is consistent with standard assumptions. As they are essentially equivalent, conventional economy considerations may decide between them. Thus, when (85) is pruned by removing all dispensable material, Occam's razor leaves us with a D–IP structure.

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Properties of Verbs Which Constitute Phrasal Verbs

Éva Kovács

Phrasal verbs are an important feature of the English language. Their impor-
tance lies in the fact that they form such a key part of everyday English. Not
only are they used in spoken and informal English, but they are also a common
aspect of written and even formal English. Understanding and learning to use
phrasal verbs, however, is often problematic as the meaning of a phrasal often
bears no relation to the meaning of either the verb or the particle which is used
with it. The primary purpose of this paper is to examine the properties of verbs
which constitute phrasal verbs, and it also raises the question whether we can
predict which verbs combine with which particle and in which relationship.

Phrasal verbs are often a particular problem for learners of English. One
reason is that in most cases, even though students may be familiar with
both the verb in the phrasal verb and with the particle, they may not
understand the meaning of the combination since it can differ greatly
from the meanings of the two words independently. The co-occurrence
of two quite common little words creates a fairly subtle new meaning
that does not seem to be systematically related to either or both of the
original words. No wonder many learners avoid them. Instead of using
them, they rely on rare and clumsier words which make their language
sound stilted and awkward. Native speakers, however, manage phrasal
verbs with aplomb. Here the question arises whether the semantic
disposition of the words involved, and their syntax, are really governed
by unpredictable rules and whether they are as arbitrary as they are often
regarded to be.

1 Classification of Verbs with Relation to Particles

According to Potter (1965:286), there are 24 kernel verbs and 16 adverbs
(or adverbial particles) which collocate to make up the functionally most
loaded phrasal verbs. These verbs are: *to back, to blow, to break, to bring, to
call, to lay, to let, to look, to make, to put, to run, to send, to set, to stand, to take, to
turn, to work.* The adverbs (or adverbial particles) are: *about, above, across, at,
by, down, for, in, off, on, out, over, round, through, to, up.* There are other verbs
and adverbs (or adverbial particles) too, but these are the ones most

frequently in use, and they produce "no fewer than 384 possible combinations".

As Live (1965:430) points out, the verbs most active in this kind of combination are of the old, common monosyllabic or trochaic "basic English" variety (many of them of "irregular" conjugation in modern English): *bring, send, take, set, go, come, look,* and many others, each occurring in combination with a considerable number of the particles, whereas many of the "more learned"(often polysyllabic) verbs of classic or French borrowing occur with none.

The Collins Cobuild Dictionary of Phrasal Verbs (1995:vi) gives thirty-eight common verbs which occur in a large number of combinations with different particles, and which have many non-transparent meanings. As pointed out, phrasal verbs which have literal meanings are not included. The thirty-eight verbs are:

break	fall	kick	make	put	stay
bring	get	knock	move	run	stick
call	give	lay	pass	send	take
cast	go	lie	play	set	talk
come	hang	live	pull	sit	throw
cut	hold	look	push	stand	turn
do	keep				

In all three of the above lists of verbs constituting phrasal verbs we can find the monosyllabic *set*. Sinclair (1991:67) assumes that *set* is a fairly common, rather dull little word that was comparatively neglected in description and in teaching. Phrasal verbs with *set* are also very common, and it is particularly rich in making combinations with words like *about, in, up, out, on, off,* and these words are themselves very common. Sinclair (1991:68), however, emphasises the importance of the environment of *set* in determining the meaning since in most of its usage, it contributes to meaning in combination with other words, i.e. the above-mentioned particles.

Strangely enough, none of the above lists contains the verb *be* constituting phrasal verbs. It is, however, relatively frequent according to the authors of the Oxford Dictionary of Phrasal Verbs (1993), in which *be* combines with the following particles: *about, around, above, after, against, along, around, at, away, back, behind, below, beneath, beyond, down, in, off, on, out,*

over, through, up, within. Most of them have literal meaning, this can be the reason for their missing from the verbs listed in the Collins Cobuild Dictionary.

In accordance with Bolinger (1971:xii) and Lipka (1972:165), Live also notes that in polysyllabic combinations of foreign origin there is a notable tendency to redundancy, in that the associated particle in many cases reiterates or approximates the original connotation of the prefix.

de- 'from'	co(n)/syn- 'with'	in- 'in'/'on'	a(d)- 'to'
derive from	coalesce with	imbed in	allude to
desist from	condole with	involve in	adhere to
deter from	comply with	indulge in	admit to
detract from	synchronize with	infringe on	attribute to
deflect from	sympathize with	intrude on	aspire to

Similarly, *provide for, alienate from, refer back,* even *exhale out, reply back, include (me) in* also occur. This tendency to attach a 'superfluous' particle suggests that expansion of a verb constitutes a pattern-habit in English.

Lipka (1972:165) notes that certain verbs are said never, or very rarely to occur, without a particle, as, e.g.; those in *auction off, jot down, peter out.* Live (1965:432) gives some more to this list: *tide over, cave in, dole out, balk at, cope with, trifle with, cater to, delve into, dote on.* Fraser (1976:9) also mentions that "we find a number of very surprising changes in meaning and co-occurrence restrictions with quite a number of verb-particle combinations whose verb never functions as a verb without the associated particle." Fraser's examples are as follows:

> ante up, auction off, balloon up, bandy about, barge in, button down, bed down, belly in, bib up, board up, bolster up, booze up, bruit about, buff up, bum up, bung up, bunk up, buttress up, cave in, chicken out, chuck up, clam up, dole out, doll up, drum up, eke out, fend off, ferret out, fork over, gum up, gun down, hollow out, horse around, jot down, keel over, knuckle under, leech out, limber up, lot out, mete out, mull over, parcel out, pension off, pep up, perk up, peter out, pine away, plank down, rev up, soup up, spice up, spout off, team up, tone down, tool up, true up, trundle off, tucker out, wad up, ward off, well up, while away, wolf down, yoke up.

We can observe that not all verbs occur with a particle and while some verbs may occur with only one particle and no others, others form a verb-particle combination with almost every particle. In the COBUILD Dictionary I have found the following verb-particle combinations which occur only with one particle:

> balls up, beaver away, belly out, bliss out, bottom out, brazen out, cave in, cheese off, chicken out, clam up, club together, cobble together, cone off, conk out, cook up, coop up, cork up, cotton up, crate up, cream off, curtain off, dam up, damp down, divvy up, dob in, dole out, doll up, duff up, dummy up, earth up, egg on, fag out, flesh out, fob off, fritter away, fur up, ham up, hare off, hash over, hive off, hoke off, hot up, hunker down, ink in, jazz up, jolly away, keel over, limber up, liven up, lop off, louse up, luck out, lump together, magic away, mete out, moulder away, muss up, naff off, palm off, pension off, pep up, perk up, peter out, portion out, pretty up, ruck up, shack up, shore up, sick up, silt up, size up, slag off, sober up, soldier on, sop up, soup up, space out, spruce up, squirrel away, staff up, sum up, tart up, team up, tide over, tool up, turf out, vamp up, ward off, weed out, while away, wimp out, wise up

The examples mentioned above plus the following ones occur only with one particular particle and no other:

> bail up, bandage up, bandy about, batter down, bowl out, beef up, beg off, bitch up, blurt out, bolster up, bolt down, boom out, boot out, botch up, brave out, brew up, brighten up, brim over, broaden out, brown off, buck up, bucket down, budge up, bung up, buoy up, butter up, cart off, cash in, chain up, chalk up, chat up, clamp down, clap out, clog up, cloud over, clutter up, cock up, coil up, collect up, comb out, cone off, conjure up, cop out, cough up, crank up, crease up, crop up, crouch down, crumple up, cuddle up, cure up, dampen down, dash off, deck out, dope up, dose up, doss down, doze off, dredge up, drone on, duck out, ebb away, edit out, eke out, empty out, end up, erode away, explain away, eye up, fan out, farm out, fathom out, fatten up, ferret out, fetch up, file away, film over, filter out, firm up, fizzle out, flag down, flash back, flatten out, float around,

flop down, flunk out, flush out, fog up, forge ahead, fork
out, form up, foul up, freak out, freshen up, fry up, glaze
over, gouge out, gulp down, gum up, hatch out, heat up, heel
over, hike up, hire out, hitch up, hollow out, hop off, hound
out, howl down, hush up, hype up, iron out, jabber away, jog
along, jot down, jumble up, jut out, kill off, kip down, kiss
away, kneel down, lace up, ladle out, lag behind, lap up, last
out, laze about, leak out, lend out, line up, linger on, link up,
loan out, loosen up, mash up, mask out, mind out, miss out,
mop up, mount up, mouth off, mow down, muffle up, mug
up, mull over, multiply out, muster up, narrow down, nestle
up, nod off, notch up, note down, offer up, ooze out, own
up, pad out, pan out, partition off, paste up, pave over, peal
out, pelt down, pencil in, plant out, plonk down, port up,
prise out, prop up, queue up, quicken up, quiet down,
quieten down, rap out, ration out, rave up, render down, rent
out, report back, rev up, rinse out, rot away, rout out, rumble
on, rustle up, salt away, sand down, save up, scour away,
screen off, scrunch up, search out, seek out, select out, shape
up, share out, sharpen up, shave off, shear off, shell out,
shoo away, shop around, shrivel up, shrug off, shuffle off,
sidle up, simmer down, single out, siphon off, skive off,
slacken off, slave away, slope off, slough off, smarten up,
smoke out, snarl up, sniff out, sob out, spark off, speed up,
spell out, spice up, spit out, spout out, sprawl out, spur on,
spurt out, square up, stack up, stammer out, stash away,
stitch up, stock up, stoke up, stow away, struggle on, stub
out, stump up, summon up, surge up, suss out, sweeten up,
swell up, swill down, swoop down, swot up, tamp down,
tape up, taper off, tease out, tense up, thaw out, thrash out,
thump out, tighten up, toil away, topple over, toughen up,
tow away, trace out, trigger off, truss up, use up, veer off,
waste away, water down, well up, whisk away, whoop up,
wire up, wither away, wolf down, wrap up, wring out, yell
out, zip up

It is also pointed out in the dictionary that in some cases the verb means
the same as the verb-particle combination. E.g.:

bail up – bail; clutter up – clutter; coil up – coil; conjure up –
conjure; crouch down – crouch; curl up – curl; drone on –
drone; fathom out – fathom; fatten up – fatten; fog up – fog;

freak out – freak; hatch out – hatch; jumble out – jumble; prop up – prop; rev up – rev; rinse out – rinse; sand down – sand; scrunch up – scrunch; shrivel up – shrivel; wolf down – wolf; wrap up – wrap

On the other hand, some verbs form a verb-particle combination with almost every particle. The most productive of these are: *put* (23), *go* (23), *come* (22), *get* (21), *push* (19), *pull* (16), *take* (15), *bring* (14), *turn* (14), *look* (12) and *fall* (11). There are other less productive verbs like *lay* (10), *play* (10), *stand* (10), *run* (10), *set* (10), *call* (10), *keep* (9), *sit* (9), *break* (8), and *give* (7).

The most productive ones occur with the following adverbial particles in the COBUILD Dictionary:

PUT: about, above, across, around, aside, away, back, behind, by, down, forth, forward, in, off, on, out, over, past, round, through, together, towards, up

GO: about, after, ahead, along, around, away, back, below, by, down, forth, forward, in, off, on, out, over, overboard, round, together, towards, under, up

COME: about, across, after, along, apart, around, away, back, by, down, forth, forward, in, off, on, out, over, round, through, to, up

GET: about, above, across, ahead, along, around, away, back, behind, beyond, by, down, in, off, on, out, over, round, through, together, up

PUSH: about, ahead, along, around, aside, back, by, forward, in, off, on, out, over, past, round, through, to, towards, up

PULL: about, ahead, apart, around, aside, away, back, down, in, off, on, out, over, round, through, to

TAKE: aback, along, apart, around, aside, away, back, down, in, off, on, out, over, round, up

BRING: about, along, back, down, forth, forward, in, off, on, out, over, round, together, up

LOOK: ahead, around, away, back, down, in, on, out, over, round, through, up

FALL: about, apart, away, back, behind, down, in, off, out, over, through

We can raise the question whether or not we can predict which verbs combine with which particle(s) and in which relationship. As Fraser (1976:13) points out, "we have no way of determining from any syntactic or semantic properties associated with a verb whether or not it will combine with a particle in one way or another".

2 Syntactic Properties

With respect to syntactic properties, we have almost no basis for specifying which verbs can co-occur with a particle or which cannot. Both transitive and intransitive verbs combine with particles both literally and figuratively, e.g., **get off** *the bus,* **put off** *an appointment (postpone);* **come back, go for** *someone or something (attack).* In the literature, Kennedy (1920:26), Lipka (1972:165) and Fraser (1976:12) note that changes with regard to transitivity are noted as the most conspicuous difference. There are cases where verbs which are normally transitive become intransitive when a particle is added. E.g.: *The pilot* **took off** *smoothly. I resolved not to* **give in.** There are also verbs which are intransitive and become transitive when a particle is added. E.g.: *The technician will* **run** *that bit of tape* **through** *again. The government will* **see** *the thing* **through.** We can observe, however, that stative verbs such as *know, want, see, hear, hope, resemble, like, hate, remember, understand,* etc. practically never combine with a particle. **Hear** *someone* **out** (listen without interrupting until they have finished speaking), **see about** *something* (arrange for it to be done), **see** *someone* **off** *at the station,* **see** *a task, plan, or project* **through** (continue to do it until it is successfully completed) appear to be exceptions to this generalization, but note that these combinations have become nonstative. Fraser (1976:8) also mentions some verbs which are usually intransitive and do not usually co-occur

with a direct object noun phrase when a particle is not present. (E.g.: *He slept off the effects of the drinking. The student **laughed off** the failure*.)

As another syntactic effect, it is often pointed out e.g. by Kennedy that "the object of the combination is of a very different character from that of the simple verb" e.g.: in *buy a house* / ***buy out** a person, lock a door/ **lock out** a person, mop a floor* / ***mop up** the water on it, clean a room* / ***clean out** its contents*. It is also pointed out by Live (1965:437) that many verbs which "remain transitive, co-occur with a different set of objects", e.g.: *carry (package)* / ***carry out** (threat), test (candidate)* / ***test out** (theory)*. Lipka (1972:176) notes that "when the selection restrictions and the meaning of the VPCs (verb particle constructions) differ considerably from the simplex verb, as in ***carry out** (threat)* vs. *carry (package)*, the two are unrelated and the VPC must be regarded as an idiomatic discontinuous verb." One might assume that the two also differ with regard to figurative usage. In some cases the VPCs seem to be confined to a figurative use, while the corresponding simplex verb occurs only in literal use: E.g.: ***blossom out** (sb/business firm), **freeze out** (sb), **smell out** (secret/plot), **bottle up** (emotion, anger), **thrash out** (problem, truth).

Sinclair's (1991:69–77) discussion of the combination of *set* + *particle* justifies some of the observations I made about the syntactic properties of phrasal verbs. The phrasal verb ***set off*** can have a noun group inside it. E.g.: It was the hedge which *set* the garden *off*. ***Set in*** seems to occur typically in a small and/or minor part of a sentence, i.e. the clauses in which *set in* is chosen are in general rather short, a number of clauses are subordinate and *set in* shows a clear tendency to end structures. E.g.: ... where the rot *set in*. The phrasal verb ***set about*** is also interesting in that it is regularly followed by an *-ing* form of another verb and the second verb is normally transitive. Besides, in front of the phrasal verb, there are a number of structures concerning uncertainty: negatives and *how; phrases like *little idea, the faintest idea, I'm not sure, evidently not knowing*. E.g.: She had not the faintest idea of how to *set about* earning any. The combination ***set off*** can be intransitive or transitive. When intransitive, it is followed by a prepositional phrase (very often the preposition is *on, for, in, into*) E.g.: We *set off **in** his car **on** the five-thousand-mile journey. When *set off* is transitive, the object is usually abstract: 'a new *round* of', a whole *series* of', 'a *reaction*'. E.g.: In Austria the broadcast was to *set off **a train*** of thought and actions.

The above discussion clearly showed that even the combination of *set + particle* has a syntactic complexity. Their semantic properties, the discussion of which is our next concern, however, seem to be even more bewildering.

3 Semantic Properties

As far as the semantic properties are concerned, Fraser (1976:11) notes that there are some natural classes of verb-particle combinations characterized by some common semantic feature(s) where the difference in meaning between the verb and verb-particle combination can be characterized in a straight-forward and systematic way. Fraser (1976:5) calls verb-particle combinations in which a consistent alteration of meaning results from the presence of the particle *systematic combinations (drink down, hang up, give over)* and the ones in which the particle changes the meaning completely *figurative combinations (figure out, look up, auction off)*.

In a number of phrasal verbs, the particle functions as an adverb and it has kept its original literal, spatial meaning. **ABOUT** and **AROUND** used in literal combinations indicate movement in many directions over a period of time, often without any specific aim or purpose. E.g. *drift about, hurl things about, run around, push something around.* **AWAY** indicates movement in a direction farther from you, or movement from the place where you are or were E.g. *run away, pull something away.* **BACK** is used with verbs of movement to say that someone or something returns to a place that they were before. E.g. *blow back, get something back.* **DOWN** indicates movement from a higher position or place to a lower one. E.g. *come down, put down.* The basic meaning of **OFF** is to do with movement away from something or separation from it and that of **ON** is to do with position, indicating that one thing is above another, touching it and supported by it, or with movement into that position. E.g. *get on/ off.* The literal meaning of **OUT** is movement from the inside of an enclosed space or container to the outside of it. You use **THROUGH** in literal combinations with the meaning of passing from one side of something to the other. E.g. *poke through, see through.* The basic meaning of **UP** is movement from a lower position or place to a higher one. E.g. *jump up, pick up.* Fraser (1976:7) notes, however, that the systematic cases amount to only a small part of the total number of verb-particle combinations, and the unsystematic figurative cases are much more frequent. Even within the group of systematic verb-particle combinations, Fraser

distinguishes combinations where the particle appears to have retained an adverbial force (E.g.: *hang up* a picture, *hide away* the piece of paper) and the ones in which the particle, rather than serving as an adverbial, appears to modify the meaning of the verb, giving it a completive sense (E.g.: *beat up, wind up, fade out, die out*).

Lipka (1972:188) also points out that there are very few collocations in which the particle has the same meaning as the adverb. In some cases, the function of the adverb is isolated. In a small group of VPCs with **OUT,** the particle has the meaning 'into society', or 'into public knowledge': *ask out* (sb), *invite out* (sb). In another group, **OUT** has the meaning 'aloud', as in *cry out, read out* (letter), *speak out* (words). In other functions, the particle is apparently isolated, as in *help out* (sb), 'temporarily', *ride out* (racehorse), 'to the limit', *strike out,* 'vigorously'.

UP has the meaning 'not thoroughly' in a few VPCs, such as *practise up* (piece for concert), *press up* (suit), *scrub up* (children). **UP** can have the meaning 'again, a second time', as in *fry up* (yesterday's dinner), *heat up* (cold meat), *warm up* (milk). The meaning 'awake' is found in a number of VPCs with UP, such as in *keep up, stay up, wait up.*

Discussing the combinations *set + particle,* Sinclair (1991:67–79) observes that *set* is a difficult word to isolate semantically, but in most of its usage it contributes to meaning in combination with other words, i.e. *about, aside, in, up, out, on,* and *off.* E.g.: **Set in** means that something begins, and seems likely to continue and develop. **Set off,** in the same way of **set out,** are usually used to refer to the start of a journey. The meaning of **set about** doing something is that you start to do it in an energetic or purposeful way.

As pointed out by Sinclair, the most striking feature of these phrasal verbs is the nature of the subjects and objects used with them. E.g.: The subjects used with *set in* usually refer to unpleasant states of affair: e.g.: *rot, decay, despair, infection, bitterness, anarchy, disillusion* etc., only a few refer to the weather or are neutral. The object of the phrasal verb *set off* (with the meaning: starting anything from an explosion to a train of thought) nearly always refers to something new. E.g.: The spark which *set off* explosion … and so *set off* the charge for the black revolution.

From Sinclair's discussion, it also becomes apparent that some phrasal verbs e.g.: **set apart** and **set aside** are similar in meaning, but not in usage. In the case of *set apart* the emphasis is on the state of apartness and the status and quality of what has been selected from apartness,

whereas *set aside* is more concerned with the activity of separating, or the separation itself. Thus there are hardly any instances where *set apart* and *set aside* can be interchanged, even though their meaning is so similar.

Kennedy (1920:24), Poutsma (1926:296), Curme (1931:379), Jowett (1950/51:156), Potter (1965:297–8), Fairclough (1965:73), Live (1965:436), Bolinger (1971:96–110), Lipka (1972:182–184 and Fraser (1976:6) have noted the aspectual cast of phrasal verbs. The adverb (or adverbial particle) is said to contribute to the expression of aspect and mode of action ("Aktionsart"), which is used for the distinction of several phases of the action or process, such as inchoative, ingressive, continuative, progressive, egressive, conclusive, resultative, terminative, iterative, frequentive vs. durative, punctual vs. linear, and also intensive, or intensifying. The two most common particles in Modern English, **UP** and **OUT** have the following aspectual meanings in the interpretation of different scholars:

UP

Kennedy (1920:24–5)	'locative idea' and perfective value' combined e.g. *cage up, board up, lace up* 'perfective value' meaning 'bringing to or out of a condition' e.g. *heat up, clean up, light up*
Poutsma (1926:296, 300–1)	'ingressive aspect' e.g. *look up (to), stand up, sit up* 'terminative aspect' e.g. *finish up, drink up, dry up*
Curme (1931:379, 381)	'ingressive aspect' e.g. *hurry up, stand up, show up* 'effective aspect' e.g. *set up* 'durative effective aspect' e.g. *keep up*
Jowett (1950/51:156)	intensive force and the thoroughness and completeness of the process'

e.g. *shoot up, slip up, beat up*

Potter (1965:287–8)   'intensive adverb'
e.g. *smash up, break up, wash up*
'instantaneous aspect'
e.g. *cheer up, hurry up, wake up*

Live (1965:436)   'intensity or totality'
e.g. *dry up, heal up, grind up*

Bolinger (1971:99–100)   'perfective meaning as manifested in resultant condition'
e.g. *shrivel up, break up, close up*
'perfective in the sense of completion or inception'
e.g. *let up, give up, take up*
'perfective in the sense of attaining high intensity'
e.g. *hurry up, brighten up, speed up*

Lipka (1972:182, 183–4)   'ingressive' mode of action
e.g. *take up, put up, sit up*

Fraser (1976:6)   'completive sense'
e.g. *mix up, stir up, wind up*

Mitchell (1979:109)   'terminative points of processes'
e.g. *tear up*

OUT

Kennedy (1920:24)   'completeness or finality'
e.g. *feather out, carry out, map out*
'openness or publicity which does not necessarily imply completeness'
e.g. *hatch out, blossom out, call out*
'exhaustion or extinction'
e.g. *blot out, die out, wear out*

Poutsma (1926:300)   'terminative aspect'
                            e.g. *wait out, starve out, search out*

Curme (1931:379, 381)   'ingressive aspect'
                            e.g. *come out*
                            'effective aspect'
                            e.g. *turn out, give out, find out*
                            'durative effective aspect'
                            e.g. *fight out, stand out, hold out*

Live (1965:436)   'thoroughness and culmination'
                            e.g. *work out , think out, seek out*

Potter (1965:288)   'intensive adverb'
                            e.g. *find out*

Bolinger (1971:104–5)   'resultant condition' or more opaque
                            aspectual meaning
                            e.g. *lose out, help out, work out,*
                            or 'exhaustion'
                            e.g. *talk out, play out*

Lipka (1972:182, 183–4)   'ingressive' mode of action
                            e.g. *set out*
                            'completive'
                            e.g. *die out, write out, puzzle out*
                            'terminativeness', 'to an end', or 'until
                            finished'
                            e.g. *burn out, live out, wait out*

Fraser (1976:6)   'completive sense'
                            e.g. *die out , fade out, spread out*

Mitchell (1979:169)   'terminative'
                            e.g. *sell out, pass out, peg out, peter out, give out,
                            last out*
                            'inceptive'
                            e.g. *set out, break out (in a rash), burst out
                            (laughing)*

'extensive'

e.g. *stretch out, spread out, string out, roll out (carpet),*

'distributive'

e.g. *mete out, deal out, hand out, give out*

'abessive'

e.g. *cast out, ferret out, pop out, pour out*

'discriminative'

e.g. *stand out, make out, point out, find out, stick out*

The Collins Cobuild Dictionary of Phrasal Verbs (1995:487–491) gives 12 different meanings of **UP**.

1) Movement and position

He *jumped up.*

He *ran up* a hill.

2) Increasing and improving

The fire *blazed up.*

She *tidied up* the flat.

3) Preparing and beginning

The children *line up* under the shade of a thatched roof.

Things were *heating up* so fast that I did not want to make any rush predictions.

4) Fastening and restricting

He *bandaged up* the wound.

He bent and *laced up* his shoes.

5) Approaching

Most leaders were obsessed with *catching up* with the West.

He was aware of something dangerous *creeping up* on them under cover of the bush.

6) Disrupting and damaging

He *messed up* the tidy kitchen.

He really *botched up* the last job he did for us.

7) Completing and finishing.

He *tore up* the letter.

Drink your milk *up* and then you can go out to play.

8) Rejecting and surrendering.
    She never *passed up* a chance to eat in a restaurant.
    As soon as the money arrived I was able to *settle up* with him.

9) Happening and creating
    He informed me of a new financial agreement he had *thought up*.
    I can come now, unless any other problems *crop up*.

10) Collecting and togetherness
    We saw garbage *heaped up* almost to the top.
    Conservatives *teamed up* with Opposition Peers.

11) Revealing and discovering
    Journalists had *dug up* some hair-raising facts about the
    company.
    No-one *owned up* to taking the money.

12) Separating
    He spent all day *sawing up* the dead wood.
    The proceeds had to *be divided up* among about four hundred
    people.

The meanings of **OUT** in the COBUILD Dictionary (1995:477–481) are
as follows:

1) Leaving
    It's time to *clock out*.
    We *set out* along the beach.

2) Removing, excluding, preventing
    Squeeze the surplus water *out*.
    They can't *rule out* the possibility that he was kidnapped.

3) Searching, finding, obtaining
    Could you *dig out* the infant mortality rate for 1957?
    He might *worm* the story *out* of her by emotional pressure.

4) Appearing
    Suddenly she *popped out* from behind a bush.
    … a home that would not *stick out* on a European estate

5) Locations outside and away from home
There were all kinds of reasons why they *slept out*.
He *invited* her *out* for a meal.

6) Producing and creating
... a searchlight that could *send out* a flashing beam.
I hadn't intended to *blurt* it *out*.

7) Increasing size, shape or extent
I turned around at the top of the hill. The farmland *spread out* below me.
We did not know how to prevent them from *dragging out* the talks.

8) Thoroughness and completeness
The soil gets as hard as brick when it *dries out*.
He's moody because things aren't *working out* at home.

9) Duration and resisting
How long will our coal reserves *last out?*
They could either surrender or *hold out*.

10) Ending or disappearing
The fire *burnt out*.
Many species *died out*.

11) Arranging, dividing, selecting and distributing
It took quite a while to *sort out* all our luggage.
... to *single out* the key problems for each continent ...

12) Paying attention and awareness
If you don't *watch out*, he might stick a knife into you.
She *pointed out* that he was wrong.

13) Supporting and helping
Their sole mission in Vietnam was to *bail out* Marines in trouble.
I was asked to come in for a few days to *help* them *out*.

14) Attacking, criticizing, and protesting
I *lashed out* at Kurt, calling him every name under the sun.
The decisions were *fought out* between the contending groups.

DOWN: has the following aspect/Aktionsart meanings: 'a diminution or complete cessation of a state or action' (Kennedy 1920), 'ingressive aspect' (Poutsma 1926, Curme 1931), 'effective aspect' (Curme 1931), 'intensive adverb' (Potter 1965).

OFF: 'orderliness or completion', 'riddance or extermination' (Kennedy 1920), 'ingressive aspect' (Curme 1931, Poutsma 1926), 'effective aspect' (Curme 1931), 'terminative slant' (Live 1965), 'intensive adverb' (Potter 1961, Mitchell 1979) 'terminative''.

AWAY: 'ingressive aspect' (Poutsma 1926; Curme 1931), 'effective aspect', 'durative effective aspect' (Curme 1931), 'iterative or the durative', 'inchoative in imperatives' (Live 1965), 'without let or hindrance', either iterative or inceptive' (Bolinger 1971).

THROUGH: 'terminative aspect' (Poutsma 1926), 'effective aspect', 'durative effective aspect' (Curme 1931).

ON: 'continuative aspect' with durative verbs' (Poutsma 1926), 'durative aspect' (Curme 1931; Bolinger 1971, Mitchell 1979) 'progressive-continuative'.

From the above comments concerning the aspectual/Aktionsart nature of the particles we can see that the particles give the ingressive mode of action and completive sense to the phrasal verbs. The ingressive mode of action plays a great role in phrasal verbs with AWAY, BACK, DOWN, OFF, while UP and OUT are mainly assigned completive, perfective force.

According to the COBUILD dictionary, **UP** is the commonest of the particles used in combinations occurring in 482 phrasal verbs and is followed by **OUT** in 410 phrasal verbs. Fraser (1976: 12), however, points out that "while we find *bake up, cook up, fry up, broil up* and *brew up* we do not find *roast up* or *braise up,* although these latter two verb-particle combinations are perfectly understandable and acceptable." In the same way, while *dish out, feed out (the line), give out, hand out, lend out, pass out, pay out, pour out, serve out, throw out, toss out* denoting the conveying of something to someone or some place exist, combinations like **grant out, *offer out,* and **show out* do not occur.

From all this it can be concluded that the semantic complexity of phrasal verbs seems to be really perplexing. Sometimes the phrasal verb fits into more than one category of particle meaning, as the meanings may overlap, or one may be the metaphorical extension of the literal meaning, and sometimes it is difficult to say exactly what meaning is contributed by the particle to the phrasal verb. In addition, many phrasal verbs have more than one sense. Often the particle has the same meaning in all these senses, but sometimes it has different meanings.

The above discussion also leads, in accordance with Sinclair (1991:68), to another very important conclusion: the semantics of phrasal verbs, however, is not as arbitrary as it is often held to be.

The discussion so far has been restricted to the syntactic and semantic properties of phrasal verbs. A final point of this paper is to consider their phonological properties.

4 Phonological Properties

The phonological shape of a verb can also determine whether or not it can combine with a particle. Kennedy (1920:56) and Fraser (1976:14) have noted that the majority of verbs occurring with particles are monosyllabic and that the remainder are made up primarily of disyllabic words which are initially stressed. Kennedy found in 988 cases (not all of which are phrasal verbs as defined here) only one trisyllabic case, this being *partition* as in *partition off* and *partition up*. Fraser also mentions *apportion out, separate (out), summarize (up)* and *telephone in,* which I have not found in any up-to-date dictionaries.

Fraser (1976:13) finds that while there are numerous phonologically disyllabic verbs occurring in verb-particle combinations, many of these may be analyzed as phonologically monosyllabic. In particular, these phonologically monosyllabic verbs contain a final syllabic liquid or nasal (l, r, m, or n):

i)   banter (about), batter (around), blister (up), peter (out), simmer (down), wither (away)

ii)   battle (out), bottle (up), buckle (down), diddle (away), parcel (out),

iii) batten (down), blacken (up), frozen (out), fasten (down),

iv)   blossom (out)

Relatively few initially stressed phonologically disyllabic verbs combine with particles. E.g.: *carry (out), auction (off), harness (up), finish (up), follow (up), balance (up)*.

There are some exceptions to the condition that a verb be monosyllabic or disyllabic and initially stressed. E.g.: *divide (up), separate (off)*.

There are also many instances in which a polysyllabic verb (e.g.: *surrender*) already embodies the notion contributed by the particle (e.g.: the *up* in *give up*) and thus the form *surrender up* would be semantically redundant. Moreover, many monosyllabic verbs do not co-occur with particles, either e.g.: *nod, rock, chide, dive, fast*. Thus, it is clear that phonological considerations alone will not determine the conditions for verb-particle combinations.

Interestingly enough, we usually cite phrasal verbs based on the verb element (*give up, give out, give over* etc.). Sinclair (1991:68), however, suggests that if, instead, we group them by particle (*give over, get over, tie over*), it is possible to make sense groupings. The Collins Cobuild Dictionary of Phrasal verbs (1995:448–492) also has a Particles index which is an extensive guide to the way in which particles are used in English phrasal verbs. Although the meanings of phrasal verbs are not always obvious, this Particles index also shows very clearly how phrasal verbs are not just arbitrary combinations of verbs and particles. Instead, they fit into the broad patterns of choice and selection in English. When a new combination occurs, it too fits into these patterns.

5 Conclusions

As the discussion above has shown, phrasal verbs have a syntactic, semantic and phonological complexity. With respect to their syntactic properties, we have almost no basis for specifying which verbs can co-occur with a particle or which cannot. Their semantic properties seem to be even more perplexing, and their phonological properties will not determine the conditions for verb-particle combinations either. Yet these combinations are not always made on a random basis, but from patterns which can to some extent be anticipated. Particles often have particular meanings which they contribute to a variety of combinations, and which are productive. In a number of phrasal verbs the particle functions as an adverb, and it has kept its original spatial meaning, while in others the adverbial particle is said to contribute to the expression of aspect and mode of action ("Aktionsart"). The literal meanings are usually to do

with physical position or direction of movements. In addition, the idiomatic meanings of phrasal verbs are very often the metaphorical extensions of the literal ones. Thus at least the semantics of phrasal verbs is not as arbitrary as it is often held to be.

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Translation as Interpretation

Albert Péter Vermes

While we obviously have an intuitive knowledge of what makes a translation a translation, if we want to be able to provide a systematic and explicit characterisation of the nature of the translation process, it will have to be done, as is claimed, for instance, by Steiner (1975/1992) and Gutt (1991), in terms of a suitable theory of communication. This paper[1] argues in favour of this approach and shows how translation can be explicated within the bounds of relevance theory, along the lines presented in Gutt (1991).

1   Translation as Interpretation: A First Approximation

Today it is commonly accepted that translation is more than just mere manipulation of language or linguistic utterances—it is a form of interlingual or, in a wider sense, intercultural communication. The essential question here is how translation is different from other forms of communication.

One specific characteristic of communication through translation is, of course, that it involves, apart from the original or source communicator, an extra communicator, the translator, who mediates between the source communicator and the target of the translation process, the target audience. In this respect, translating seems similar to the situation where in a noisy place somebody has to render the words of the person standing on his right side to the one standing on the left because under the circumstances they cannot communicate with each other directly, even though they may share a common language. What makes the rendering of the message necessary here is that there is noise in the channel of communication, which blocks the transfer of information between the communicator and the audience.

There are then other situations in which the signal gets through to the audience, who is, moreover, familiar with the code, yet it does not seem to make sense to him. This might happen, for instance, in the case of sophisticated texts on elaborate topics (such as linguistics or communication), where the reader, although familiar with the language, will be

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puzzled at what the language conveys and will ask for the help of some-body who can explain or interpret the text for him.

Translation, however, is different from the above cases in that the interference of a mediator is necessitated not simply because the signal needs to be amplified or because the audience is unable to make sense of it but, first of all, because the signal as such is unintelligible to the audi-ence.

Thus, translation may be seen as a form of communication where the translator, a mediator, interprets the source communicator's message for the target audience, as he is incapable of interpreting it for himself. This can happen for two main reasons. Firstly because the audience may not be able to identify the source signals (problems with the code) and, secondly, because the audience may not possess the necessary back-ground information for making sense of them (problems with the con-text).

Unfortunately, this definition of translation as an interpretive com-municative process is still too wide and imprecise in that it allows for the inclusion within its bounds of phenomena which are not normally thought of as instances of translation, such as hermeneutic interpretation or reading a fairytale to a child. However, it puts into focus the notion of interpretation, which may serve as the starting point of the quest for a more rigorous definition of translation.

2 Interpretation

As explained in Sperber and Wilson (1986), utterance interpretation is an inferential process whereby the audience, on the basis of the context, infers from the stimulus the intended meaning of the communicator. For this to happen, the audience must use the set of contextual assumptions envisaged by the communicator, otherwise the communication may fail. Let us call the situation when this condition is fulfilled a *primary communi-cation situation,* and the second, where the audience uses a more or less different set of contextual assumptions a *secondary communication situation* (Gutt 1991:73).

Translation, of course, often occurs in secondary communication situations. An important question here is whether a given message (set of assumptions intended by the communicator) can be communicated in such a situation and to what extent. A secondary communication situa-tion will often result in a misinterpretation. An observation to this effect

appears in Seleskovich (1977), where she notes that problems in the process of interpretation arise when the translator lacks the necessary knowledge of the world and/or of the *cognitive context* (of the text) which can enable her to work out the *non-verbal sense* of the text on the basis of its *linguistic meaning*. Gutt (1991) lists four kinds of misinterpretations which may arise when a linguistic utterance is interpreted against a context different from the one that was actually intended by the communicator:

- The use of wrong contextual assumptions can lead to the choice of the wrong semantic representation;
- A wrong context may lead to the derivation of a wrong propositional form;
- Wrong contextual assumptions can prevent the identification of a propositional form as an intended explicature or as only a source of implicatures;
- A wrong context can also lead to the derivation of implicatures not intended or, vice versa, to the loss of implicatures actually intended by the communicator (p. 73).

The terms explicature and implicature are meant in the following sense. When an assumption communicated by the utterance is a development of a logical form encoded by the utterance, we call this assumption an *explicature*. This is the case with ordinary assertions, where the propositional form of the utterance is part of the intended interpretation. The situation is different, of course, with figurative or non-assertive utterances: here the propositional form of the utterance is not an explicature because it is not part of the intended interpretation. When an assumption is communicated otherwise, it is called an *implicature* (Sperber and Wilson 1986:182).

According to relevance theory an act of communication can only be successful if it achieves relevance in a given set of contextual assumptions, and relevance is defined in terms of *contextual effects* and *processing effort*. There are three ways in which the contextualisation of new assumptions in a context of old assumptions may achieve some contextual effect: by adding new assumptions to the context in the form of contextual implications, by strengthening some old assumptions or by erasing others. Otherwise, if a contextualisation does not modify the context

(because the new assumptions are found too weak and are consequently erased) or all it does is simply add some new assumptions to it, it will have failed to achieve any contextual effect (Sperber and Wilson 1986:117).

Relevance, then, is clearly context-dependent: a given set of assumptions to be communicated that yields an appropriate number of contextual effects may fail to do so in a different context and thus the communication may break down. Alternatively, it can break down because the effort needed to work out these contextual effects in a *secondary context* may be gratuitously great, leading to a loss of interest in the communication on the part of the audience. As Bell (1991) writes, this is the point, the *threshold of termination,* "where the reader has got enough out of the text and/or feels that, in cost-benefit terms, there is little point in continuing" (p. 213).

It is then a gross oversimplification of matters to say that a given message can always be communicated through translation: it is only possible if the secondary context makes it possible to communicate that message. And this is exactly what Steiner says when he writes "not everything can be translated *now* " (Steiner 1975/1992:262, italics as in original). Some things may defy translation at a given moment but through changes of context and language may become translatable in the future.

Translators, too, have long been (even if only intuitively) aware of this fact. This is manifest in translations which are addressed to an audience essentially different from the original one, for instance when a great classic of American literature like *The Last of the Mohicans* by James Fennimore Cooper was rendered into Hungarian by Ádám Réz in such a way that long politico-historical descriptive passages were eliminated for the obvious reason that the translation was done for children, who would not be interested in these or, rather, would not be prepared to interpret such descriptions, all of which might result in the child reader losing interest and putting the book down. Thus in such a case it may be a wise decision on the part of the translator to leave out these parts, in order to ensure that the communication as a whole would be successful.

In sum, the primary question in translation is not in what way a given message can be communicated in the target language but whether it is communicable at all in the context of the receiving culture, in the given communicative situation, in consistency with the principle of

relevance; all other considerations follow from the answer given to this fundamental question. Thus, as Gutt writes, the translator, first of all, needs to clarify for herself whether the original informative intention is communicable in the given circumstances or it needs to be modified, and only then can she start thinking about the question of exactly how her communicative intention may be formulated (Gutt 1991:180).

3 Translation as Interlingual Interpretive Use

If, as is most often the case, the same informative intention cannot be conveyed in the secondary context, then it will need to be altered in order to make it communicable, while ensuring at the same time that only such changes are effected as absolutely necessary to achieve this purpose. Translation can then be seen as the act of communicating in the secondary context an informative intention that interpretively resembles the original one as closely as possible under the given conditions. This entails that the principle of relevance in translation is manifested as a *presumption of optimal resemblance:* the translation is "(a) presumed to interpretively resemble the original [...] and (b) the resemblance it shows is to be consistent with the presumption of optimal relevance" (Gutt 1991:101). In other words: the translation should resemble the original in such a way that it provides adequate contextual effects and it should be formulated in such a manner that the intended interpretation can be recovered by the audience without undue processing effort.

The following example in (1), taken from Péter Esterházy's *Hrabal könyve* (Magvető Kiadó, Budapest, 1990, p. 10) and its English translation in (2) by Judith Sollosy (Quartet Books, London, 1993, p. 4) will help to elucidate what optimal resemblance means in translation (the italics are mine).

(1) Volt cukrászda, két konkurens kocsma, melyet mindenki a régi nevén hívott, a *Serház* meg a Kondász ...

(2) There was a café of sorts and two rival taverns, which everyone called by their old names, the *Beerhall* and the Kondász ...

The problem here is that the Hungarian word 'ser' is associated with an encyclopaedic assumption to the effect that the expression is old-fashioned, it is not used any longer, and evokes the atmosphere of "the

golden days" of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Since in this part of the book the writer describes the layering upon each other of the past and present, this assumption definitely has some contextual importance here. However, the English word 'beer' does not carry a comparable assumption and this part of the context is thus lost in the translation. On the other hand, it has a near synonym in English, 'ale', which does contain in its encyclopaedic entry the assumption, waking images of the past, that this drink is brewed in the traditional way, without adding hops. Moreover, the related compound 'alehouse' is further loaded with the encyclopaedic assumption that the expression is outdated, old-fashioned, and its use in the translation would thus have resulted in the closest possible interpretive resemblance with the original. Here, in my opinion, the translator committed a mistake: she let part of the context be lost without a good reason, since the preservation of the encyclopaedic assumption in question would not have caused a considerable increase of processing effort and would not therefore have threatened the optimal relevance of the translation. In this case, then, although the target text does fulfil the presumption of optimal relevance, the level of interpretive resemblance could have been made higher. In traditional terms, this might be called an instance of "unjustified translation loss", which in this case means the loss of some implicature, while in other cases an explicature can also be lost in similarly unwarranted ways. On the other hand, it may happen that the preservation of some implicature or explicature will threaten the optimal relevance of the target text; that is, an excessive degree of interpretive resemblance may also count as a—different kind of—translation mistake.

We have arrived at, then, a definition of translation which seems to provide all the necessary conditions to guide the translator:

> They determine in what respects the translation should resemble the original—only in those respects that can be expected to make it adequately relevant to the receptor language audience. They determine also that the translation should be clear and natural in expression in the sense that it should not be unnecessarily difficult to understand (Gutt 1991:102).

These conditions, among other things, seem to explain why it is preferred that the translator translate into her mother tongue (or her

"language of habitual use", as is sometimes allowed). The translator, on the one hand, has to be able to predict what assumptions might be present in the audience's cognitive environment and this is most likely when they share a common culture. And, on the other hand, she has to possess an ease of expression in the target language which is normally possible only in the mother tongue. That is, in most cases the translator will be familiar with the cultural context and also with the language to an extent sufficient to enable her to satisfy the above conditions only in her mother tongue and very rarely in a foreign language.

The above definition also accounts for another interesting problem, namely that although the degree of resemblance between translation and original can always be increased, for some reason it often seems undesirable. We can now explain why this is so: exactly because the increase in resemblance may be accompanied by an increase of processing effort which might outweigh the gains in contextual effects. The two factors, contextual effects and processing effort need to be carefully balanced by the translator, who has to accept the fact that losses in contextual effects are sometimes unavoidable in order to keep the processing effort at a reasonable level, thereby ensuring the overall success of the communication. Relevance, it needs to be kept in mind, is always a joint function of contextual effects and processing effort.

Having accepted a definition of translation as an act of communication aimed at optimal resemblance with the original, it seems in order that I clarify certain points here. First of all, how should we understand the expression "*the translation* optimally resembles *the original*"? The terms "translation" and "original" are certainly not meant here as the translated and the original text (a text, in the narrow sense, is a collection of printed marks) but as the set of assumptions they give rise to in the secondary and the primary contexts, respectively.

Second, what is the specificity of translation (as a form of interpretive language use) compared to monolingual communication? In monolingual communication the communicator communicates (that is, provides evidence, for the audience, for) her own thoughts, whereas a translator communicates (provides evidence for) the assumptions conveyed by the source text, which she has worked out in a different context and language, built on a conceptual system which is likely to be, at least partially, different from that of the secondary context (including the target language). Thus the uniqueness and the difficulty of translation lies

partly in the fact that it involves second-order interpretation and partly in that it may (and most often does) necessitate a shift between conceptual systems.

Third, does this definition enable us to distinguish translation from other forms of interlingual communication, like adaptation, where a certain interpretive relationship between two texts also obtains? In Gutt's (1991) view, every interlingual interpretive act of communication is an act of translation, irrespective of how close is the interpretive relationship between the source and the target text. This relationship may range from complete to non-existent, and since in this continuum there are no natural break-points, the theory does not provide a grasp to distinguish between what counts as translation and what counts as non-translation. Yet, at one point he does allow for the possibility of separating translation from, for instance, paraphrase in such a way that an interpretive act which does not fulfil the promise of optimal relevance may be regarded as paraphrase (Gutt 1991:121). In my opinion, however, this view takes us the wrong way for the following reasons. The relevance of a stimulus is always a function of the context and thus an utterance which is optimally relevant in one context, may not be so in a different context. From this it follows that an interpretive act which is optimally relevant in one context and is thus a translation, may not be optimally relevant in another context and would therefore be an instance of non-translation. I do not think that this would be a desirable turn. Whether a given target text qualifies as translation or not, obviously, cannot depend on if it is optimally relevant but on the intention with which it was produced. The pivotal question, in my view, is whether the secondary communicator intended the target text to be a translation or a paraphrase. This, of course, is a rather trivial statement. The question is how and, most importantly, whether the theory is able to grasp this difference of intentions. I think it is, and the crucial element is contained in the definition. If translation is regarded as a communicative act which, in the secondary context, purports to convey an informative intention that interpretively resembles the original *as closely as possible*, this means that an interpretive act of communication will be a translation only if it is produced with the intention to convey in the secondary context, in consistence with the principle of optimal relevance, those and only those explicatures and implicatures which the original conveyed in the primary context. If the secondary communicator does not have this basic

intention then the target text is not a translation but something else, a summary or an exegesis, for example.

4 Direct and Indirect Translation

A limiting case of translation as interpretive use is when the interpretive resemblance between the translation and the original is purportedly complete: that is, when the translation "purports to allow the recovery of the originally intended interpretation interlingually" (Gutt 1991:163). In a way, this is similar to direct quotations, which may be employed to allow the recovery of the original interpretation intralingually, on condition that they are processed in the original context. Generally speaking, two stimuli may give rise to the same interpretation if and only if they are processed in the same context, because any interpretation is causally dependent on the interplay between stimulus and context.

This kind of *direct translation,* consequently, is only possible if the translation is processed in the original, or primary, context, otherwise the contextual differences will result in differences in contextual effects. Technically, the following definition can be adopted:

> A receptor language utterance is a direct translation of a source language utterance if and only if it purports to interpretively resemble the original completely in the context envisaged for the original (Gutt 1991:163).

Naturally, in interlingual (intercultural) situations it is very rare that the original context should be available in the target culture. It is possible perhaps in circumstances where different language communities have shared the same geographical, political, and economic environment for a long enough time to eliminate major cultural differences but in most cases the secondary communication situation will be substantially different to exclude the possibility of direct translation. This, then, implies that the default case is not direct but *indirect translation,* which covers various grades of interpretive resemblance.

Consider, for an illustration of the exposition above, example 3, taken from an interview with Clint Eastwood by Ginny Dougarry (The Times Magazine, 28 March 1998, p. 19):

(3)   In the early Fifties, during his two-year stint in the US Army,
       he had a casual relationship with a schoolteacher in Carmel.
       When he attempted to end the affair, she turned violent. Did it
       frighten him? "Yeah, it gave me the spooks," he says. "It
       wasn't a homicide—someone trying to kill me. But it was
       someone stalking me and threatening to kill themself."

What is interesting here is the use of the pronominal form
'themself', when the referent is clearly a female person. Naturally, any-
one familiar with the present-day American cultural context will realise
that this is probably the result of a somewhat exaggerated effort to com-
ply with expectations of political correctness. Thus (3) conveys the fol-
lowing implicature:

(4)   Clint is trying to be PC.

Now what could a Hungarian translator do with the last sentence in
(3)? Let us first suppose she assumes that her average Hungarian reader
knows nothing about what PC means in America and she does not con-
sider it possible to introduce this notion within the limits of the given
translation task. In this case, assumption (4) will, most probably, be
completely lost, and the result will be an instance of indirect translation,
since the interpretive resemblance between the original and the transla-
tion is less than complete.
    Let us now suppose that the translator assumes her reader to be
familiar with the concept of PC, that is, she assumes that the translation
operates in the same context as the original does. Then she could try to
look for a solution that will convey assumption (4) in the Hungarian text,
thereby achieving complete interpretive resemblance, in this respect at
least, between (3) and the translation, which can thus be said to be an
instance of direct translation.
    Parenthetically, my guess is that in this particular case the assump-
tion is likely to be lost because the difference concerning pronominal
gender contrast between the two languages would probably make the
preservation of the assumption too effort-consuming and would thus
threaten the optimal relevance of the translation.
    Therefore, it seems that here the translation is doomed to be
somewhat indirect but, regarding that (4) is a relatively weak implicature,

no serious damage occurs—unless, of course, (4) will later be needed as part of the context.

5 Conditions and Corollaries of Direct Translation

The notion of direct translation, however, sheds light on some important points. First of all, complete interpretive resemblance can only be aimed at if the translator herself is capable of performing a thorough interpretation of the original. If this condition is not fulfilled, then the translation cannot even purport to be direct, in the true sense of the term. What this entails is the requirement for the translator to be thoroughly familiar with not only the two languages but also with the two cultures (cultural contexts) in question.

Second, direct translation may serve as a useful means of familiarising the target audience with the source culture by communicating to him the original informative intention. On the other hand, the originally intended interpretation, as we have seen, is only communicable in the original context, which entails that the target audience needs to have, or seek, access to all of this contextual background information. This means that the translator has to look for ways to provide such information and it also points to the fact that direct translation in many cases requires some extra effort on the part of the audience as well, in the hope of gaining a full understanding of the original message. One might see some contradiction in that direct translation presupposes the availability of the original context and that, at the same time, the target reader may be expected to make an effort in accessing this context. I do not, however, see this as a problem. Direct translation presupposes the original context in the sense that complete interpretive resemblance cannot be achieved in a different context and thus the translator, aiming at direct translation, is bound to suppose that the target text will be processed by the reader in the original context. It is a different question whether the target reader is in fact able to access this context (that is, whether it is part of his cognitive environment) and if not, whether he is willing to exert some effort to that effect. For this to happen, the reader needs to be aware of the necessity of this effort, that is, he needs to know that what he is reading is a translation, and a translation which was produced with the aim of reproducing the original informative intention (message) in full.

Then, thirdly, as Gutt (1991) also points out, in such circumstances it is a crucial requirement, in order that the communication does not fail, that the audience be explicitly made aware by the translator of the intended degree of resemblance between the original and the translation in a translator's foreword or otherwise (p. 183). This case, when the target reader is aware of the fact that what he is reading is a translation, Gutt (1991) calls overt translation.

Finally, the translator, as any communicator, has to make sure that her communicative intentions are in accordance with the expectations of the audience. If she thinks that the intended target audience will not be able or willing to exert the extra effort demanded by a direct translation then she will be bound to choose another approach to the given translation task, in order to ensure the success of the communication (Gutt 1991:185).

6 Conclusions

The notion of translation as interpretive language use is based on the view that translation is a form of communication and, as such, can be accounted for in terms of the relevance theory of communication. This implies that the theory of translation is a natural part of the theory of communication and that any translation principle, rule or guideline is an application of the principle of relevance and "all the aspects of translation [...], including matters of evaluation, are explicable in terms of the interaction of context, stimulus and interpretation" through this principle (Gutt 1991:188).

Of course, the importance of the context had already been realised by the communicative-functional approaches to translation as well. Polysystem theory, skopos theory, and the action theory of translation all pointed out that a translation is always the product of a specific context, including various factors such as cultural conventions, the circumstances and expectations of the target reader, or the intended purpose of the translation and thus the content of the translation is effectively determined by these factors. As a consequence, in these theories the source text is relegated, from the status of the absolute measure of evaluation, to that of a mere stimulus or source material and the success of the translation is measured by its functional adequacy in the target context. In this, these approaches can be regarded as the forerunners of relevance theory. What I see as a major advantage of relevance theory is that, con-

trary to them, it actually explicates what adequacy means in a context: a text can be regarded adequate in a context inasmuch as it achieves optimal resemblance in it. In this framework, we could even substantiate the much-debated notion of equivalence, by considering it as the instance of maximal interpretive resemblance of the translation to the original in the secondary communicative context of the translation. This brief and sketchy train of thought was only meant to illustrate that the conceptual apparatus of relevance theory can also be used in the analysis of matters of translation quality with the sort of explicitness which, I think, is not offered by any of the previous theories.

As for the objection to the application of relevance theory to translation, voiced among others by Tirkkonen-Condit (1992), concerning the vagueness of the criteria by which the translator can decide what is relevant in a context, the answer is that, on the one hand, no other theory has ever come close to providing nearly as explicit a definition of what relevance means in communication and, on the other hand, eventually the success of an act of translation, as of all communication, is the responsibility of the translator-communicator—it depends on how well she assesses the cognitive environment of the assumed target reader.

Another critical observation concerning Gutt's theory is that he does not try to link his statements to the notions and categories of earlier, more traditional, theories of translation. Although he does recognise, for instance, the correspondence of the distinction between his direct and indirect translation with the distinction between the traditional categories of literal and free translation, he abstains from using these, in my view, in order not to burden his notions with unnecessary connotations. This, I believe, is not a shortcoming but the natural result of his intention to break away from the descriptive-classificatory approach. Gutt's theory is not a translation theory in the traditional sense but, rather, the application of a general communication theory to translation. As such, it is not in the strict sense part of what we may call the traditional literature on translation since, instead of using concepts worked out specifically for describing translation, it attempts to refine an already existing conceptual apparatus in order to make it more general in scope, enabling it to handle an even wider range of communication phenomena.

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Sociolinguistics: Some Theoretical Considerations[1]

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Sociolinguistics is a term including the aspects of linguistics applied towards the connections between language and society, and the way we use it in different social situations. It ranges from the study of a wide variety of dialects across a given region dow n to the analysis between the way men and women speak to one another. Sociolinguistics often shows us the humorous realities of human speech and how a dialect of a given language can often describe the age, sex, and social class of the speaker; it codes the social function of a language. One of the main factors that has led to the growth of sociolinguistic research has been the recognition of the importance of the fact that language is a very variable phenomenon, and this variability may have as much to do with society as with language. A language is not a simple, single code used in the same manner by all people in all situations, and "linguistics has now arrived at a stage where it is both possible and beneficial to begin to tackle this complexity" (Trudgill 1974:32). Sociolinguistics, then, is the study of social life through linguistics. It is the best single label to represent a very wide range of contemporary research at the intersection of linguistics, sociology, social psychology, anthropology, educat ion and human communication studies. It has become an increasingly important and popular field of study, as certain cultures the world over expand their communication base and intergroup and interpersonal relations take on escalating significance. In the n ormal transfer of information through language, we use language to send vital social messages about who we are, where we come from, and who we associate with. It is often shocking to realize how extensively we may judge a person's background, character, and intentions based simply on the person's language, dialect, or, in some instances, even the choice of words.

Among the main concerns of sociolinguistics one can mention the following ones:

- How do individuals and social groups define themselves in and through language?
- How are forms of speech and patterns of communication distributed across time and space?
- How do communities differ in their "ways of speaking"?
- What are typical patterns in multilingual people's use of language?
- How is language involved in social conflicts and tensions?
- Why do men and women talk differently?
- Is there a sociolinguistic theory of language use?
- What are the most efficient, and defensible, ways of collecting language data?
- What are the implications of both qualitative and quantitative methods of sociolinguistic research (see, e.g. Coupland and Jaworski 1997)?

Two trends have characterized the development of sociolinguistics over the past several decades. First, the rise of particular specializations within this field has coincided with the emergence of more broadly based social and political issues. Thus, the focus on themes such as language and ethnicity, and language and gender has corresponded with the rise of related issues in society at large. Second, scholars who study the role of language and society have become more and more interested in applying the results of their investigations to the broadly based social, educational, cultural, and probably gave rise to their emergence as sociolinguistic topics to begin with. As a result, sociolinguistics offers a unique opportunity to bring together theory, description, and application in the study of language.

The basic notion underlying sociolinguistics is quite simple: language use symbolically represents fundamental dimensions of social behaviour and human interaction. The notion itself is simple, but the ways in which language reflects behaviour can often be complex and subtle. Furthermore, the relationship between language and society affects a wide range of encounters—from broadly based international relations to narrowly defined interpersonal relationships. In considering language as a social institution, sociolinguists use sociological techniques involving data from questionnaires and summary statistical data, along with information from

direct observation. The study of language in its social context tells us a lot about how we organize our social relationships within a particular community. For instance, addressing a person as *"Mrs.", "Ms.",* or by a first name is not about simple vocabulary choice, but about the relationship and social position of the speaker and addressee. Similarly, the use of sentence alternatives such as *Just shut up and get on with your work! Will you, please, stop talking and get on with your work? You'd better get on with your work instead of talking* is not a matter of simple sentence structure. But the choice involves cultural values and norms of politeness, deference, and status. In approaching language as a social activity, it is possible to study the specific patterns or social rules for conducting conversation and discourse. One can describe the rules and peculiarities for both opening and closing a conversation, the proper cases of taking conversational turns, or the ways of telling stories, jokes, etc.

In modern sociolinguistics it is also very important to examine how people manage their language in relation to both their cultural backgrounds and their purposes of interaction. In this respect such problems as how mixed-gender conversations differ from the single-gender ones, how different power relations manifest themselves in language forms, how the children are taught the ways in which language should be used, or how language change occurs and spreads to communities, and, of course, many other questions are of primary importance. In order to solve these problems related to language as social activity, it is advisable to use ethnographic methods. One can attempt to gain an understanding of the values and viewpoints of a community to explain the behaviours and attitudes of its members. All the above mentioned theoretical issues need further investigations, and they are much more complicated than they at first appear. The possible solutions may differ from culture to culture, interacting with many other social characteristics of speakers such as social class, age, sex, context, etc. to varying extents. All the topics of sociolinguistics are not simply linguistic but social ones. As such, any remedy will require changes in both society and language.

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